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ABSTRACT 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and related stock listing requirements now require boards of 
publicly traded companies to have a majority of outside, independent directors to provide a 
counterbalance to the power of management on the board.  SOX also mandated the existence 
of three board committees, audit, nominating, and compensation which had to be comprised 
solely of independent directors.    
Using a sample of 335 firms and 3,675 observations from the S&P 500 from 1999 to 2009, I 
use panel Poisson regressions in pre-SOX (1999-2003) and post-SOX (2004-2009) periods 
to test the effect of SOX structural changes at the board and committee levels on governance 
practices as measured by the Entrenchment Index.  I first consider the direct relationships, 
suggesting positive relationships between the mandated requirements of board 
independence, the presence of audit, nominating and compensation committees, and the 
independence of these committees on selected governance practices at the board level in the 
pre- and post-SOX periods.  In the pre-SOX period I find significant relationships between 
board independence and management entrenchment as well as significant relationships 
between the existence of audit, nominating, and compensation committees and management 
entrenchment.  I find no significant relationships in the post-SOX period.   
I then create a new construct, board independence power (comprised of dimensions of 
structure/prestige, ownership and expertise) to measure the latent power of the independent 
members of the board. I validate the construct quantitatively through a factor analysis and 
interviews with board members and lawyers specializing in corporate governance.  
I hypothesize that board independence power positively moderates the relationship between 
the SOX structural changes and selected governance practices at the board level.   In the pre 
and post-SOX periods, board independence structure/prestige power significantly moderates 
the relationship between the existence of the mandated committees and selected governance 
practices supporting shareholder value when they are lagged for one and two time periods.     
Results of this study demonstrate that the SOX structural changes by themselves have not 
led to governance practices associated with shareholder value.  This is important given the 
organizational attention, energy and cost necessary to fulfill the SOX requirements.         
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
“Sarbanes-Oxley is perhaps the most sweeping change in corporate governance since the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was founded.”  (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & 
Cannella, 2009: 230) 
1.1  Introduction           
The year 2012 marked the 10th anniversary of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
in the United States.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) served as an institutional  response to 
the escalation of corporate scandals such as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom which were viewed 
as a serious breach in corporate governance standards (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 
2010; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005).  SOX and the new listing requirements for publicly traded 
companies governed by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ were 
designed to augment transparency and increase accountability of both management and 
boards of directors by introducing stringent and legally required corporate governance rules.  
I refer to SOX and related listing changes on the major exchanges collectively as SOX for 
brevity (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2009). 
One of the main goals of SOX was to enhance corporate governance by shifting the balance 
of organizational control from management to owners, represented through the independent 
representatives on boards of directors.  To do so, SOX legally mandated a number of 
structural governance changes including requirements for the board to consist of a majority 
of independent directors, the presence of audit, nominating and compensation committees, 
and the need for these three committees to be comprised solely of independent directors.  
SOX also required changes in internal control processes, significantly augmenting previous 
reporting requirements.  As a result, SOX occasioned significant investments of both 
organizational time and resources with its impact on investors estimated at $1.4 trillion 
(Langevoort, 2007).  Critics have suggested that SOX is an overreaction to a few bad 
corporate citizens (Aubert & Grudnitski, 2014), a quick cure for an overblown problem 
(Romano, 2005) or at best, misguided (Carver, 2010).    
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This study explored whether the extensive SOX governance changes in board structure 
actually changed governance practices at the board level. First, I present the theoretical 
foundations of corporate governance research, focusing on the theories that are most 
relevant to the concepts being developed in this study.  Given the focus of the study on the 
monitoring role of the board, agency theory is an appropriate perspective to adopt, while 
recognizing the limitations of its scope outside this focus (Davis, 2005; Lynall, Golden, & 
Hillman, 2003).    
Next, I present board conditions in the pre-SOX period exploring the relationship between 
management and the board.  I discuss the absence of legal requirements for board and 
committee structures (Baysinger & Butler, 1985) and suggest that it is important to 
determine the level of board independence, the existence of key board committees (audit, 
compensation and nominating) and the membership of these key board committees during 
this timeframe. The analysis determined the presence of the CEO and the affiliated directors 
on the aforementioned committees.  This exploration was important as it demonstrated the 
level of board independence prior to the governance changes brought about through SOX 
which assisted in quantifying any shift that took place post-SOX.   I then detail governance 
changes at the board and board committee levels that were mandated in 2002 as a result of 
the passage of SOX and in 2003 as a result of related listing changes to major financial 
exchanges and hypothesize how they may have shifted board dynamics in ways that are 
reflected in stronger board practices related to governance that are designed to uphold 
shareholders (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009). 
However, there are other influences on corporate governance decisions beyond the SOX 
structural changes.  I further hypothesize the moderating impact of ‘board independence 
power’ on the relationship between the SOX structural changes and corporate governance 
practices, suggesting board independence power positively moderates the relationship 
between the SOX structural changes and governance practices in that under higher levels of 
board independence power, there is a significantly stronger positive relationship between 
SOX structural changes and selected governance practices at the board level hat support 
shareholder value.  While the concept of board power has been presented in academic 
research (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Horner, 2009; Tang, Crossan, & Rowe, 2011; 
 3  
Westphal & Zajac, 1995), it has only been partially developed theoretically and has been 
subject to very little empirical testing.  In addition, board power as a construct may be too 
broad.  By definition, the board has both inside and outside directors; therefore, board power 
conceptually would include items related to management.  This does not provide a pure 
differentiation of the power held by independent, outside directors.  This study suggests that 
it is more accurate to use a subset of board power, namely board independence power, in the 
consideration of the potential influence of the independent members of the board.  The board 
independence power construct is theoretically developed and validated before it is used as a 
moderator in the SOX structural changes to corporate governance practices relationship.   
My goal is to identify, through hypotheses testing, which of the SOX changes encourage 
corporate governance practices that support shareholder value and which actually increase 
the likelihood of management entrenchment.  In all cases, I tested the relationship between 
the SOX structural changes and corporate governance practices as moderated by board 
independence power.  The presence of management on boards continues to be a strong 
influence on board decisions (Albuquerque & Miao, 2006; Chikh & Filbien, 2011; 
Finkelstein, 1992; Haynes & Hillman, 2010); therefore, it was important to control for 
ongoing management influences as reflected through the CEO of the organization.  I 
performed the analysis on a sample of approximately 335 firms from the S&P 500 from 
1999 to 2009, deconstructing it into the pre-SOX timeframe (1999 to 2003) and the post-
SOX timeframe (2004 to 2009).  A conceptual model for the entire framework is provided in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  Proposed Theoretical Model 
 
SOX Structural Changes 
Board Independence Power  (Theorized) 
Selected governance practices supporting shareholder value 
 + 
Board Independence (H1) 
Presence of  Audit, Nominating and Compensation Committees (H2) 
Committee Independence (H3) 
(H4) 
Structure (H5) 
Ownership (H6) 
Expertise (H7) 
Prestige (H8) 
(H9) 
 + 
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1.2  Level of Analysis 
Given the complexity and multi-phased nature of this study, there was not a single level of 
analysis in this research.  The primary focus was at the board and board committee levels.  
Additional elements of this study moved the analysis up to the firm level and linked it to 
organizational practices.  The analysis looked at changes within firms; it did not compare 
differences between companies.   
1.3  Corporate Governance 
Given the ongoing role of boards of directors in public, private and not-for-profit 
organizations, there is a robust research stream in the field of corporate governance 
(Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009).  Chapter 2 of this study presents the predominant theoretical 
approaches and models that have been used to consider corporate governance in the 
management literature. These approaches have largely considered the internal and external 
roles of boards:  monitoring; resource- provision; and, advice-giving.  Given that SOX was a 
response to real or perceived destructive breaches in appropriate management behaviour, I 
focus exclusively on the monitoring role of the board which Barney (2006) suggests is the 
board’s primary responsibility. From a monitoring perspective, corporate governance 
research has primarily used an agency theory lens to explore the principal-agent relationship 
(Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) with the principal as the board and the 
agent as management.    
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 fundamentally changed the 
application of corporate governance both in terms of board process and board structure.  
Prior to SOX, there were a number of reports from organizations such as the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) advocating for greater board and committee independence.  
Research considering the time period leading up to the SOX changes suggests that major 
public U.S. companies already had independent boards or were moving in that direction 
(Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008; Valenti, 2008).  This was done voluntarily; public 
corporations were legally required to have boards but there were few if any conditions 
around their size or composition (Lutzy, 2003; NYSE, 2013).  SOX and the new listing 
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requirements for publicly traded companies governed by major North American stock 
exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ were designed 
to increase accountability of boards through new corporate governance rules that dictated a 
number of structural conditions for boards and board substructures.  This study only 
focussed on the structural changes required of boards as a result of SOX and the listing 
changes which are considered in tandem.   
SOX mandated board structure in three key ways.  First, it required boards to have a 
majority of outside directors; this theoretically changed the balance of power between inside 
and outside directors, strengthening the independence of the board to better monitor 
management behaviour. Second, SOX externally mandated the existence of three 
committees:  audit; compensation; and, nominating.  While boards often had one or all of 
these committees, SOX cemented their importance through legally requiring their existence 
for publicly-traded firms.  Prior to SOX, the NYSE only required the presence of an audit 
committee (NYSE, 1977).  Third, SOX legislated that only outside directors were eligible to 
sit on the audit, compensation and nominating committees, reducing the influence of 
management directors on critical evaluation criteria (Brick & Chidambaran, 2008).  While 
audit committees were often fully independent (NYSE, 2013), the addition of nominating 
and compensation committees was telling in that there now was the potential for a reduction 
in management influence around board nominees and rewards and/or penalties for 
management performance.  In 2010, this trend around committee independence continued in 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act which reiterated the 
requirement of members of the compensation committee to be independent members of the 
board as per the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United 
States.    
1.4  New Board Dynamics  
Chapter 3 of this study details board and committee structures pre and post-SOX, 
highlighting the differences in these time periods.  While much of the historic board research 
has focussed on the inside/outside director dichotomy (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Gordon, 
2007), SOX has shifted the debate somewhat as committee members on the three main 
committees are now legally required to be outside directors.  From this perspective, direct 
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CEO or management influence is conceptually no longer an issue as insiders are not able to 
serve on these committees.  This is a potentially large shift in dynamics of board committees 
and their role in important decisions such as CEO succession and compensation, as well as 
new board membership.  In addition, there has been limited research that holistically 
considers the structural changes from pre to post-SOX at the full board and the committee 
level (Linck et al., 2009).  Chapter 3 puts forward hypotheses suggesting a positive, causal 
relationship between the three structural SOX changes and board governance practices that 
guard shareholder value.  Each of the SOX structural changes is considered individually as 
well as holistically in their relationship to corporate governance practices.  Board 
governance practices are considered through the lens of specific board actions that either 
protect or reduce shareholder value as measured through the Entrenchment Index (E-Index) 
constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). The E-Index has been used extensively 
in corporate governance research as a measure of governance that supports shareholder 
value (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014; Bebchuk, 2012; Straska & Waller, 2014).  The index 
contains six measures (staggered boards, golden parachutes, bylaw amendment provisions, 
charter amendment provisions, poison pills, and supermajority requirements for mergers) 
associated with management entrenchment and anti-takeover provisions. Extensive 
governance research has suggested board governance practices are positive when they 
protect shareholder value (low E-Index), and negative when they entrench management 
control (high E-Index).1   
Chapter 4 presents the concept of board independence power, suggesting it positively 
moderates the relationship between the SOX structural changes and governance practices in 
that under higher levels of board independence power, there is a significantly stronger 
positive relationship between SOX structural changes and selected governance practices at 
the board level that protect shareholder value. I first theoretically develop the board 
independence power construct, broadly following the theoretical and empirical process of 
Finkelstein (1992) in his conceptualization of the dimensions of top managers’ power.   I 
                                                 
1 A list of the over 300 studies that use the E-Index as a measure of management entrenchment can be found on the website of Dr. Lucien Bebchuk at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/studies.shtml .  
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define a dimension as “a conceptual term used to describe a distinct facet of a construct that 
is conceptualized as having heterogeneous facets” (Podsakoff, Shen, & Podsakoff, 2006: 
202).  I a priori consider board independence power with the same constituent dimensions 
of structure, ownership, expertise, and prestige, developing each one individually with its 
own measures.  I then discuss how they work together to form the theoretical phenomenon 
of interest, board independence power.  The construct of board independence power will be 
subject to empirical testing as described in Chapter 5.    
Ultimately, the extensive changes in corporate governance instituted by SOX are only as 
useful as evidenced in their impact on board governance practices and firm competitiveness.  
Conceptually, the new SOX provisions have created more independent boards at both the 
board and board substructure levels; one would anticipate that this would translate into 
board decisions that strengthen corporate governance provisions. In practice, this 
independence may have already existed prior to the legislated changes.  If this were the case, 
one would expect to see positive trends toward selected governance practices at the board 
level start prior to SOX changes.  Given the significant attention associated with the creation 
and implementation of SOX from both an institutional and organizational perspective, I 
consider in Chapter 4 whether there are structural, ownership, expertise, and prestige 
elements of board independence power, both individually and together, that may enhance 
the SOX structural requirements and result in selected governance practices at the board 
level that protect shareholder value.       
1.5  Data and Methodology  
My sample was taken from the S&P 500 for firms that were included in the S&P 500 Index 
for a majority of years (rather than all of the years) from 1999 to 2009.  I removed firms 
from the financial services industry given the challenge of developing and interpreting 
financial metrics in regulated industries (Liu & Jiraporn, 2010; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Reeb 
& Upadhyay, 2010).  This resulted in a sample of 335 firms and 3,675 observations.2  Based 
                                                 2 This study uses firms that were in existence for the majority of the years in both the pre and post-SOX timeframes, not all of the years.  That is why the total number of observations is less than 3,685 (335x11 years). 
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on the hypotheses being tested, a few of the variables included data beyond the 1999-2009 
parameters, namely 1998 (past performance) to 2011 (corporate governance practices).  This 
allowed for the testing of lagged relationships.  The quantitative testing of the hypotheses 
used secondary, archival data primarily from the Bloomberg, Compustat, BoardEx, and 
RiskMetrics databases and SEC filings for the dependent, independent, and control 
variables.  I also use data from Yahoo! Finance, the LexisNexis volumes of Corporate 
Affiliations for public companies and data that have been made publicly available by Lucian 
Bebchuk.3   
The methodology I employ is a two-step process. I first use this data to develop the board 
independence power construct, using an exploratory factor analysis to determine the 
relationship within and between the theoretically proposed board independence power 
dimensions of structure, ownership, expertise, and prestige. After the analysis, I determine 
that the board independence power construct was comprised of dimensions of 
structure/prestige, ownership, and expertise. I use additional statistical tests to ensure 
construct validity.  I also conduct first-person interviews with seven independent board 
members of American listed companies and two lawyers specializing in corporate 
governance in order to establish face validity for the new board independence power 
construct.   
Once the board independence power construct was developed, I finalize a custom-created 
panel (longitudinal) dataset covering 1999 to 2009 that was divided into pre-SOX (1999-
2003) and post-SOX (2004-2009) panels for analysis.  I select 2003 as an end-date for the 
pre-SOX analysis as firms were legally required to be in compliance with SOX by 2004 
(Warren, Zey, Granston, & Roy, 2011) and changes to the major North American stock 
exchanges regarding committee membership were not established until 2003.  I use 2009 as 
the end date for the post-SOX analysis to allow for the testing of time effects in the 
dependent variable.  The corporate governance practices dependent variable is an aggregated 
count variable so I employ panel Poisson regression models.   
                                                 3 Dr. Lucian Bebchuk provides historic data (1996 – 2006) on his website for the entrenchment index he and his colleague constructed that measures governance provisions associated with management entrenchment. The data are available at:  http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml  
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1.6  Results 
The results of this study do not suggest that the structural changes mandated through SOX 
have had a positive impact on the governance of boards.  The main effects of board 
independence and the presence of the three mandated committees were significant in the 
pre-SOX period, but in a way that increased the likelihood of governance practices that 
reflect management entrenchment.  They were not significant in the post-SOX timeframe. 
Therefore, it is difficult to claim the mandated structural changes under SOX had any impact 
on selected governance provisions of the board.  The study did find that some components 
of board independence power moderated the relationship between the presence of the audit, 
nominating and compensation committees and selected governance practices that protect 
shareholder value such that it dampened the negative relationship found between the 
presence of the three mandated committees and selected governance decisions supporting 
shareholder value.  This relationship was seen both in the pre and post-SOX timeframes but 
only at time “t” and “t+1”.  Given this finding, additional research should be undertaken to 
better understand the moderating power of independent members of boards. 
1.7  Contribution to Theory and Practice 
This study aims to contribute to theory in a number of ways.  It uses agency theory to extend 
the conceptualization of principal-agent relations in a way that recognizes the shifting 
governance framework as brought forward through SOX.  This is done through the 
consideration of the monitoring role of the board in the context of SOX, suggesting SOX 
provisions and elements of the board may be acting to create a power-foil to the traditional 
CEO power base.    
There are also significant practical implications that may result from this research.  The 
creation of the board independence power construct may assist in identifying board 
attributes and behaviours that are more directly linked to stronger corporate governance 
practices; the insistence by shareholders on the adoption of similar attributes may further 
strengthen governance practices by boards.  Given that there are no significant results 
demonstrated in the post-SOX era for the relationship between the SOX structural changes 
and governance decisions that protect shareholder value, it sends a strong signal to 
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regulators in North America and abroad that the time and energy spent by corporations and 
governments to implement these sweeping changes perhaps are only superficial and 
symbolic signals with no tangible link to an improvement in governance practices, the 
fundamental goal of SOX.   
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2.  THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
GOVERNANCE REFORM 
2.1  Introduction 
While there is no single, unifying theory of corporate governance that has become accepted 
in the field (Carver, 2010), there are a number of theories that are dominant in the research.  
These main theories have included agency (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), resource dependence (Boyd, 1990; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), stewardship (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991), managerial power (Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Cianci, Fernando, & 
Werner, 2011; Finkelstein, 1992), power circulation (Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, & 
Donahue, 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002), social 
network (2008; Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, & Labianca, 2009; Granovetter, 1973; Knoke & 
Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1995; Westphal & Zajac, 1998) and institutional 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008).  As individual theories and in combination with 
each other (Combs et al., 2007; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Jackling & Johl, 2009; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), they have considered a wide spectrum of board 
characteristics and qualities from structural, financial, power, and sociological perspectives.   
This study will offer hypotheses grounded in the board role of monitoring as theoretically 
developed in agency theory (Bathala & Rao, 1995; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980).  In 
this section, I first provide the definition of corporate governance upon which the study is 
based.  I then present an overview of corporate governance theories and models, while 
focussing on agency theory.  Finally, I detail how the negative and extremely public 
breaches in corporate governance practices resulted in SOX changes that attempted to 
strengthen the monitoring oversight of boards in the agency relationship.   
2.2  Corporate Governance Theories 
There is no uniform definition of corporate governance (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 
2010); however, there have been a number that have been offered in the corporate 
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governance literature.  One of the clearest definitions was put forward in the Cadbury 
Report, a comprehensive study of corporate governance practices in the United Kingdom 
published in December, 1992. The Cadbury Report was the work of the ‘The Committee on 
the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance’ which had been established by the 
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accounting profession in 
England and was chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, the Chairman of Cadbury and Cadbury 
Schweppes.  The Report defined corporate governance as, “the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled” (1992: 15).  This definition is broad and incorporates the 
heterogeneity of corporate governance approaches.  Given the regulatory frame used for this 
study, I use a conceptualization of corporate governance that considers it to be “the whole 
set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determined what publicly traded 
corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks and 
returns from the activities they undertake are allocated” (Blair, 1995: 3).  This study also 
encompasses the definition offered by Filatotchev and Boyd (2009: 257) who “consider 
corporate governance to be a structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties with a 
stake in the firm”.  
The governance of a modern corporation is becoming an increasingly complex task.  
Corporate governance explores the mechanisms through which shareholders are able to 
determine and administer a corporation’s strategies, including those to control management 
behaviour.  Shareholders accomplish this goal largely through their elected intermediary, the 
board of directors, although boards are but one governance mechanism.  The Cadbury 
Report (1992: 15) provides a description of the role of boards of directors: 
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) bifurcated the responsibilities of the board and that of management 
with regards to decision-making, suggesting that the management of a firm is responsible for 
strategy creation and implementation, while the board is responsible for ratifying the 
 14  
strategy and monitoring (and rewarding/punishing) the performance of management.   This 
study focuses solely on the monitoring function of the board.   
Members of boards of directors are elected by shareholders with the expectation that board 
members will ensure that managers act in the best interests of the corporation (Clarke, 
2007).  Higher external uncertainty and rapidly shifting environments have resulted in 
greater expectations from stockholders of a board’s ability to manage more complicated and 
numerous information flows (Ruigrok, Peck, & Keller, 2006).  At its core, the board’s job is 
to ensure that management does not pursue its own self-interest to the detriment of the 
corporation’s interests.  The best interests of the corporation have been interpreted by the 
legal system in the United States and organizations such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to be the best interests of shareholders, namely an obligation to maximize 
profits (Jamieson, 1994).  In Canada, that perspective may be shifting as a result of decisions 
by the Canadian legal system that obligates companies to consider other financial interests 
(e.g. bondholders).  Over time, this approach may widen further to incorporate the interests 
of the broader community.    
The governance approach of the organization has an impact on the operation of the firm.  
Corporate governance research broadly suggests four approaches: shareholder primacy; 
stakeholder primacy; director primacy; and managerialism (Lan & Heracleous, 2010).  I 
now present a brief summary of each of these models as a way of illustrating that corporate 
governance is not homogeneous; the approach adopted for analysis is dependent upon the 
framework one adopts as dominant.  
The shareholder primacy model posits that shareholders are the main residual claimants of 
the firm’s income stream and thus have ultimate power and control over the corporation.  
Management’s sole purpose is to maximize shareholders’ wealth and should only engage in 
activities that are of benefit to shareholders.  Boards are agents of shareholders and are there 
to make sure professional managers do not exploit resources to the detriment of 
shareholders.  Management in this model are ego-centric and will try to maximize their own 
self-interests rather than shareholders; thus the shareholder primacy model is directly 
aligned with agency theory which is outlined in more detail below.   
 15  
In the stakeholder model, nonshareholder parties have an interest in the corporation and are 
considered to be as important as shareholders.  From a governance perspective, boards and 
management take into account the diverse interests of those that affect and are affected by 
the corporation and its operations.  Stewardship theory is aligned with this approach (Davis 
et al., 1997; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1994).   
The director primacy model has the board as the primary actor.  Boards are independent 
decision makers who are active participants in deciding the strategy and direction of their 
organization (Golden & Zajac, 2001).  Directors make the key strategic decisions; 
management is just one of the corporate participants who contribute to the production of the 
firm and its outputs for which it receives part of the surplus.  This view is supported in a 
limited way by other management theories including resource dependence theory (RDT).   
RDT suggests that a firm’s survival is dependent on its ability to gain access to and control 
of external resources, aided through linkages to other organizations through board interlocks 
(Boyd, 1990; Davis, 1996).     
Finally, managerialism, or management control, suggests that rational, self-disciplined 
individuals are hired to run the organization.  They have control of the organization and a lot 
of discretion on decisions.  Shareholders are passive and uninformed, and the board just 
rubber stamps the decisions of management (Boyd, 1990; Herman, 1981; Koenig, Gogel, & 
Sonquist, 1979).  Within this view, board interlocks are unimportant because boards have no 
influence on the operation of the firm.  Drucker (1981: 108) characterized the power of 
boards within this view as “an impotent ceremonial and legal fiction.  It certainly does not 
‘conduct the affairs of the enterprise’”.  This view of boards as largely irrelevant and 
ineffective from a governance and monitoring perspective has also been somewhat 
supported through empirical testing (Bayly, 1986).   
Organizations that adopt a shareholder primacy model and managerial model have the 
opportunity for large agency issues, but for different reasons.  In the shareholder primacy 
model there is a high level of information asymmetry between shareholders and the 
managers who run the organization.  Managers exploit this asymmetry to either focus on 
their own goals or to disguise management ineffectiveness that has prevented the 
achievement of stakeholder designated goals; in either scenario the principals (board) have 
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difficulty in effectively monitoring this behaviour due to a lack of or access to the 
appropriate information.  In the managerial perspective, due to the irrelevance of the board, 
managers have the power in the organization and are left to their own devices to achieve the 
goals that the managers have prioritized.  As they have little accountability, managers can 
take strategic decisions that inflate organizational responsibility or power (e.g. unnecessary 
acquisitions to inflate firm size leading to higher CEO compensation  (Boyd, 1994)) or 
undertake organizationally deviant behaviour such as pay and promotion discrimination or 
abuses of executive perquisites.  This type of activity may be contrary to the best interest of 
the shareholder as it takes away from organizational returns.   
It is important to understand that corporate governance research has been positioned in 
different ways depending on the organizational context, theoretical consideration or the 
position of the organization within its evolutionary lifecycle (Lynall et al., 2003).  In 
addition, researchers have assessed the effectiveness of existing governance mechanisms 
and control systems (Jensen, 1993; Romano, 1993) and considered the elements judged to be 
responsible for their success or failure (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  I consider these two areas 
to be beyond the scope of this study as I focus on the structural elements of the board which 
engenders an examination of board composition and attributes.  The choice of theoretical 
frame can be based on the specific role of the board under consideration, namely its 
monitoring and control, advice-giving (service) or resource-provision functions (Daily & 
Dalton, 1993; Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  As this study considers the impact of SOX which was brought 
forward to address breaches in monitoring and control by boards, I put forward agency 
theory as a theoretical frame for this study.  I now provide the tenets of agency theory in this 
governance context.   
2.2.1  Agency Theory 
Agency theory considers corporate governance from a fiduciary perspective (Boyd, Haynes, 
& Zona, 2011; Brennan & Solomon, 2008), focusing on the conflicting priorities of 
principals (boards as representatives of the owners) and agents (management) (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   It is based on the recognition of an 
incentive problem between a principal and an agent (Dow & Raposo, 2005) and focuses on 
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the causes and consequences of differences in goals between the two parties (Boyd, 1994).    
A board of directors, elected by shareholders in publicly traded companies, is put in place to 
monitor, evaluate, and reward or punish the behaviour of management in order to align 
management activity and priorities with the goals of shareholders.  The agency problem is 
created as a result of corporate governance structures where the board, on behalf of 
shareholders hires an agent such as a CEO or President to be responsible for the operation of 
the organization (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Shareholders want the CEO’s focus to be on activities that maximize shareholder value.  
Barney commented (1996: 397): 
If stockholders are interested in maximizing the rate of return on their investment in a firm and if managers make their investment decisions with the objective of maximizing the rate of return on those investments, then stockholders will have few concerns about delegating the day-to-day management of their investments to managers.  Unfortunately, in numerous situations the interests of a firm’s outside stockholders and its managers do not coincide. 
Agency issues arise when the activities preferred by stockholders are not as attractive to the 
CEO as other actions the CEO can take that provide them with greater personal rewards at a 
tolerable risk threshold (Eisenhardt, 1989).  As suggested by Hoskisson and Hitt (1994: 42-
43) “managers in pursuit of their own best interests may select strategic alternatives different 
from those they would have chosen had they pursued exclusively the interests of 
shareholders”.  It is the role of the board to monitor, catch and prevent such behaviour.  
However, managerial actions are not perfectly observable by the board and it is unclear what 
actions the CEO can or will take to increase the value of the firm; no contract can be 
constructed that takes all possible contingencies into account.  Compensation policies 
therefore attempt to tie the CEO’s reward structure to the attainment of shareholder wealth.  
As noted by Jensen and Murphy (1990: 226), while shareholder wealth is related to many 
factors outside of the actions of the CEO, it is appropriate to compensate CEOs “on the basis 
of shareholder wealth since that is the objective of shareholders”.  This is accomplished by 
ensuring that some element of the CEO or top management team’s pay is variable based on 
the success of the organization, often through shares or options.   
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The traditional consideration of agency theory does not suggest that the ideal board 
configuration would be one of a purely independent board (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Indeed, this view advocates for the presence of the CEO as well as a 
few other inside directors on the board.  Outside directors do not have access to the same 
information as inside directors; therefore, inside directors provide a depth of information 
that is helpful to outside directors as they guide the strategic positioning and future direction 
of the company.  Further, the presence of inside directors in addition to the CEO provides a 
level of control where otherwise the CEO would be the only management input of 
information to the board.  This is only effective where non-CEO inside directors are neither 
intimidated by the CEO nor fearful of ramifications when they provide information or 
counsel that is either in opposition to or not sanctioned by the CEO.  Inside directors 
(excluding the CEO) could be protected by placing more hiring and compensation decisions 
for the top management team exclusively under the purview of the full board or independent 
compensation committees.  However, CEOs often wield a strong influence on a board even 
in the presence of strong independent directors making it risky for the other inside directors 
to also provide an independent, information-provision role to assist the outside directors.  In 
addition, the higher the number of inside directors on the board the higher the potential 
agency cost associated with the monitoring (Baysinger & Butler, 1985).   
While it is outside the theoretical scope of this study, it is worth noting that power 
circulation theory provides similar conceptual support for the presence of a few senior, 
inside directors on the board.  Power circulation theory suggests that because non-CEO 
inside directors seek to attain the highest levels they can in an organization, including the 
CEO position, they actively monitor CEO behaviour and in so doing, serve as a power foil 
to the CEO. As a result, there is an ongoing power struggle between the CEO and their 
senior team which causes the CEO, especially weak CEOs to temper their behaviour to be 
aligned to shareholder wishes so that they are not replaced by one of their peers (Ocasio, 
1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002).  Governance research has combined power circulation 
theory and agency theory suggesting that the most appropriate inside-outside board 
configuration for monitoring CEO behaviour is dependent on the relative power of the CEO 
with powerful CEOs requiring an outsider-dominated board while the tension and 
competition between inside directors and the CEO is enough to keep weak CEOs in check 
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(Combs et al., 2007).  However, the introduction of SOX structural provisions may have 
been deemed necessary to signal to the business community a need to create a more pure 
distinction between principal and agent from a monitoring perspective, even if traditional 
agency theory and power circulation theory suggest that inside directors could provide a 
similar monitoring function.  In addition, power circulation theory has only been 
traditionally applied to the consideration of the insider elements of the board due to the 
hierarchies inherent in the top-management team dynamic.   Given that the focus of this 
study is the power of outside, independent directors, it is not theoretically relevant to also 
include power circulation theory in this model.  It would also be difficult to extend power 
circulation theory to outside, independent directors, as they do not have a tiered structure 
similar to that of top management teams.      
Critics of agency theory put forward that it is too narrow (Ahrens, Filatotchev, & Thomsen, 
2011) and based on an assumption of opportunistic behaviour on the part of managers 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991) when that may not be their internal motivation.  Managers may 
be motivated by non-financial items, such as job satisfaction or pleasure at seeing the 
organization succeed.  The classic financial reward structure would not address the agency 
issue in these scenarios, nor would an agency issue even necessarily exist.  Other researchers 
have suggested that agency theory, by itself, is limited (Finkelstein et al., 2009) and should 
be considered with other complementary theories for a holistic picture of the role of boards, 
including stakeholder, stewardship, resource dependence, institutional, and social networks 
(Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Christopher, 2010; Granovetter, 1983; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Judge, 2009; Lynall et al., 2003; Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 
2005).   However, the use of agency theory to explore the research question put forward in 
this study is relevant to the context of breaches in corporate governance practices through 
self-interested, often illegal behaviour by management that is either not caught through 
monitoring by the board or not halted by the board.  Therefore, while alternate perspectives 
and sociological drivers of management behaviour may be valid, the context put forward in 
this study is most appropriately considered within the classic principal-agent tension as the 
desire to augment the traditional monitoring and control function of the board was the 
motivation for SOX.   
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There are also differences between the agency theory role of the board as representatives of 
principals (shareholders) and legal requirements of the board as determined by corporate 
law.  The presence of a shareholder elected board is a legal requirement for publicly-traded 
firms in North America; however, in the pre-SOX era there were no requirements for board 
composition, the presence of specific committees or the roles of board members 
(Bainbridge, 1993).  As noted by Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996: 412)  “the courts 
evaluate directors’ fiduciary responsibility on the basis of the business judgment 
rule…[which] presumes that directors make decisions on an informed basis, in good faith, 
with the best interest of the corporation in mind, and, importantly, that directors be 
disinterested and independent”.   While this may appear to be congruent with agency theory 
there is an important distinction regarding the nexus of a board’s authority; courts have 
focused on directors’ authority being grounded in state law, while agency theory has viewed 
it as emanating from shareholders.  However, both of these perspectives are able to largely 
exist in harmony as the courts operate in a legal context where corporations are only allowed 
to exist through state law while shareholders and governance research focus on the power 
and responsibilities of boards as authorized and mandated through regulatory frameworks 
such as SOX and stock exchange listing requirements. 
At its core, the agency context is predicated on the concept of shareholder primacy 
(Jamieson, 1994); corporate governance protects the interests of shareholders where the role 
of the board is to monitor whether management is acting in a way that protects and 
maximizes shareholder value.  The role of monitoring performed by the board is a way to 
mitigate the perceived agency problem that arises when the aims of investors in the firm’s 
activities (the principals) diverge from those that manage these activities (the agents) 
(Afshan, Chhetri, & Pradhan, 2011; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Markarian & Parbonetti, 2007). Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that monitoring involves 
the measurement of the decision agents and an implementation of rewards. Barney (1996: 
401) considers monitoring mechanisms to be “institutional devices through which a firm’s 
stockholders can observe, measure, evaluate and control managerial behavior…to ensure 
that when managers engage in decision-making, they do so in a way consistent with 
stockholders’ interests”.  A broader description of the board activities included in monitoring 
and explored in governance research has been captured by Hillman, Nicholson and 
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Shropshire (2008: 444) as, “monitoring the CEO (Boyd, 1995; Daily, 1996), strategy 
implementation (Rindova, 1999), planning for CEO succession (Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 
2000), and evaluating and rewarding the CEO/top managers (Conyon & Peck, 1998)”.    
The monitoring function is a critical governance tool as the board is the shareholders’ proxy 
to ensure the actions of managers are in the best interests of shareholders (Hillman et al., 
2008; Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2011; Kumar & Sivaramakrishnan, 
2008).  As noted by Hillman and Dalziel (2003: 385) the responsibility of managers to act in 
the best interests of shareholders is “an obligation that is met by scrutiny, evaluation and 
regulation of the actions of top management by the board”.  Theoretically, the optimal level 
of monitoring by the board would be where there is a balance between the costs and the 
benefits of monitoring the decisions and the actions of top management (Brick & 
Chidambaran, 2008).  In the pre-SOX era, it is in the area of monitoring that boards were 
perceived as not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders as evidenced in a number of 
high profile governance scandals (Clark, 2005; Warren et al., 2011).  While there is a lack of 
research that quantifies the number of boards in the pre-SOX timeframe who were not 
serving as effective monitors, the media and public attention paid to the breaches in 
governance at companies such as Enron and WorldCom created a strong perception that 
there was a lack of monitoring of management by boards.      
Therefore, given my focus on the monitoring and control role of the board, I adopt a 
shareholder primacy model as expressed through agency theory as the theoretical lens.  The 
structural changes instituted by SOX were designed to return to a stronger board-oversight 
model with power provided to the board through greater independence and control over 
agency issues resulting from management behaviour misaligned with shareholder value.  
Thus, I believe the theoretical context, namely an agency lens, is an appropriate perspective 
through which to explore the pre and post-SOX timeframes.         
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3.  BOARD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to understand whether SOX structural changes have impacted corporate governance 
practices, it is necessary to understand board structures and relationships prior to SOX and 
after SOX.  This chapter will first outline pre-SOX board structures and relationships 
highlighting the elements of the board during this timeframe that have received significant 
research attention including board size, board independence, and the role of management.  I 
will then look at board changes that were mandated through SOX, detailing how they 
impacted board structure and relationships at both the board and committee levels.  I will 
also touch on elements of board power, in particular those attributable to the independent 
members of the board which I call board independence power, a concept of increasing 
interest in the post-SOX era which will be developed in a more robust manner in Chapter 4.   
The pre-SOX timeframe is captured as 1999 to 2003 inclusive and the post-SOX timeframe 
is considered to be 2004 to 2009 inclusive.  I use 2003 as the end date for the pre-SOX 
timeframe as even though the SOX legislation was passed in 2002, complementary changes 
to board structures were not brought forward by major North American stock exchanges 
(such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)) until 2003.  Thus, to appropriately capture 
those requirements, 2003 was used as the end point for the pre-SOX timeframe.  I select 
1999 as the start-point for the pre-SOX era as it was the year that the NYSE began to require 
domestic listed companies to include at least three independent directors on audit 
committees, signaling the beginning of a shift at the committee-level to recognize the 
importance of director independence.  In addition, in 1999 archival corporate governance 
datasets began to collect data around committee membership.   I select 2009 as the end 
timeframe for the post-SOX era to allow for the consideration of the lag effects in the 
hypothesized relationships.   
3.2  Pre-SOX Board Structures and Relationships 
From a legislative perspective, the governance landscape in the pre-SOX era had few 
restrictions on board structure and on the relationships between inside and outside board 
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members.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established in 1934 under 
The Securities Exchange Act (1934) in order to promote full disclosure to investors.  Over 
the next 70 years prior to SOX, there were few legal or regulatory changes made to 
corporate governance structures at the board and committee levels (NYSE, 2013); however 
there were a number of policy papers put forward by regulatory bodies and organizations 
concerned with firm governance that advocated for stronger rules around higher levels of 
board independence and oversight.  In 1956, the NYSE suggested that listed companies 
include at least two outside directors on their boards in order to provide greater transparency 
and speed in disclosing corporate information.  The NYSE continued their suggestions on 
corporate governance reform by releasing a white paper in 1973 recommending a minimum 
of three outside directors on the board and a completely independent audit committee.  
Building on these recommendations, in 1977 the NYSE proactively required listed domestic 
companies to form audit committees in order to be listed on the exchange (Lutzy, 2003).  
They also mandated that the audit committee be made up of independent directors; however, 
it was at the discretion of the board the level of the relationships that would determine 
independence (NYSE, 1977).  In 1998, the NYSE tightened and clarified the definition of 
independence for audit committee members, requiring that “independence is required in 
both mental attitude and in appearance, and thus members are precluded from having any 
relationship with the company that might interfere with the exercise of a director’s 
independence from management and from the company” (Lutzy, 2003: 103).  
Thus, in the pre-SOX timeframe, there were no mandated limits on board size, no 
requirements for minimum levels of board independence, and extensive examples of 
interlocking directorships between boards, calling into question the true nature of the 
impartiality of the outside directors on the board.  However, research has illustrated that 
while there were no legal or regulatory imperatives for a majority of board independence in 
the pre-SOX era, in practice, boards of major U.S. companies often had a majority of 
independent directors or were already moving in that direction (Linck et al., 2008; Valenti, 
2008).  In addition, while there were no legal requirements for boards to have specific 
committees outside of audit committees, by convention many also had nominating and 
compensation.  There were no requirements for minimum size of committees or full 
independence requirements for the nominating and compensation committees.  This does not 
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mean that boards pre-SOX were necessarily constructed with a majority of inside directors 
or did not have audit, nominating and compensation committees.  The construction of the 
dataset for this study allowed for the analysis of characteristics in the pre and post-SOX eras 
to note changes resulting from the legislation.   
Corporate governance research examining this pre-SOX period has primarily considered 
board structures including board size and board independence  (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; 
Bhagat & Black, 2002; Daily et al., 2003; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Johnson et al., 1996; Pfeffer, 1972; Vance, 
1964), board membership (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994) and board relationships largely 
presented as the influence of the CEO on the board (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996; Boyd, 
1995; Cannella & Monroe, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Westphal, 
1999).  Broadly, corporate governance analysis in the pre-SOX timeframe focused its 
attention on attempting to find a causal relationship between board structure and firm 
performance with ambiguous results (Bhagat & Black, 1999; Klein, 1998).   
While there was limited consideration during the pre-SOX timeframe of an analysis of 
governance associated with board decisions upholding shareholder value, the SOX 
timeframe began to see some of this work as a result of the creation of a corporate 
governance index (G-Index) by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003).  The G-Index used 
1,500 U.S. firms between 1990 and 1999 to create a corporate governance index comprised 
of 22 anti-takeover provisions (associated with management entrenchment and therefore 
negatively related to governance at the board level) and two shareholder’s rights provisions 
(positively associated with governance at the board level) using data compiled by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Centre to measure stockholder protections.  As noted by 
Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan  (2009: 2446): 
The G Index is constructed by adding one for each corporate governance feature that restricts shareholders' rights, such as poison pills and staggered voting for directors, and subtracts one for features that increase shareholder rights, such as cumulative voting. The higher the index, the weaker are the rights of shareholders to discipline management and the greater, therefore, are the potential agency problems.   
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The G-Index has been used to retroactively examine the corporate governance practices of 
boards during the pre-SOX era (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond, 2006; Cremers & 
Nair, 2005; Cremers & Ferrell, 2014; Klock, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2005).  Results from these 
studies were mixed, although several found a relationship between weak corporate 
governance provisions and operating underperformance (Core, Guay, & Rusticus, 2006).   
The E-Index constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) is a subset of the G-Index in 
that it contains six provisions of the G-Index that have been more strongly associated with 
firm value.  Bebchuk et al. (2009: 783) explain the six provisions as including “four 
constitutional provisions that prevent a majority of shareholders from having their way 
(staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for 
mergers and supermajority requirements for charter amendments), and two takeover 
readiness provisions that boards put in place to be ready for a hostile takeover (poison pills 
and golden parachutes).”  While it is a narrower measure, it is more accurate through its 
inclusion of only governance provisions that have a tangible impact on shareholder wealth.  
The E-Index has increasingly been used by governance scholars to explore pre and post-
SOX governance differences (Garvis, 2009; Nitkin, 2012; Wang, Graefe-Anderson, Pyles, & 
Kim, 2014).     
Similarly, the E-Index has been widely used in the finance literature as a measure of 
corporate governance standards, with a low E-Index representing a low level of management 
entrenchment.  As examples, Alali, Anandarajan and Jiang  (2012) explored the relationship 
between corporate governance and a firm’s credit rating in a sample of American firms 
measuring corporate governance standards three ways: the E-Index; the G-Index; and, the 
Governance Score of Brown and Caylor (2006).  They found that “firms characterized by 
stronger corporate governance have a significantly higher credit rating, and that this association 
is accentuated for smaller firms relative to larger firms”  (Alali et al., 2012: 291).  Akyol, Kim 
and Shekkar (2014: 328)  examined firms with accelerated share repurchases (ASR) finding 
that “ASR ﬁrms have a higher entrenchment index, which suggests a lower quality of 
governance for these ﬁrms”.  Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2009) used the E-Index as a 
measure of stronger managerial entrenchment and therefore higher agency issues when 
looking at firms with corporate blockholders.  In their consideration of the relationship 
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between corporate governance and firm performance, Bhagat and Bolton (2008, 2013) use 
the G-Index and the E-Index as measures of “better governance” (2008: 257) and “good 
governance” (2008: 257).   
The broad use of the E-Index as a measure of corporate governance standards in both 
corporate governance and the finance research provides a conceptual and theoretical 
framework to use the E-Index in this study as a measure of selected governance practices 
that protect shareholder value.      
3.2.1  Board Structures: Board Size 
The most evident board characteristic is its size.  From the governance literature in the pre-
SOX era, research found two opposing relationships between board size and firm 
performance.  The first school of thought supported increasing board size as the size and 
complexity of the organization was increased.  For example, as a result of choices in firm 
strategy, large organizations are frequently more sophisticated in their operation.  It has been 
proposed that they require greater board attention and a more diverse board skill set to 
monitor firm behaviour (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994; Mintzberg, 1983; Ocasio, 
1994; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1980).  Thus, governance researchers 
have argued and empirically demonstrated that boards of larger organizations need to be 
larger to manage the increased set of responsibilities (Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2009) or higher 
levels of diversification (Yermack, 1996).  
However, there are scholars who propose that smaller boards are actually more effective 
than large ones in their ability to make strategic decisions (Goodstein et al., 1994), avoid 
confrontation (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) and work hard as part of a group (Kidwell & 
Bennett, 1993). This school of thought suggests that on larger boards, members become 
more isolated from each other, interacting less often thereby enabling the firm’s 
management to more easily manipulate board decision making. In addition, boards that are 
large and diverse may have higher levels of conflict and fragmentation (Goodstein et al., 
1994) and may have higher costs to monitor (Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007).    
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Thus, the board size-firm performance relationship during the pre-SOX era is unresolved, 
with research suggesting there are linkages to stronger monitoring and performance with 
both large boards (Goodstein et al., 1994; Lehn et al., 2009; Mintzberg, 1983; Ocasio, 1994; 
Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1980) and small boards (Goodstein et al., 
1994; Kidwell & Bennett, 1993).  These research streams have mainly considered board size 
at the level of the full board without examining how their subordinate structures may impact 
information flows, relationship building and power dynamics.  Given the focus on board size 
during the pre-SOX timeframe, it is important to provide details of its prominence in the 
literature; however, with the volume of research completed to date on board size in the pre-
SOX timeframe and the focus of SOX on independence rather than size, I do not present 
hypotheses on board size as they would only be a replication of what has been extensively 
considered in the literature to date.  Board size is proposed as an element of board 
independence power and discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.     
The other key structural board variable in corporate governance research in the pre-SOX 
timeframe was the concept of board independence, although at that time there were no legal 
requirements for specific levels of board independence (NYSE, 2013).  As noted by Dalton 
and Dalton (2011: 406): “it has been repeatedly argued that a board’s willingness and ability 
to responsibly monitor the enterprise is related to board members’ independence”.  The 
analysis related to board independence from the pre-SOX era was predominately considered 
at the board level and the measurement of this construct did not use a uniform consideration 
of ‘outside director’.  In its broadest consideration, an outside director is any board member 
who is not also an officer of the company, thus all non-management members of the board 
(Johnson et al., 1996).  It is clear that the adoption of this classification of outside director 
could allow for large gaps in the monitoring role of the board if family members, former 
employees, individuals with contractual relationships with the firm (such as legal or 
financial services, suppliers or customers), or individuals over whom management holds 
sway are considered outside directors.  Baysinger and Butler (1985: 110)  suggest that those 
categories of outside directors are “assumed to be incapable of making or acting on a critical 
appraisal of management”.  As a result, corporate governance literature has separated 
outside directors into two categories:  affiliated directors who are not officers but are 
associated with management through significant business transactions  ($60,000 per year or 
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more) with the home firm (Finkelstein et al., 2009); and, independent directors who have no 
financial, family or psychological ties to the management of the company.  As noted by 
Gordon (2007: 1477), “[the term] "independent director" entered the corporate governance 
lexicon only in the 1970s as the kind of director capable of fulfilling the monitoring role. 
Until then, the board was divided into "inside" and "outside" directors””.  This segmentation 
is supported by regulatory requirements from the SEC for companies to publicly report on 
the different categories of outside director in their proxy statements (Braiotta, 2004; Daily & 
Dalton, 1994).   
As outlined by Westphal and Zajac (1997), independent directors can be rendered 
ineffective monitors in one of two ways:  the independent directors can either not have 
enough information to effectively monitor and evaluate the actions of the CEO and senior 
officers, or, they can be peer CEOs themselves (CEO-directors) and be sympathetic to the 
home firm CEO in a way that blunts their willingness to be dispassionate and unprejudiced 
in their assessment.  The latter condition is exacerbated if there are further board interlocks 
between the CEO of the home firm and the independent board member of the home firm.  
Similarly, Useem (1984) thought that the interaction between CEOs and peers on the board 
of their firm would lead to the creation of an inner circle of elites that would support each 
other over the best interest of shareholders.  This loyalty to the inner circle would effectively 
negate the monitoring effectiveness of the independent director while maintaining the 
perception that there were independent directors on the board (Gordon, 2007).   However, 
research of large U.S. corporations by Westphal and Zajac (1997) discovered behaviour of 
increasing independence by CEO-directors from the CEO of the home firm between 1982 
and 1992 suggesting, during that timeframe at least, independent directors on boards were 
attempting to self-correct for biases related to social exchange with the home firm CEO.  
The SOX-related structural changes outlined later on detail further steps taken to attempt to 
legally mitigate this interdependence.   
Pre-SOX research into board independence explored the differentiation between types of 
directors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Weisbach, 1988) as well as the director 
independence-firm performance link (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Bhagat & Black, 2002; 
Peng, 2004), the latter again presenting somewhat ambiguous results. In 1972, Pfeffer noted 
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that only one published work to date (Vance, 1964) had attempted to use board composition 
(including board independence) as an independent variable and link it to the firm’s financial 
performance through quantitative means.  Vance’s study of 103 large companies found that 
firms that had boards that were predominately insiders performed better on average than 
those firms who had outsider-led boards.  He further discovered no shift in the percentage of 
insiders/outsiders over time.  Baysinger and Butler (1985) categorized directors into three 
groups which roughly translated into inside directors (executive component), affiliated 
directors (instrumental component), and independent directors (monitoring component) and 
found no relationship between the percentage of independent directors and financial 
performance.  Their research demonstrated that organizations with boards comprised of a 
mix of the three categories were more likely to survive and prosper.  Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) suggested that boards with a majority of independent directors would be better in 
monitoring management than boards with higher levels of inside directors.   Finally, there 
was a robust stream of research put forward by Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson that 
provided both original empirical work and meta-analyses of corporate governance research 
into the role of board independence in the timeframe leading up to SOX (Daily & Dalton, 
1993; Daily & Dalton, 1994; Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1999; Dalton et al., 1998; 
Johnson et al., 1996).  The meta-analyses (Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998) found no 
relationship between the percentage of outside directors and firm performance as captured 
through both accounting and market-based measures.  I use the term outside deliberately as 
due to the heterogeneity in the measurement of director independence in the corporate 
governance studies, it cannot be stated with certainty that the measurement of independent 
directors did not combine affiliated directors with independent directors.   
The categorization of director independence in the post-SOX era and the relationship 
between board independence and firm performance remains blurred and challenging to 
compare across studies.  The shifting results could be due to changes in firm behaviour over 
the timeframes captured in the studies.  However, the ambiguity could also be due to the 
difference in measurement of director independence with some research bifurcating 
directors between management and non-management without the empirical separation of 
affiliated directors.  Regardless of the reason, the SOX changes mandating overall board 
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independence clearly equated independent, non-affiliated directors with stronger monitoring 
and thus better corporate governance practices by the board.     
3.2.2  Board Structures:  Board Committees 
From an agency theory perspective, boards have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of 
the firm as they fulfill the duties of their office (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Johnson et al., 
1996); thus, there is an expectation from shareholders that boards will structure themselves 
to most appropriately perform their monitoring and advisory roles for the firm.  In order to 
more effectively oversee firm behaviour, boards delegate responsibility to board committees 
for specific advisory and monitoring functions (Anderson & Anthony, 1986; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006; Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010).  Much of the deliberation, monitoring, and 
advisory role of the board is actually completed at this subordinate level and ratified at the 
board level, rendering committees the true nexus for the decision-making of the board 
(Anderson & Anthony, 1986).  A number of researchers have called for governance scholars 
to consider the role of committees and their relation to selected governance decisions 
protecting shareholder value and firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 
1998; Klein, 1998; Vafeas, 1999; Westphal & Khanna, 2003).  
Committees have a number of roles, namely facilitating the exchange of information 
between directors, aiding in the monitoring and reward of the upper echelon of the firm 
(through audit and compensation committees) and ensuring the ongoing functioning of the 
board (through the nomination committee).  Board committees are designed to more 
effectively address the ratifying, monitoring and advisory functions of the full board (Dalton 
et al., 1998).  While board committees in the pre-SOX timeframe have not received as much 
attention as the full board, governance research has taken a look at committee characteristics 
including demographic information (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Kesner, 1988), their role in 
corporate governance (Vafeas, 1999) and their link to firm performance (Klein, 1998).  Prior 
research (Klein, 1998) has suggested that the problem of endogeneity in the linkage between 
governance and firm performance can be somewhat mitigated by looking at committees 
rather than the full board where results can be masked.   
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Research related to committees in the pre-SOX timeframe also explored the determinants, 
presence, composition, role, and impact of specific committees.  Carson (2002) explored the 
factors which led to the presence of audit, nominating and compensation committees in 
Australian firms, discovering that the three committees have different antecedents.  She 
found the presence of audit committee to be positively association with the presence of Big 
6 auditors and the number of intercorporate relationships between board members.  
Compensation committees were also found to be related to these two antecedents, as well as 
with higher levels of institutional investment.  Finally, the presence of nomination 
committees was found to be associated with board size and leverage.   
Main and Johnston (1993) used a sample of 220 British companies and found that only 30 
per cent had remuneration committees. They further discovered a positive relationship 
between the presence of remuneration committees and the level of director compensation. 
Conyon and Peck (1998) examined whether the presence of a compensation committee (in 
addition to other factors including CEO duality and the independence of the overall board) 
was related to the level of management compensation.  They found that boards with 
compensation committees and higher levels of board independence had a strong alignment 
between management pay and organizational performance. Vafeas (2000) explored the 
determinants of compensation committee membership in 576 U.S. large public firms, 
discovering an association between committee membership and the number of outside board 
members, the number of additional board seats held by directors, director age, and director 
tenure.  Similarly, Ruigrok et al. (2006) looked at 210 Swiss firms to determine the presence 
of a nomination committee and its relationship to overall board composition and diversity.  
They determined that public firms with nomination committees were more likely to have 
boards with a higher level of independent and foreign directors, although it had no impact on 
the presence of female directors.   
The determination of the overall power of board committees in the pre-SOX timeframe is 
uncertain as there were few restrictions in terms of their existence and their membership.  
Management and affiliated directors could be present on major committees such as audit, 
nominating and compensation, creating the conditions for insider influence on committee 
independence.  This could lead to a self-perpetuating situation, with powerful insiders 
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present on nominating committees influencing choices for new directors who were 
sympathetic to requests from management over organizational decision-making or 
compensation decisions (Pfeffer, 1972).  In this study, data in the pre-SOX timeframe was 
examined to explore the breadth of management and affiliated director presence on major 
board committees including audit, compensation and nomination to better understand the 
prevalence of this practice.   
3.2.3  Board Relationships 
Boards in the pre-SOX era were often dominated by the will of management, in particular 
that of the CEO, (Gordon, 2007; Pfeffer, 1972) where directors were seen as “ineffective 
monitors of managerial activity” (Finkelstein et al., 2009: 243).  This does not suggest that 
strong management automatically led to breaches in corporate governance or management 
malfeasance; however, there is a greater potential for management entrenchment where 
there is weak oversight of management at the highest levels of the organization.  Weak 
management oversight at the board level was created and reinforced in a number of ways.  
First, as previously discussed, there were no legal requirements on board independence 
which resulted in boards with significant levels of management presence or allies of 
management in the form of affiliated directors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Vance, 1964).  
Boards had the potential to become skewed in favour of management as management was 
disproportionately able to control information flow.   
Second, there was no prohibition against management sitting on nomination committees 
which meant that outside directors sitting on boards had been approved by management 
before being selected.  When vacancies were created on the board, the cycle was perpetuated 
as existing directors, who were management members themselves or directly or indirectly 
beholden to management members on the board, selected individuals for approval by 
shareholders who would also be sympathetic to the existing management (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996a).  Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) found that when the CEO was a 
member of the nominating committee or when no nominating committee existed, new 
directors selected as outside directors were more likely to actually be affiliated directors than 
independent directors.  As noted by Lorsch and MacIver (1989: 20): “in most companies, 
selecting directors has been the responsibility of the CEO, who chose the candidates, then 
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recommended them to the board for approval”.  This created a scenario with directors 
rubber-stamping the activities of management and serving as ineffective monitors of firm 
behaviour in clear violation of their intended role as principals protecting the interest of 
shareholders.   
It should be noted that in this pre-SOX era not all research demonstrated that boards were 
the tools of management.  A research stream led by Westphal and colleagues suggested that 
boards could be divided into those that were controlled by CEOs and those that were 
controlled by outside directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1996b).  They 
found that boards with powerful CEOs appointed new directors who were demographically 
similar to the existing CEO and who would be compliant, while boards with independent 
directors who were willing to stand up to management appointed new directors who were 
demographically similar to the existing board.  Thus, there were two types of boards with 
the latter being more protective of shareholder interests and closer to the vision of an ideal 
board put forward through agency theory.  
Board relationships in the pre-SOX era are appropriately viewed through the lens of the 
power structure between management directors on the board and those directors who were 
independent.  The power of management on the board has been considered through the 
concept of CEO power with the level of CEO power in an agency structure dependent on the 
level of control of the CEO in relation to the board (Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Westphal, 1999; 
Westphal, 1998; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  As discussed in Chapter 2, the managerial 
perspective presents boards as tools of the senior management team, providing a rubber 
stamp for their decisions (Herman, 1981).  This is particularly true in cases where powerful 
CEOs ensure that boards have little ability to either formulate or change the firm’s strategy.   
The theoretical construction and measurement of CEO power was variable in the pre-SOX 
timeframe.   The most often used elements included CEO duality (where the CEO of the 
home firm is also the Chairperson of the board) and CEO tenure.  Central to the 
management of agency problems is the separation of ownership (board) and control (CEO).  
The splitting of the titles of CEO and Chair of the board is important for organizational 
oversight; theoretically, the separation improves firm performance as the arms-length board 
of directors provides another level of supervision for CEO behaviour (Boyd, 1994; Harris & 
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Helfat, 1998).  It has also been suggested that CEO duality is positive for organizations, as 
housing the CEO and board chair position in a single person creates strong, unambiguous 
leadership and minimizes any information gap allowing for faster and more strategic 
decisions by the board (Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994).  However, CEO duality 
is thought to exacerbate agency issues in the blurring of the line between operating the firm 
(management) and monitoring and rewarding performance (board).  Corporate governance 
research has closely examined the linkage between firm performance and CEO duality 
during the pre-SOX timeframe (Abdullah, 2004; Baliga et al., 1996; Boyd, 1995; Elsayed, 
2007; Rechner & Dalton, 1991).  Meta-analyses looking at elements of board composition 
(Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998) found the separation of the CEO and the chairperson 
was not associated with financial performance.   
CEO tenure was also considered in the pre-SOX period as an element contributing to CEO 
power; the older the CEO and the longer their term as CEO, the more power they were 
thought to gain due to experience, familiarity with the organization and the opportunity to 
build relationships (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Zajac & Westphal, 1995).   Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) suggested that long CEO tenure (over 10 years) could be an indication of a 
propensity for dominance by the CEO.  Similarly, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) 
submitted that CEOs with long tenure may develop a mystique or aura that creates power 
which then becomes institutionalized;  Jack Welch, the former CEO at General Electric 
could be presented as an example of this phenomenon.     
Much of the research related to the power of the CEO separately tested elements researchers 
believed to be related to the CEO power construct.  In 1992, CEO power as a multi-
dimensional construct was conceptually developed and empirically measured by Finkelstein 
(1992) who called it top manager’s power.  Defining power as “the capacity of individual 
actors to exert their will” (1992: 508), Finkelstein theorized top management power as being 
comprised of four power dimensions:  structural power; ownership power; expert power; 
and, prestige power.  He theoretically and empirically developed the elements included in 
each of the four power dimensions, performing a principal components analysis to determine 
that his theoretical model was indeed appropriate. He further tested the predictive validity of 
the four power dimensions to illustrate how they assisted in the predictability of a number of 
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strategy variables (e.g. diversification and acquisition activity).  Finkelstein’s model for top 
managers’ power has been used and adapted in studies exploring CEO power and CEO 
dominance, although most of the studies do not adopt the holistic model presented in 
Finkelstein’s work but select the variables which are of most relevance to the research 
question being explored and test them either individually or as an index (Bigley & 
Margarethe, 2002; Chikh & Filbien, 2011; Combs et al., 2007; Haynes & Hillman, 2010; 
Lewellyn & Muller‐Kahle, 2012; Tang et al., 2011).    
Given the historic and ongoing role of management on boards, elements of CEO power were 
controlled for in the analysis performed in this study.  The items included in the 
operationalization of CEO power as a control variable are described in Chapter 5.   
3.3  Breaches in Governance and Legislative Reform 
The focus on shareholder primacy increased through the 1980s and 1990s, cementing its 
position as the dominant corporate paradigm not only at the board level, but also accepted 
and expected from a societal perspective (Davis, 2005). Shareholders and financial analysts 
evaluated management performance on whether they achieved short-term financial targets, 
prompting management to consider and undertake creative means to achieve those ends 
(Kunsch, 2012).  This allowed for the creation of corporate governance structures and 
processes that were malleable by management and not prevented by independent 
representatives on boards (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).  The governance result was weak board 
oversight (Cohen, Hayes, Krishnamoorthy, Monroe, & Wright, 2009), ineffective audit 
committees and financial oversight (Cohen et al., 2010), and cronyism in director 
appointments.  As a result, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw governance scandals at a 
number of global, multi-billion dollar companies across industries including accounting 
fraud by the top management team at Enron and WorldCom, and corporate excesses by the 
top management team at Tyco International.  These scandals cost investors billions of 
dollars through sudden drops in share prices and had an impact on investor confidence in the 
overall market.   They were also widely covered in the global media, putting public pressure 
on governments to take tangible action to prevent future occurrences.     
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Given the depth and breadth of the corporate scandals, it cannot be denied that the abuse of 
power for self-interest may not have been identifiable through internal control systems (Van 
den Berghe & Baelden, 2005).  However, the prioritization of shareholder return has been 
identified as one of the major causes of major accounting scandals and earning restatements, 
necessitating the increased governance and monitoring provisions in SOX (Cohen et al., 
2010; Hillman et al., 2011).   
The media and stakeholder pressures from corporate governance scandals in 2001/2002 
convinced congressional leaders in the United States to take swift and strong action to 
significantly reform corporate governance norms.  The United States Congress passed the 
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 with 
overwhelming bi-partisan support in both the House of Representatives (vote of 423-3) and 
the United States Senate (vote of 99-0).  This bill, also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002) incorporated stronger corporate governance initiatives into federal securities laws 
(Romano, 2005).  SOX applied to all public company boards, management, and public 
accounting firms in the United States.  In 2003, major North American stock exchanges 
including the NYSE and NASDAQ made significant changes to their listing requirements 
and corporate governance guidelines which were complementary to the SOX changes 
(Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Duchin, Matsusaka, & Ozbas, 2010; Harris & Raviv, 2008; Linck 
et al., 2009).  Table 1 presents the major NYSE rule changes as outlined in Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2009: 236). 
Table 1:  Major NYSE Rule Changes (2003) Related to SOX 
NYSE Listing Changes (2003) Related to SOX (i)    All firms must have a majority of independent directors. (ii)   An independent director as defined by the NYSE rule is a director that has no material relationship with the listed company, directly, or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company (NYSE 303A.1). In addition, the rule points to certain director ties that disqualify board members from being independent.  The main ties are current employment or recent former employment in the firm, family affiliation with the executives of the firm, substantial business ties with the firm, and family affiliation with persons that have such ties with the firm.  In general, a director retains his or her affiliation status until 3 years after the termination of such affiliation.  (iii)  The compensation committee, nominating committee, and the audit committee shall consist of independent directors.  
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(iv)  The compensation committee and the nomination committee must have a written charter that defines the obligations of these committees.  The committees should also have self-evaluation procedures. (v)   All audit committee members should be financially literate.  In addition, at least one member of the audit committee would be required to have accounting or related financial management expertise. (vi)  Nonmanagement directors of a company must meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions without management in order to empower nonmanagement directors to serve as a more effective check on management.  
It is the structural changes that are outlined in Table 1, subsections i to iii that are the focus 
of this study.  The legislation made a number of significant changes in the operation and 
governance of public companies which included creating a Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, establishing external auditor independence, mandating the reporting of 
internal control systems, enhancing financial disclosure provisions, strengthening fraud and 
white collar crime provisions, and requiring new board structures to enhance board 
independence.  In response to SOX, the SEC approved changes to board and committee 
level measures in November 2003 that had been proposed by the NYSE and NASDAQ as 
part of their listing requirements.  In sum, these changes required full board independence 
and the presence of fully independent audit, compensation and nominating committees.   
3.4  Post-SOX Board Structures and Relationships 
The goal of SOX was to reinstitutionalize corporate governance accountabilities by moving 
public boards away from perceived management control through a higher level of board 
independence and more stringent provisions for reporting internal controls.  As noted by 
Harris and Raviv: (2008: 1798) in relation to the SOX changes, “the prevailing view among 
regulators is that it is in the interest of shareholders for corporate boards to be controlled by 
independent directors”.  Board independence was accomplished by requiring a majority of 
outsider directors on public boards so that management representatives on boards would not 
be able to solely overturn board decisions.  In addition, SOX changes legislated the 
existence of the audit, compensation and nominating committees for publicly-traded firms 
(Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010), requiring at least three board members on each committee, all of 
whom had to be outside directors (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009).  The CEO was no 
longer eligible to sit on these committees, nor were members of the management team or 
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affiliated directors, theoretically reducing management control in committee deliberations.  I 
now discuss each of these three structural requirements in more detail and put forward 
hypotheses related to these changes.   
As previously noted, in the pre-SOX timeframe there were no legal requirements for boards 
to be comprised of a majority of independent board members although there were a number 
of policy papers from organizations such as the NYSE recommending the practice and major 
U.S. companies were already voluntarily moving in that direction (Linck et al., 2008).  SOX 
and the related changes from major North America stock exchanges, in particular the NYSE 
required listed companies to have a majority of independent directors.  In order to ensure 
that the outside directors were independent and not affiliated with management, the NYSE 
Listed Company Manual, Section 303A.02 provided a robust definition for independent 
directors: 
(a) No director qualifies as "independent" unless the board of directors affirmatively determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company).    (b) In addition, a director is not independent if: 
(i) The director is, or has been within the last three years, an employee of the listed company, or an immediate family member is, or has been within the last three years, an executive officer of the listed company. 
(ii) The director has received, or has an immediate family member who has received, during any twelve-month period within the last three years, more than $120,000 in direct compensation from the listed company, other than director and committee fees and pension or other forms of deferred compensation for prior service (provided such compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service). 
(iii) (A) The director is a current partner or employee of a firm that is the listed company's internal or external auditor; (B) the director has an immediate family member who is a current partner of such a firm; (C) the director has an immediate family member who is a current employee of such a firm and personally works on the listed company's audit; or (D) the director or an immediate family member was within the last three years a partner or employee of such a firm and personally worked on the listed company's audit within that time. 
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(iv) The director or an immediate family member is, or has been within the last three years, employed as an executive officer of another company where any of the listed company's present executive officers at the same time serves or served on that company's compensation committee. 
(v) The director is a current employee, or an immediate family member is a current executive officer, of a company that has made payments to, or received payments from, the listed company for property or services in an amount which, in any of the last three fiscal years, exceeds the greater of $1 million, or 2% of such other company's consolidated gross revenues.  (NYSE Listed Company Manual, 2013) 
While there is literature linking the composition of boards to firm performance (including at 
least four meta-analyses) in both pre- and post-SOX timeframes (Afshan et al., 2011; Capon, 
Farley, & Hoenig, 1990; Dalton et al., 1999; Dalton et al., 1998; Rhoades, Rechner, & 
Sundaramurthy, 2000), there is far less research that explores the relationship between board 
structure and board practices. Research by Valenti (2008) found no statistical difference 
between the average number of outsiders on boards from 1997-2001 and 2005, although this 
sample was limited to the top 120 firms in the Fortune 400 and may have been too small to 
note trends.  A larger study of 8,000 public companies was conducted by Linck, Netter and 
Yang (2009) who examined boards between 1989 and 2005 and found increases in both 
board size and board independence post-SOX.  Recent research from Dah, Frye and Hurst 
(2014) found that a nontrivial number of firms in their sample actually reduced the number 
of independent directors post-SOX to bring it down closer to the 50 percent majority.   
The requirement for a board that was majority-led by independent directors speaks directly 
to the concern that the monitoring of management by boards was lax which created the 
opportunity for management to behave inappropriately.  By mandating that boards have a 
majority of independent directors, one would expect a strengthening of the monitoring of 
principals over the agent (management) leading to a mitigation of management control and 
malfeasance.  As a result, increased board independence should lead to governance practices 
that minimize management entrenchment.  This is captured in the E-Index (Bebchuk et al., 
2009) which has been extensively used in governance research as a measure of corporate 
governance practices related to management entrenchment (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014; 
Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010).  I therefore hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 1:  There is a positive relationship between the level of board 
independence and selected management practices that support shareholder value. 
3.4.1  Mandated Committees 
SOX and related listing changes focussed on three main committees:  audit; nominating 
(sometimes considered in tandem with governance); and, compensation.  While these 
committees often existed as part of board substructures, SOX structural changes formally 
mandated the existence of these three committees (Dalton & Dalton, 2011).  As noted by 
Reeb and Upadhyay (2010: 471): 
Starting in 2003, the major stock exchanges (at the behest of the SEC adoption of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act) mandated that firms develop a compensation committee as well as a nominating committee or corporate governance committee.  Thus, after 2003, publicly-traded US firms were effectively required to have 3 monitoring subcommittees of the board.  
The legislated requirement for the audit, compensation and nominating committees gave 
these three committees a heightened importance as foci of board decision-making; they were 
responsible for the oversight of firm performance (audit), monitoring and rewarding top 
management (compensation), and determining who was to be invited to sit on the board 
(nominating).   Indeed, the three SOX mandated committees are critical to the functioning of 
the organization and the board and contribute to ongoing board dynamics.  The audit 
committee recommends the choice of external auditors and oversees their work, acting as a 
mediator between the auditors and management.  The committee also reviews the 
company’s financial statements before they are approved by the full board and eventually 
released to shareholders and the public.  The compensation committee has the responsibility 
of evaluating the CEO’s performance against previously articulated organizational 
objectives and determining the CEO’s compensation level against their evaluation   
Members of this committee are also responsible for making recommendations around non-
CEO officer and director compensation, giving them a powerful lever over their fellow 
board members.  Finally, the nominating committee assists the board in identifying and 
selecting individuals to serve as directors and also CEO.  They do this by determining the 
abilities and skills required by the board.  This requires directors on the nominating 
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committee to be aware of the capabilities of existing board members so that they are able to 
recognize the need for additional competencies to be added to the board. 
The prioritization of committees through the SOX changes has resulted in greater research 
attention being paid to board committees.  Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella are clear that 
“there should be no doubt that board committees can be of consequential interest to 
strategists and organizational theorists” (2009: 230).  Researchers have recognized the 
increasing importance of board committees as decision-making bodies (Alexander, 1999; 
Brennan & Solomon, 2008; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Klein, 1998; Shropshire, 2010) and 
have called for more research into their influence (Dalton et al., 1999).  In the post-SOX era, 
research has included examining committee membership (Peterson & Philpot, 2007), 
committee effectiveness (Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Neal, 2009; Carcello, Neal, 
Palmrose, & Scholz, 2011; Jiraporn, Singh, & Lee, 2009; Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010), the 
relationship between committees (Liao & Hsu, 2013), and the linkage between firm 
performance, committee type (Brick & Chidambaran, 2010; Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010) and 
committee composition (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010).   
The aforementioned research papers largely focus on, either individually or in combination, 
the three mandated committees and their impact on board dynamics.  The structural presence 
of the three committees resulted in a more decentralized process with decisions first 
considered at the committee level.  These decisions are then ratified by the full board.  When 
one considers the importance of the items that are dealt with at audit, compensation and 
nomination committees, the potential enhancement of the influence of these committees is 
consequential.  From a power perspective, by requiring boards to have audit, nominating and 
compensation committees, there is less opportunity for management to become involved in 
decision-making where they may attempt to sway board governance practices in a way that 
is not congruent with shareholder value.  I therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive relationship between the existence of the audit, 
nominating and compensation committees and selected management practices that 
support shareholder value. 
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3.4.2  Committee Independence 
The final major SOX structural change involved mandating complete committee 
independence for the audit, nominating and compensation committees. While the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act required an independent audit committee, the NYSE Listed Company Manual, 
Section 303A.03 clearly states that listed companies must have an audit committee (Section 
303A.07(a)), nominating/corporate governance committee (Section 303A.04(a)) and 
compensation committee (Section 303A.05(a)) entirely comprised of independent members. 
These rules from the NYSE were proposed in August 2002 and accepted by the SEC in 
November 2003 (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009). The independence for the compensation 
committee was further legislatively reinforced through Section 952 of The Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).  These SOX-related 
structural changes to board committee independence prompted increased attention from 
corporate governance scholars.  As an example, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) examined 
the link between changes in the independence requirements of SOX on the audit, 
compensation and nominating committees and firm value.  They found that while the choice 
to make the firms completely independent had little impact on the value of the firm, firms 
that chose not to move to completely independent committees were the low performing 
firms in their sample.   
The most apparent impact of the independence requirement for SOX-mandated committees 
was the ability of these committees to deliberate and make decisions in the absence of 
management influence.  The narrowing of the definition of independent directors by listing 
organizations such as the NYSE effectively removed affiliated directors from sitting on 
these three committees as well, again, providing an environment within which outside 
directors were able to be open and honest without fear of retaliation from powerful 
management board representatives.  The strongest possible advantage of independence 
requirements may have manifested on nominating committees, where independent directors 
may have felt pressure to accept the recommendations of management regarding potential 
new board members.  As stated in the NYSE listed company manual (2013: Section 
303A.04. Commentary): “New director and board committee nominations are among the 
board’s most important functions. Placing this responsibility in the hands of an independent 
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nominating/corporate governance committee can enhance the independence and quality of 
nominees”.  This flexibility may be marginalized somewhat where the board chair makes the 
committee assignment decisions, particularly if the chair is also the company CEO, or when 
the ‘independent’ members are in effect loyal to the CEO rather than to shareholders; 
however, the independence requirement should, over time, make the nomination process less 
beholden to management input and take advantage of the networks of independent directors.   
This independence of action would also be evident on the compensation and audit 
committees.  By removing any management or affiliated directors, committee members are 
able to have an open and frank discussion about the performance of the organization and its 
senior executives and make decisions accordingly.  Independence from direct management 
pressures for firm performance should also diminish the occurrence of fraud and accounting 
irregularities, one of the main drivers of the SOX changes.  Bronson, Carcello, 
Hollingsworth, and Neal (2009) found that the enhanced monitoring provisions of audit 
committees were only realized when audit committees were completely independent as 
required by SOX.  Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) looked at the impact of the SOX 
requirements for board independence and an independent compensation committee on CEO 
compensation levels.  They found board independence to be associated with a drop in CEO 
compensation; firms who were not compliant with SOX independence requirements saw 
CEO pay decreases of 17 per cent more than firms who were compliant. They did not 
discover significance between compensation committee independence and levels of CEO 
compensation, suggesting the board-level variable to be more relevant.  However, these 
results were discounted by Guthrie, Sokolowsky and Wan (2012) who used the same sample 
to illustrate that the result could be attributed to two outlier firms in the dataset, suggesting 
that the oversight influence of independent directors may be overinflated at least in terms of 
CEO compensation. 
The intent of SOX changes related to committee independence were clearly related to 
strengthening the monitoring and oversight ability of the outside board members; however, 
there may have been additional benefits as well.   As committees are a smaller group than 
the full board, they are believed to have more efficient communications (Dalton et al., 
1999).  When independent directors become members of any committees, they have the 
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opportunity to forge stronger relationships with their fellow independent directors which 
may create increased opportunities for information sharing.  This committee interaction 
allows for a more complete understanding of firm behaviour because the overlap of 
members on committees reduces information asymmetry between board members. Westphal 
(1999: 9) suggested that “people feel more comfortable offering advice to individuals with 
whom they have a social relationship”.  The heightened communication allows for stronger 
control by the board over firm behaviour which manifests as better board governance 
practices. The SOX requirement that the audit, nominating and compensation committees be 
comprised solely of independent directors may have heightened this effect.  Given board 
size and therefore the number of independent directors available, committee independence 
may have placed independent directors in more contact with each other as each of the three 
mandated committees must have at leave three members.  Increased interaction amongst the 
directors would allow for more information sharing and create greater group cohesion and 
social categorization (Knapp, Dalziel, & Lewis, 2011) which could result in stronger 
monitoring by the independent members of the board.  Thus, director interaction on these 
committees as a result of the SOX structural changes may weaken the ability of management 
to influence the important decision-making being undertaken at this sub-board level, 
particularly as it relates to board corporate governance practices. I therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a positive relationship between the level of committee 
independence on the audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected 
management practices that support shareholder value. 
There also may be a combined impact of the SOX changes existing simultaneously.  
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) found a relationship between a drop in CEO 
compensation and the SOX requirement that the majority of board members be independent.  
However, they believed the independent directors on the board to be more effective because 
the nominating committee no longer had management representation, increasing the 
likelihood that the directors nominated to join the board were independent from 
management influence.  The combination of board independence, the requirement for the 
presence of committees that take important decisions out of the hands of management 
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members on the board, and the independence of these mandated committees may all work 
together to create conditions for low management entrenchment.  I therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4:  There is a positive relationship between the SOX structural changes 
and selected management practices that support shareholder value. 
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4.  INFLUENCE OF BOARD INDEPENDENCE POWER 
4.1  Introduction 
As noted by Linck, Netter and Yang (2008: 313): “SOX might have fundamentally changed 
the corporate governance environment, resulting in a regime shift”.  Chapter 3 presented 
hypotheses involving a direct relationship between the SOX structural board changes and 
governance practices; Chapter 4 now outlines a potential moderating influence on that 
relationship, namely board independence power.  While the overarching concept of board 
power has been used in corporate governance research (Zajac & Westphal, 1996a), it has 
received only minimal conceptual development or empirical validation as a construct and its 
application and operationalization have been heterogeneous.  In addition, there has been 
significant overlap in terms similar to board power such as board control which has created 
confusion in the literature.  In Chapter 4, I reduce the ambiguity related to the term ‘board 
power’ by first differentiating it from other similar concepts.  I then narrow the focus to 
distinguish between potential power related to the overall board (board power) and the 
independent members of the board (board independence power).  Finally, I theoretically 
develop the construct of board independence power and suggest hypotheses detailing how it 
may interact with the SOX structural changes to impact selected governance decisions 
protecting shareholder value at the board level.  
4.2  Board Power 
Power, as a concept, has been clouded with multiple approaches and conceptual nuances 
(Brass & Burkhardt, 1993).  In this study, board power refers to the authority of the board of 
directors over the management of the firm, which is both structural and relational (Anderson 
& Galinsky, 2006).  Structural power results from the formal position as an elected member 
of the board and may accrue from the configuration of the board and board committees 
while relational power results from the relative ability to exert influence over others 
(Lewellyn & Muller‐Kahle, 2012).  In addition to the structural and relational dichotomy, 
research has also explored the difference between power as latent or operational.  Brass and 
Bernhardt (1993) provide an excellent discussion of the nuance between potential power and 
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the enactment of power; their research examines potential organizational power through 
structural positions.  This distinction follows the suggestion of Pfeffer (1992: 14) who 
examines power ‘as a potential source’ rather than its actual use.   
The bimarcation between the potential and the use of power (although it has been considered 
in tandem as well) also exists within behavioural power research.   The behavioural stream 
includes the work of social psychologists French and Raven (1959) who created a 
classification of five (later extended to six) bases of power.  Based on their classification 
system, the consideration of power from a structural perspective recognizes that power may 
exist due to an individual or group’s role, responsibility and title (legitimate power), or 
expertise (expertise power) as distinct from power derived from positional differences 
between individuals or groups (relative power).  The work was built upon comprehensively 
by social psychologist David Kipnis who along with a group of colleagues led a series of 
experiments looking at micro-behavioural elements of power within and between 
organizations, exploring both the capacity for and use of power (Kipnis, 1976; Kipnis & 
Cosentino, 1969; Kipnis, Schmidt, Swaffin-Smith, & Wilkinson, 1984; Kipnis, Schmidt, & 
Wilkinson, 1980; Wilkinson & Kipnis, 1978).        
My study focuses on structural power and within that frame, adopts the conceptualization of 
power as a latent source with the potential for influence rather than in the exercise of its use 
(Brass & Burkhardt, 1993).  It is appropriate to consider board power in tandem with the 
SOX structural changes and  governance practices at the board level as Pearce and Zahra 
(1991) suggest that board power assists in the protection of the interest of shareholders.   As 
discovered by Westphal and Zajac (1995), when boards have more power, they will be more 
vigilant in monitoring and responding to the activities of top management.  Therefore 
conceptually, board power should have a positive influence on the relationship between 
SOX changes and selected governance practices protecting shareholder value.    
As noted in Chapter 2, management power on the board has been developed and measured 
through the top management/CEO power construct.  Board power has often included the 
examination of similar variables including CEO duality, board independence and board 
stock ownership (Harris & Raviv, 2008; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Horner, 2009; Stout, 
2007; Tang et al., 2011; Warren et al., 2011; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  However, the 
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traditional conceptualization and measurement of board power has often not been nuanced 
enough to cleanly differentiate between management, affiliated, and independent directors, 
nor has it been broadly developed to consider the power dimensions of only the independent 
members of the board.  Therefore, I develop the construct of board independence power in 
Section 4.3 and suggest that this is a more appropriate concept to juxtapose beside 
management power.  
It is also important to differentiate board power from other similar constructs related to 
board influence, namely board control and board vigilance.  Both of these latter terms have 
been used in governance research in the consideration of the role and authority of the board.  
While board control has been used widely in governance research, there is no homogeneous 
definition or operationalization (Boyd, 1994).  It has been largely presented as a multi-
dimensional construct that embodies the mechanisms to manage the behaviour of 
management as implemented by the board on behalf of shareholders.  Control mechanisms 
at the disposal of the board in the agency model are generally “carrot or stick” approaches 
such as stock options and bonuses linked to performance or public shaming of deviant 
management members.  As noted, the measurement of board control has been heterogeneous 
(Boyd, 1994; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Harris & Raviv, 2008; Warren et al., 2011) and has 
included a disparate array of variables including CEO duality, board independence, number 
of institutional directors, board share ownership, and director compensation.  While there 
has been overlap in the use of board control and board power, I suggest that board control is 
more appropriately considered in its application while board power is the potential authority 
inherent in the board to influence management behaviour.  As such, the idea of control could 
be considered as a manifestation of board power.       
Board vigilance has been defined as “the extent to which the board has the ability and 
willingness to monitor and discipline the CEO” (Tang, 2007: 11).  Its application in 
corporate governance research has been blurred in that it has been theorized based on both 
the potential activities of the board as contrasted with the top management team as well as 
the board’s actual activities including monitoring and judging management actions 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Tang et 
al., 2011).  Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella (2009: 243) note that “board vigilance is 
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linked to, but goes beyond the power of the board relative to the CEO”.  As a result, the 
conceptualization of board vigilance is broader in scope than the focus of this study which 
considers board power as a latent rather than actualized force.    
4.3  Board Independence Power 
Board power is more nuanced than it has been presented in the governance literature to date.  
While board power has been explored in governance literature as a foil to CEO power 
(Boyd, 1994), this positioning should be more refined if it is to accurately portray the 
principal-agent tension.  The consideration of board power on publicly-traded boards, as 
viewed through the construction of the board itself, implicitly includes management power 
as it is common for at least one member of the senior management team (usually the CEO) 
to be present on the board in a voting capacity.  As previously discussed, management has 
traditionally wielded a significant influence on the independent board members through 
direct management presence on key committees or through the management proxy of 
affiliated directors.  Given the focus of the SOX changes on shifting the balance of the board 
and committees to the independent members, it is important to distinguish between the 
power of the overall board and the power of the group of independent members of the board.  
Thus, as to not further confound the already muddled concept of board power, I suggest that 
this new construct be termed “board independence power” and it be considered as a subset 
of board power.  The board independence power construct allows me to capture the 
authority and influence of the independent board members as unique from the other two 
traditional categories of board members, namely management and affiliated, in order to 
measure the potential power of independent board members on selected governance 
practices protecting shareholder value.  
As a guide to the development of the new board independence power construct, I look to 
previous work that has developed analogous corporate governance constructs.  The multi-
dimensional concept of top management power has been conceptually and empirically 
developed by Finkelstein (1992) and presents four major types of power:  structural; 
ownership; expertise; and, prestige.  Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella (2009: 279) 
suggest that “many of the same phenomena that drive power relationships among top 
managers may also be relevant for board members…each of these power types appears to be 
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operative among board members”.   Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella (2009) further 
recognized that a direct translation of the top management framework to board power would 
require a more complex model given that there are both inside and outside directors on the 
board.   Thus, to understand the nature of the power of the board that is distinct from 
management representatives on the board, it is necessary to construct a model that captures 
power types of independent directors, namely those who are not management 
representatives nor affiliated with management.  Such a model would encompass the 
underlying elements of board independence power.  As it is important to understand the 
potential influence of the independent elements of the board in their own right, rather than as 
compared to the top management team, I conceptualize board independence power in 
absolute rather than relative terms.  This differs from Pearce and Zahra (1991) who also 
consider CEO power and board  power independently from each other,  but present board 
power in a way that is operational as opposed to latent, viewing it through the lens of board 
participation in strategic decision-making.  By constraining the consideration of power in 
this study to measures that could form the proposed dimensions of board independence 
power rather than those that are actually wielded, I remain consistent with my definition of 
power as a latent source.     
Following the theoretical model of Finkelstein (1992) in his development of the four 
dimensions of top management power, I now present how these four dimensions can be 
applied to create board independence power which I suggest is a formative construct, 
determined or caused by measures rather than being a manifestation of them (Podsakoff et 
al., 2006).  I propose a formative specification because the measures that make up the 
totality of board independence power are not manifestations of board independence power in 
their own right.  For example, the number of board committees, considered on its own, is a 
structural count of the number of committees on the board.  I suggest that each of the four 
power dimensions represents a distinct aspect of the board independence power construct 
and have their own measures or indicators.    
Further, I put forward hypotheses regarding how these four power dimensions can moderate 
the relationship between the SOX structural changes and selected governance practices at 
the board level that are associated with protecting shareholder value first individually, and 
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then suggest that these four dimensions work in tandem to create the overall board 
independence power construct.   
4.3.1  Board Independence Structural Power   
The consideration of power achieved through the structural elements of board independence 
are related to “formal organizational structure and hierarchical authority” (Finkelstein, 1992: 
508).  While independent directors are appointed for a variety of reasons beyond the 
perception of their ability and willingness to effectively monitor management (e.g. resource-
provision, advice-giving), the focus of the construction of this power dimension is on the 
role of the independent director as an impartial witness and judge over management activity.   
There are structural patterns that evolve from board composition that augment or minimize 
their role related to monitoring of management.  While there are a number of elements of 
board structure that have been considered by governance researchers, the structural power 
elements from a board perspective that have been most widely considered have been board 
size  (Boone et al., 2007; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Dalton et al., 1999; Lehn et al., 
2009; Linck et al., 2008) and the percentage of inside/outside directors (Daily et al., 2003; 
Markarian & Parbonetti, 2007; Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012).  These measures are useful, 
but have been confounded in that the percentage of inside/outside directors has generally 
included affiliated directors in the independent director count, skewing the result and not 
accurately reflecting the ties and allegiances affiliated directors have with management.  As 
such, these measures are not nuanced enough to capture the true influence of board 
independence related to structure.   
There is a much broader realm of potential board structural elements that may contribute to 
strengthen (or weaken) the structural power of independent board members including board 
substructures (committees), prominent independent directors as a result of structural 
committee assignments, and director chairpersonships.  I suggest that a more appropriate 
group of items to consider in terms of structural power attributable to independent board 
members could include:  board size; board independence (of outside directors); number of 
board committees; management influences on director appointment; director compensation; 
and, chairperson independence.   I now consider each of these elements below, developing 
why they are important for inclusion as part of board independence structural power.  
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Board size.  The overall size of the board impacts the number of independent 
directors required to form a majority.  While board size must be a minimum of three 
members, there is no maximum size.  However, boards are rarely largely than 15 members 
and it is considered that effective board should have no more than seven or eight members 
(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) although as previously outlined, the empirical evidence linking 
board size to firm performance remains ambiguous.  While group conflict can assist in 
financial performance and strategic decision-making (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), the 
results regarding conflict and organizational performance are mixed.  Larger boards have 
been found to have higher levels of conflict and take longer to make strategic decisions in 
response to the external environment (Goodstein et al., 1994).  SOX changes may 
exacerbate this situation if boards add on independent directors to ensure enough members 
for a majority of independent directors on the full board and on committees without 
subtracting directors from the overall board.  Smaller boards with a smaller number of 
independent directors may see greater interaction between these directors due to their 
increased prominence on SOX-mandated committees.  However, because they are fewer in 
number, it is easier for them to be targeted and influenced by management representatives 
through social and professional contact and they may be more easily co-opted.  Given that 
governance literature generally has suggested that smaller boards are more efficient than 
large boards (Linck et al., 2009), I suggest that board size is a negative contributor to board 
independence power.   As boards that are too small may be subject to groupthink, there may 
also be an ideal threshold for board size, after which they become too large to be effective; 
as such, I suggest that there could be is a potential curvilinear (inverted-U shape) 
relationship between board size and board independence power.    
Board independence.  The concept and role of board independence has already been 
discussed at length in this study.   Both the presence and proportion of independent directors 
contribute to effectiveness of board monitoring.  As noted by Aguilera (2005: S49), “there 
are strong perceptions that independent directors lead to increased good governance”.  
Boards on which these directors are independent (not affiliated directors) will have a greater 
ability to balance the influence of management and overturn decisions that are counter to 
board-level decisions that are associated with protecting shareholder value.  Board 
independence structural power should be heightened on boards with a higher percentage of 
 53  
independent directors. 
Number of board committees.  While board size, CEO duality and the percentage of 
outsiders have dominated the corporate governance discussion of overall board effectiveness 
and its subsequent link to firm performance, when the level of analysis is changed to the 
committee level where “boards usually do most of their work” (Adams et al., 2010: 90), 
these three attributes are not as relevant.  Horner (2009: 48) notes that this shift in the level 
of analysis is important as it reflects different choices made by boards: “The division of 
work on the board into committees represents a certain amount of horizontal differentiation 
within the board, although this has received relatively little scholarly attention”.  The 
number of committees is an important structural characteristic.  If there are a small number 
of committees, there is a less of a draw on a director’s time as they are not expected to 
participate on multiple committees.  If there are a large number of committees, depending on 
board size, they may be asked to serve on multiple committees.  Governance literature has 
traditionally suggested that multiple committee membership is a negative element for 
independence as directors have limited time and therefore will not be able to perform the 
monitoring role as effectively as if they were on a smaller number of committees (Jiraporn et 
al., 2009).  In addition, a greater number of committees may create a dispersion of power 
amongst the committees, reducing the probability of interaction amongst the board 
members.  As a result, I suggest that the number of board committees will be a negative 
contributor to board independence structural power.  
Superdirectors.  Individual board members who have a high number of connections 
to other directors as a result of their presence on more than one of the SOX committees can 
serve as a conduit, moderating the information flow between committees and strengthening 
the monitoring ability of independent directors as a result.  I consider these individuals to be 
“superdirectors”, defined as independent directors who sit on all three of the SOX-mandated 
committees.  To date, research into board committees has not examined this phenomenon.  
However, given the SOX requirement for solely independent directors on the audit, 
nominating and compensation committees, it is anticipated that there will be an increased 
number of superdirectors on boards since the governance changes.  Superdirectors have 
access to increased information and thus are better able to monitor and evaluate the 
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effectiveness of organizational governance controls.  In so doing, they may be identified by 
their peers on the board as an alternate power source to that offered by management, usually 
manifested through CEOs who occupy a dual role as board chair.  By serving as a foil to 
CEO/Chairs, superdirectors can balance CEO power and empower other independent 
directors to ensure that the board is acting in ways that protect shareholder value by 
vigilantly monitoring management; therefore, they should be a positive contributor to board 
independence structural power.    
One must recognize that there are some negative elements in board members being selected 
as superdirectors.  Sitting on the three mandate committees – audit, nominating and 
compensation – is a large time commitment in terms of reviewing materials and attending 
committee meetings.  As such, directors may not perform the task to the best of their ability.  
Independent directors who are superdirectors will need to be particularly vigilant in order to 
stay on top of their monitoring responsibilities.  In addition, it may be challenging to find 
independent directors with the skill set to be competent in performing the diverse tasks 
required of all three committees, in particular the financial expertise required for the audit 
committee.   However, research has demonstrated that individuals with more centrality in 
organizations (as evidenced through a higher number of committee memberships) may be 
perceived as holding more power (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). 
The power of superdirectors can either serve as a foil to the CEO or be coopted by the CEO.  
In the first instance, superdirectors would use their influence to diminish the power of the 
CEO; this could manifest in observable ways such as lower compensation than the industry 
average or fewer financial restatements.  Alternatively, CEOs could recognize the power of 
superdirectors (or even place them in that position) and coopt their influence to further boost 
the power of the CEO.  In these instances, we should expect CEO compensation higher than 
the industry average and minimal board monitoring.  This latter condition would be 
expected if superdirectors were in fact actually affiliated directors rather than completely 
independent.  However, independent superdirectors are expected to positively contribute to 
board independence structural power.  
       Timing of board appointment.  A possible influence on board independence structural 
power is the timing around the appointment of independent directors relative to the current 
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CEO.  As outlined in Chapter 2, directors appointed under the existing CEO may feel an 
obligation to them which could impact the ability of an independent director to appropriately 
monitor and act upon management behaviour (Kim & Cannella, 2008; Westphal & Zajac, 
1995).  In addition,  Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) found a positive association between 
CEO involvement in board selection and a lower proportion of independent directors.   
While governance research is unclear on the relationship between director selection and firm 
performance (Kim & Cannella, 2008), the appointment process through which an 
independent director is named to a board may influence their actions once on the board 
itself.  The creation of a completely independent nomination committee under the SOX 
changes was intended to augment the transparency of new board appointments; however, 
directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure may be unduly influenced by them.  I 
suggest that the timing of the board appointment, specifically whether independent directors 
are appointed during the tenure of the existing CEO will serve as a negative element of 
board independence structural power.   
Independent chairperson.  Much attention has been paid to the influence of CEO 
duality on board behaviour and firm performance, in particular how it augments CEO power 
and weakens board power.  However, there are actually three potential scenarios for the 
board chair instead of only the CEO duality-non CEO duality dyad.  The board chair can be 
the CEO, be an affiliated director (which would capture former CEOs as they were once 
firm employees) or be an independent director.  I suggest that board chairs who are 
completely independent directors would positively contribute to board independence 
structural power as they have more outside and independent control of information and 
board process than if the board chair was also a member of management or an affiliated 
director.  To the best of my knowledge, there is little governance research that looks at this 
more nuanced occurrence of boards with independent chairs and considers how it 
contributes to the power of independent directors.   
Lead independent director.  In the absence of an independent chairperson, the 
presence of a lead independent director should also contribute in a positive way to board 
independence structural power as they are the named representative of the independent 
elements of the board.  Their impact has been suggested to contribute to board power 
 56  
(Horner, 2009).  Their positive influence on monitoring management behaviour may only 
hold if they are an independent rather than an affiliated director.   
I suggest that overall, these elements of board independence structural power work in a 
positive way to augment the hypothesized impact of the SOX structural changes on board 
governance.  Agency theory suggests that the independent elements of the board serve the 
purpose of monitoring and evaluating management behaviour.  This is similar to the goal of 
the SOX changes of enhancing the independence elements of boards, largely through 
structural changes themselves.  Boards that have adopted additional measures that 
structurally increase the power of the independent elements of the board should amplify the 
effect of the SOX structural changes in a way that is positively reflected in selected 
governance practices that are associated with protecting shareholder value.  I suggest that 
this impact should be carried across each of the relationships put forward in Hypotheses 1 to 
4.   Therefore, I put forward the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a:  The relationship between board independence and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
board independence structural power. 
Hypothesis 5b:  The relationship between the existence of the audit, nominating and 
compensation committees and selected governance practices that support 
shareholder value is positively moderated by board independence structural power. 
Hypothesis 5c:  The relationship between the level of committee independence on the 
audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected governance practices 
that support governance practices is positively moderated by board independence 
structural power.   
Hypothesis 5d:  The relationship between the SOX structural changes and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
board independence structural power. 
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4.3.2  Board Independence Ownership Power 
There is a breadth of corporate governance literature that ties board equity to stronger 
monitoring of management behaviour (Boyd, 1994; Kim & Cannella, 2008).  Board 
ownership power has been explored in governance research;  Shen and Canella  (2002) 
presented board power as the percentage of outside directors and the sum of the percentage 
of firm shares held by outside directors and the percentage of shares held by large, outside 
owners.  Conceptually, independent board members who hold higher levels of the 
company’s stock are more closely linked from a financial perspective to the success of the 
firm, tied to the shareholders they are representing on the board (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; 
Jensen, 1989).  As such, they should be more vigilant in monitoring management behaviour 
to ensure that shareholder value is protected.  Bhagat and Bolton (2013) suggested that by 
itself, dollar ownership of board members could be used as proxy for corporate governance 
standards as it is simple and less prone to measurement error.  
It should be noted that some countries including the United Kingdom are considering a 
completely opposite approach to share ownership by directors, suggesting that by financially 
tying directors to the company they are hampering their ability to work in the best interest of 
the corporation and are instead incenting short-term financial gain. The counter argument is 
that if individuals have nothing at stake in the firm, then they could take decisions that are 
very risky as they will not personally (or financially) suffer the consequences of their 
decision.  This study follows the research stream where shareholding by both senior 
management and independent directors is perceived to support the achievement of 
shareholder supported organizational goals.   
Independent directors are often considered to be a homogeneous group with common goals; 
this is not generally the case.  A significant proportion of corporate equity in the United 
States is owned by institutional investors who play an active role in firm strategies with the 
goal of maximizing shareholder value  (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003).  The 
power of institutional directors as representatives of owners on the board has been 
traditionally thought of as a mechanism to control managerial opportunism (Smith, 1996; 
Useem, 1996) when perceived to be at odds with the maximization of shareholder value. As 
suggested by Barney (1996: 408), “large institutional investors have very strong incentives 
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to monitor the behavior of firms, to ensure that decision are made in ways that enhance the 
value of their investment”.  The effect of independent director share ownership should be 
further augmented if there are independent directors on the board who are also institutional 
owners (owning 5 per cent or more of the company’s shares) or are representatives of 
institutional owners (blockshareholders) (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Boyd, 1994; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Kosnik, 1987; Zajac & Westphal, 1996a). Similar to the effect of board 
equity, the larger the number of independent, institutional directors on a board, the stronger 
the monitoring of management actions.  Given these two elements, I suggest that board 
independence ownership power will be positively augmented by board equity and the 
number of independent, institutional directors on a board.  Therefore, I put forward the 
following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 6a:  The relationship between board independence and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
board independence ownership power. 
Hypothesis 6b:  The relationship between the existence of the audit, nominating and 
compensation committees and selected governance practices that support 
shareholder value is positively moderated by board independence ownership power. 
Hypothesis 6c:  The relationship between the level of committee independence on the 
audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected governance practices 
that support shareholder value is positively moderated by board independence 
ownership power.   
Hypothesis 6d:  The relationship between the SOX structural changes and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
board independence ownership power. 
4.3.3  Board Independence Expertise Power 
The attributes, skills, and experiences of directors gained both because of and outside of 
their board role provide them with differing levels of ability as related to their effectiveness 
in monitoring.   The expertise of an individual can impact their ability to perform and be 
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effective in their job (Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2013) and may change the perception of 
their abilities by their peers.  Director expertise may impact their committee assignment 
(Klein, 2002; Peterson & Philpot, 2007), influence how often they are sought out for their 
advice (Finkelstein, 1992) and moderate management power (Gul & Leung, 2004).   The 
level of expertise should influence the power of independent directors as a depth of 
experience provides them with a broader knowledge base through which to monitor 
management behaviour.  While beyond the scope of this study, independent director 
expertise should also augment their resource-provision and advice-giving roles (O'Connor, 
Byrne, & Michayluk, 2015).  The latter should particularly be true for early-stage firms 
where it is anticipated that advice is readily sought from directors with experience in similar 
industries.  I suggest that board independence expertise power be constructed from director 
age, director tenure and director experiences.   
Director age.  While age is an attribute that is automatically gained rather than 
achieved through effort, experience is gained through exposure to different occurrences over 
time.  From a business perspective, the older one is, the longer one has had to learn from 
events and positions in industry.  There has been more time to develop broader and deeper 
networks of contacts and greater opportunities to be exposed to heterogeneous people, 
organizations and situations.  Ceteris paribus, directors who are older are able to draw on 
their cumulative experiences to more effectively monitor management behaviour and may 
have a broader repertoire of solutions and recommendations for dealing with both positive 
and negative organizational behaviour.  Director age has been positively linked to stronger 
shareholder protection  (Tompkins & Hendershott, 2012) and selection criteria for new 
CEOs (Davidson, Nemec, & Worrell, 2006).   I suggest that age is a positive contributor to 
board independence expertise power.     However, it may also be true that as directors age, 
they become more entrenched in their beliefs and practices which may result in board 
inaction.  As a result, it may be that age has a curvilinear (inverted-U shape) relationship 
with board independence expertise power.   
Director tenure.   Directors who remain on a board for an extended period of time 
may have a greater depth of understructure/prestige about the firm given that they have had 
time to better learn about the company and have a stronger appreciation of how the focal 
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firm fits within the context of the overall industry.  This would make them stronger monitors 
of management behaviour strengthening corporate governance on the board.  However, as 
directors remain on a board, they build stronger relationships with management, thus 
increasing the likelihood of being co-opted by the management elements of the board 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Hillman et al., 2011; Vafeas, 2003).  As a result, even though 
over time independent directors may gain knowledge about and familiarity with the 
organization which leads to stronger monitoring, it may be overshadowed by the likelihood 
that this monitoring will not lead to positive changes in governance practices of the board 
over time because they will have lost the impartiality due to overfamiliarity with 
management.  Therefore, I suggest it necessary to test both relationships, a positive linear 
one and one which explores director tenure as a curvilinear (inverted-U shape) influence on 
board independence expertise power, where monitoring by independent directors becomes 
stronger as they gain knowledge about the firm, but over time becomes influenced by 
relationships with management and monitoring effectiveness declines.   
Director experience.  The experiences of directors have been positively related to the 
firm’s performance (Chan & Li, 2008; He & Mahoney, 2006) as well as to challenges with 
governance conditions in the pre-SOX regime.  Director experience may also influence the 
placement of directors on committees (Erkens & Bonner, 2013).   Independent directors who 
have management experience and who are able to understand and interpret financial metrics 
should have a stronger ability to monitor management behaviour as they have greater 
familiarity with business norms and artefacts.  Independent directors with these 
characteristics will, through their related experience, be able to appropriately benchmark 
issues such as CEO compensation and organizational performance against other 
organizations.  This expertise should also heighten the ability of these independent directors 
to recognize when management is attempting to exert undue control or not provide fulsome 
information when it comes to governance provisions brought before these committees.   As a 
result, the financial and management experience of independent directors should positively 
contribute to board independence expertise power.   
I suggest that overall, items contribute, in both a positive and negative way to board 
independence expertise power.  As they exist concurrently, they will work in tandem to 
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influence the impact of the SOX structural changes on selected board governance practices 
that protect shareholder value.  Therefore, I put forward the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7a:  The relationship between board independence and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
board independence expertise power. 
Hypothesis 7b:  The relationship between the existence of the audit, nominating and 
compensation committees and selected governance practices that support 
shareholder value is positively moderated by board independence expertise power. 
Hypothesis 7c:  The relationship between the level of committee independence on the 
audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected governance practices 
that support shareholder value is positively moderated by board independence 
expertise power.   
Hypothesis 7d:  The relationship between the SOX structural changes and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
board independence expertise power. 
4.3.4  Board Independence Prestige Power 
The fourth dimension of power is that related to prestige.  Lewellyn and Muller-Kahn (2012: 
294) considered prestige to be “commanding position in people’s minds”.   It is a concept 
that has been used to varying degrees in the construction of CEO power (Finkelstein, 1992; 
Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001; Tang et al., 2011) and can equally be applied to 
independent directors.  Independent directors who are perceived to have high levels of 
prestige are likely to be more respected and adhered to than those with lower levels of 
prestige.  They may enjoy more prominent committee appointments, longer board tenure, 
and be publicly associated with the company through media accessibility.  Companies, 
especially those in early states of growth may be interested in prestigious directors as a 
mechanism for attracting capital or talent to the organization (Deutsch & Ross, 2003; 
Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010); research has found a linear relationship 
between the number of prestigious outside directors and a firm’s IPO valuation (Pollock et 
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al., 2010).  I suggest that beyond the resource-provision role, prestigious directors may be 
more effective monitors of firm behaviour as they recognize the importance of catching 
improper activity early so that it does not become a scandal that would tarnish their 
reputation.  In addition, because they derive power from their prestige position, they are 
more willing to monitor board governance practices and voice their opinion with regard to it.  
As they have power relative to the rest of their director peers, their opinion will be more 
readily sought and followed.   I suggest that board independence prestige power is formed 
through the external appointments held by independent directors and by their graduation 
from elite education institutions.    
Board appointments.   Independent board members may serve a similar role on other 
boards.  Corporate governance research has looked extensively at this occurrence, 
particularly from the perspective of board interlocks and its assistance with the resource 
provision elements of boards (Shropshire, 2010).  The number of additional boards upon 
which an independent director serves may not only provide them with additional experience 
and information about organizational norms, it signals their desirability in the broader 
director market.  Prestige is a reputational concept and a director’s reputation may be 
enhanced if they hold multiple board appointments (Finkelstein, 1992).  This may translate 
into greater respect from management, peer directors on the board, and the broader business 
community (including analysts).  While beyond the scope of this study, it may also cause an 
internal psychological effect; the increased deference from peers as a result of the increased 
board appointments augments the individual director’s feeling of self-worth which makes 
them (consciously or unconsciously) adopt an enhanced air of power which in turn, makes 
them even more highly valued by their peers (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004). I 
suggest that the number of board appointments may be a positive element of board 
independence prestige power.  However, independent directors who sit on a large number of 
committees or on many other boards may have less attention to spend on any one board in 
particular and as a result, may not have enough time to do a thorough job of monitoring 
management behaviour (Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2004; Ghosh, 2007; Harris & 
Raviv, 2008; Jiraporn et al., 2009; Volonté, 2015).  As such, there may also be an inflection 
point on the number of outside board appointments that are ideal before monitoring 
performance slips, thus suggesting a curvilinear relationship between board appointments 
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and monitoring.  I further suggest the number of board appointments may have a curvilinear 
relationship (inverted-U shape) with board independence prestige power.  
Elite education.  The upper echelon literature has examined the role of elite 
education on the appointment of both CEOs and directors (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003; 
Nguyen, 2012).  Elite education is considered to be attending and receiving degrees from 
universities and colleges that are perceived to be the best and most selective in terms of 
acceptance and matriculation.  By being selected to attend and attending an elite academic 
institution, a signal is sent to one’s peers and to the broader community about one’s abilities 
and place in society.  It conveys status on individuals and creates a network of both 
immediate peers at the institution, alumni from the institution as well as those individuals 
who attended or were associated with institutions in the same category (e.g. Ivy league in the 
United States).  It may also influence who is invited to be nominated for directorships if a 
firm is looking to augment the company’s prestige or if it is perceived that as a result of the 
elite education, both resource-provision and advice-giving could be strong (Finkelstein, 
1992).  Independent directors with elite education should positively contribute to board 
independence structural power in that as a result of attending an elite institution, they should 
be effective monitors of organizational behaviour because they have gained an inherent 
power from their education.  It should be noted that this effect could be diminished if the 
independent directors and the management of the organization share elite network 
affiliations.  Finkelstein (1992) compiled a list of academic institutions considered to be elite 
establishments as determined by their rankings in undergraduate education, MBAs and law 
degrees; he determined that elite education contributed to CEO prestige.  I suggest that elite 
education will positively contribute to board independence prestige power.   
There is likely to be a cumulative effect with these two items in that the greater the number 
of board appointments and the attendance at elite schools, the higher the perceived prestige 
of the individual director.  As a result, these items will positively work in tandem to create 
the dimension of board independence prestige power.  Therefore, I put forward the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 8a:  The relationship between board independence and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
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board independence prestige power. 
Hypothesis 8b: The relationship between the existence of the audit, nominating and 
compensation committees and selected governance practices that support 
shareholder value is positively moderated by board independence prestige power. 
Hypothesis 8c:  The relationship between the level of committee independence on the 
audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected governance practices 
that support shareholder value is positively moderated by board independence 
prestige power.   
Hypothesis 8d:  The relationship between the SOX structural changes and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
board independence prestige power. 
4.3.5  Board Independence Power - Index 
While I hypothesize a relationship between each of the four power dimensions for board 
independence power (structural, ownership, expertise and prestige), these elements occur 
concurrently.   As I suggest that board independence power is a formative construct, all of 
these power dimensions may work in combination to provide a more powerful effect.  
Researchers also have suggested that multiple measures may be important to capture all 
facets of a construct (Boyd, 1994; Haynes & Hillman, 2010).  Boards that exhibit higher 
levels of board independence power across all four facets should provide stronger 
monitoring and as a result, work to amplify the hypothesized positive impact of the SOX 
changes.  Therefore, I put forward the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 9a:  The relationship between board independence and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
overall board independence power. 
Hypothesis 9b: The relationship between the existence of the audit, nominating and 
compensation committees and selected governance practices that support 
shareholder value is positively moderated by overall board independence power. 
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Hypothesis 9c:  The relationship between the level of committee independence on the 
audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected governance practices 
that support shareholder value is positively moderated by overall board 
independence power.   
Hypothesis 9d:  The relationship between the SOX structural changes and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
overall board independence power. 
In summary, I suggest that the moderating effect of board independence power on the SOX 
structural changes will positively impact selected governance practices that support 
shareholder value in that under higher levels of board independence power, there is a 
significantly stronger positive relationship between SOX structural changes and low 
management entrenchment.  The hypothesized effects are summarized in Figure 2 below. 
 Figure 2:  The Hypothesized Effect of SOX Structural Changes and Board Independence Power on Management Entrenchment 
  At risk for management entrenchment  
Highest potential for low management entrenchment 
 Highest potential for management entrenchment   
 At risk for management entrenchment 
 
Low adherence to SOX structural changes 
High adherence to SOX structural changes 
Weak board independence power 
Strong board independence power 
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5.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1  Methodological Approach       
5.1.1  Research Design 
The complexity of my research question demands a careful consideration of the quantitative 
research design.  I first develop board independence power to determine the most 
appropriate composition of this construct.  I support my theoretical and statistical testing of 
the board independence power construct by interviewing seven independent directors of 
public boards of American companies in order to establish face validity for the board 
independence power construct.  Details related to these interviews are provided in Chapter 
6.1. 
I then test the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 3 that propose a direct, positive 
relationship between SOX structural changes and low management entrenchment that are 
associated with protecting shareholder value, followed by the hypotheses in Chapter 4 that 
propose how the relationship between SOX changes and low management entrenchment that 
are associated with protecting shareholder value are moderated by board independence 
power.  I test the hypotheses for both time frames of interest (pre- and post-SOX) and also 
explore whether there were lagged effects.   
5.2  Sample and Data Collection 
This research utilized a sample of firms drawn from the S&P 500 as of July, 2010.   The use 
of the S&P 500 for the sample of firms has been widely employed in corporate governance 
research (Haynes & Hillman, 2010) due to the importance of the operation of these firms in 
the global economy and the public availability of data over a number of years.  The initial 
sample began with the entire S&P 500 population in 2009.   I then removed 80 firms that 
were classified as Financial as per the S&P 500 industry index, as firm performance is 
challenging to develop and interpret in regulated industries (Liu & Jiraporn, 2010; Mak & 
Kusnadi, 2005; Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010).   This left a sample of 420 firms.  I eliminated a 
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further 22 firms where complete information was not available for key variables, resulting in 
a starting sample of 398 firms in 2009.       
I then broadened the years encompassing 1999 to 2009 in order to create a longitudinal 
dataset; the breadth of this data allowed for the analysis of pre- and post-SOX timeframes in 
order to compare them.  Other work has used this split sample approach to look at 
governance performance in these two timeframes specifically related to governance indices 
(Armstrong, Core, & Guay, 2014; Bhagat & Bolton, 2009.; Bolton, 2014; Brown & Nyonna, 
2015; Garvis, 2009; Harp, Myring, & Shortridge, 2014; Wang et al., 2014). The 1999 to 
2009 timeframe was selected to allow for the lagging of the dependent variables (to 2011) 
and in recognition of the fact that information on key variables (committee composition) 
was not readily available prior to 1998.  I included firms that were in existence for the 
majority of the 1999 to 2009 timeframe and for whom data on the dependent and 
independent variables were available.  This resulted in a final sample of 335 firms that were 
included in both the pre and post-SOX timeframes with a total of 3,675 observations.     
For this proposed sample, corporate governance information was gathered from the 
Bloomberg, RiskMetrics, and BoardEx databases for the respective board and committee 
composition of the firms in the sample.  Information on individual directors, where required 
was accessed from BoardEx, ExecuComp, RiskMetrics, and SEC datasources that contained 
information on historic firm proxy statements. Additional information was drawn from 
Compustat and company annual reports as required.     
5.3  Variables    
In this section I outline the variables that were used to test my hypotheses.  I first present the 
dependent variables, followed by the independent variables and the control variables.   
However, it may take time for the relationship between the independent variable of SOX 
structural changes and the interaction term of SOX structural changes and board 
independence power to have an impact on the dependent variable (E-Index).  Given that it is 
difficult a priori to anticipate the appropriate lag structure, in addition to a model where all 
variables are measured and tested at time t, I also tested models where the independent and 
control variables were measured at time t and the dependent variables were first measured at 
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t+1 and then at t+2  to allow for the possibility that the effect was delayed (Mitchell & 
James, 2001; Tang et al., 2011).   
Dependent Variable 
5.3.1  Governance Practices 
Governance research has developed a small number of governance indices that are proxies 
for governance practices at the board level that protect shareholder value (Alimehmeti & 
Paletta, 2014).   For this study, I used governance practices at the board level as my 
dependent variable in all of the hypotheses and operationalized the construct as per the 
methodology of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell in their Entrenchment Index (2009).  The 
Entrenchment Index (E-Index) includes six governance components found to be correlated 
with firm value and stockholder return: staggered boards; limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments; supermajority requirements for mergers; supermajority requirements for 
charter amendments; poison pills; and golden parachutes (Table 2).  Bebchuk et al. (2009: 
783) found “that increases in the level of this index are monotonically associated with 
economically significant reductions in firm valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q”. 
Therefore, high levels of the E-Index represent high management entrenchment.  I code 1 
for the presence of each of these provisions and 0 for their absence.  Given that relationships 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable may not be evident by 
considering the items comprising the E-Index when constructed as an index, I test the 
hypotheses in this study using the E-Index in two ways: the complete index (using Poisson 
regression models); and, with the six individual items (using logistic regression models).   
Table 2:  Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Measures 
Items Measured in the E-Index Description Staggered board A board in which directors serve overlapping terms, making it harder to replace board members all at the same time. Golden parachutes Severance deals that provide cash and other compensation to senior executives if they are terminated, demoted or resign as a result of a change in control.  This can incur a significant cost and does not have to be approved by shareholders.  
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Bylaw amendment limitation 
Restricts shareholders’ ability to amend the governing documents of the constitution except by a specified majority – often a supermajority. Charter amendment limitations 
Similar to the bylaw restriction, it limits a shareholder’s ability to amend the charter except by a specific majority – often a supermajority. Poison pill Defensive tactic to prevent takeovers.  An example could include allowing shareholders other than the one trying to acquire the firm, to purchase shares at a deep discount which drops the share price and dilutes the value of shares. They are only triggered by certain events. Supermajority Charter provisions that require a threshold of approval for mergers or other business transactions that are higher than those required by the state.  They are often 66.7, 75 or 85 per cent and are often higher than attendance at the annual meeting.   
For robustness, I also test the hypotheses using the methodology of Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) in their G-Index.  The GIM index has also been broadly used in corporate 
governance literature; high GIM scores connote weaker corporate governance practices.  It 
employs 24 indicator variables to construct an index that is considered to be representative 
of board governance practices that protect shareholder value by limiting management 
entrenchment.  It is important to note that there are issues with the G-Index, in particular its 
relationship with firm performance and stock market liquidity (Chung, Elder, & Kim, 2010).  
Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) found that while weak governance does predict operating 
underperformance, there is no subsequent relationship to reaction by the market. In similar 
research, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found no relationship between the G-Index and future 
stock performance.  However, this study did not consider the relationship between weak 
governance and firm performance but whether the SOX changes impacted selected board 
governance practices.  As a result, the G-Index was used as a representation of board choices 
where companies with low G-Index scores were considered to demonstrate governance 
practices that protect shareholder value in that they do not entrench management influence.   
The G-Index is constructed from 22 items that are associated with anti-takeover provisions 
(supporting management entrenchment) and two provisions that are associated with 
additional voting rights for shareholders.  Therefore, using the GIM governance index, I 
coded 1 for the presence of each of the 22 anti-takeover provisions.  For the two voting 
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provisions, I coded 1 for the absence of these provisions and 0 if they were present.  Table 3 
provides the items measured in the G-Index.   
Table 3:  Governance Measures at the Board Level in the G-Index 
Items Measured in the G-Index Description Delay  
Blank check Preferred stock over which the board has a broad latitude to determine rights including voting, dividends, etc. Classified board Also called a staggered board, is one in which directors serve overlapping terms, making it harder to replace board members all at the same time. Special meeting Either entirely eliminates the ability to call one, or increase the threshold of shareholder support required to call a special meeting beyond that specified by state law.  This adds time to proxy fights and is a delaying tactic.  Written consent Either eliminates the ability to take action based on written consent, or increases the threshold of shareholder support required for written consent beyond that specified by state law.  This adds time to proxy fights and is a delaying tactic.   Protection  
Compensation plans Those with changes-in-control provisions give participants who are enrolled in bonus plans the ability to cash out or accelerate their payments if organizational control changes.  Contracts  Contracts between a company and specific directors and officers that absolves them of certain legal expenses and judgements results from lawsuits pertaining to their conduct.  These contracts can be in addition to the indemnification clauses in the firm’s bylaws or charter.  Golden parachutes Severance deals that provide cash and other compensation to senior executives if they are terminated, demoted or resign as a result of a change in control.  This can incur a significant cost and does not have to be approved by shareholders. Indemnification  Similar to the liability clause below, these charter or bylaw provisions release officers or directors from responsibility from legal expenses of judgements based on their conduct. Liability Charter amendments limiting a director’s personal liability to the extent permitted by law. Severance Assured payments to top management team members when they leave the firm.  It is not contingent on a change of control in the organization and can be a significant financial payout of organizational resources. Voting  
Bylaw amendment Restricts shareholders’ ability to amend the governing documents of the constitution except by a specified majority – often a supermajority. 
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limitation 
Charter amendment limitations 
Similar to the bylaw restriction, it limits a shareholder’s ability to amend the charter except by a specific majority – often a supermajority. Cumulative voting Allows a shareholder to allocate their votes in any manner which could assist in helping minority shareholders.  This provision positively contributes to shareholder rights and so is coded 1 if it is absent.   Secret ballot Requires a neutral party, sworn to secrecy to count the proxy votes, eliminating potential conflict.  This provision positively contributes to shareholder rights and so is coded 1 if it is absent.  Supermajority Charter provisions that require a threshold of approval for mergers or other business transactions that are higher than those required by the state.  They are often 66.7, 75 or 85 per cent and are often higher than attendance at the annual meeting.   Unequal voting Provides different voting groups with either more or less voting power.  For example, when shareholders exceed a certain threshold of ownership their voting power becomes limited.  Other  
Antigreenmail Perceived by firms and states as a take-over defense, it requires the approval of a given majority of shareholders to agree to the buy-back of large blocks of shares purchased by a third-party.  The third-party usually insists on a premium in exchange for not seeking control of the company.   Directors’ duties Allow directors to consider groups beyond just stakeholders when making decisions.  This is seen as negative as it gives directors a legal basis for rejecting a takeover that may have benefitted shareholders. Fair price Limits the envelope of prices that a bidder can pay in two-tier offers, which in effect makes acquisitions more expensive and thus less likely to happen Pension parachutes Restrict an acquirer from using the additional cash in the pension fund of the target firm to finance the acquisition.   Poison pill Defensive tactic to prevent takeovers.  An example could include allowing shareholders other than the one trying to acquirer the firm, to purchase shares at a deep discount which drops the share price and dilutes the value of shares. They are only triggered by certain events. Silver parachutes Similar in concept to the golden parachute, but would include a broader group of employees.   Business combination laws Place a restriction on the types of transactions that can be undertaken between a significant shareholder and the company, unless they have the approval of the Board of Directors. Cash-out laws Shareholders are allowed to sell their shares to a controlling shareholder at a rate that is based on the highest price of recently acquired shares. This prevents shareholders from gaining an additional premium. 
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The data for both indices were obtained for 1999-2011 from the RiskMetrics database in 
order to allow for the testing of lags in selected board-level governance practices results 
(t+1, t+2).    
Independent Variables 
5.3.2  SOX Structural Conditions 
I use structural board changes passed through SOX in 2002 and the related major stock 
exchange listing changes which came into effect in 2003 to test whether they impacted 
board-level governance practices that are associated with protecting shareholder value.  As 
suggested by Hambrick, Werder and Zajac (2008: 384), “an individual firm’s governance 
arrangements are situated in a particular historical, social, and organizational context”.   
Thus, the consideration of the current state of corporate governance suggests a particular 
path dependency that must recognize the significant legislative shift in corporate governance 
in North America as a result of SOX.  As noted by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009: 233): 
“analyzing a regulation event helps mitigate the endogeneity problem, since changes to 
board structure can often be attributed to the rulings rather than to unobservable firm and 
CEO characteristics”.  The structural requirements encompassed three main items:  majority 
of independent directors on the board; presence of audit, compensation and nominating 
committees; and, the complete independence of the audit, compensation and nominating 
committees.   
Board independence.  This variable is the number of members of the board who are 
independent (neither affiliated nor management) directors divided by the total number of 
directors on the board.  This data are available from RiskMetrics.   
Presence of mandated committees.  This variable is constructed as a binary variable 
with 1 signifying the presence of the audit, compensation and nominating committees and 0 
if all three are not present (Conyon & Peck, 1998).  This data are available from 
RiskMetrics.   
Independence of mandated committees.  Each of the audit, nominating and 
compensation committees were binary coded where 1 is fully independent and 0 is not fully 
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independent.  Independent directors are those who are neither management nor affiliated 
with management.  The numbers from each committee were then added together, creating a 
range of 0 to 3 for each firm where a firm coded 3 had completely independent mandated 
committees.  This value was then converted into a binary value where firms with fully 
independent mandated committees received a “1” and those that did not received a “0”. This 
data are available from RiskMetrics.   
5.3.3  Board Independence Power   
As per the theoretical construction in Chapter 4, I now put forward the measurement 
methods for the variables that I test to validate whether to include them in the theorized four 
power dimensions for board independence power: structure; ownership; expertise; and, 
prestige.  As noted, the board independence power construct is new; the categorizations 
below are what I a priori predicted they would be.  Therefore, the elements that make up 
each of the four dimensions may need to be reclassified or removed depending on the 
findings from the components analysis.  I test multiple indicators for each dimension 
following the suggestion of Boyd (1994: 342) who when researching the impact of board 
control on CEO compensation found that “the results of the confirmatory factor model 
support the argument that board control be measured by multiple indicators”.  While this 
study considers board independence power rather than board control, the logic behind the 
creation of the formative board independence power construct is analogous. 
5.3.3.1  Board independence structure power 
I outline the proposed variables for board independence structure power below.   
Board size.  Board size, as measured as the number of directors appointed to a board, 
has been a commonly used element in the measure of the structure of a board (Boone et al., 
2007; Lehn et al., 2009; Linck et al., 2008) and in linkages to corporate performance (Coles 
et al., 2008; Dalton et al., 1999; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Wintoki et al., 2012).  Board size is 
important in the consideration of board independence as the overall size of the board 
impacts the number of independent directors required to form a majority.  For this research, 
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the number of directors on the board as of the company’s annual year-end was obtained 
through RiskMetrics, the firm’s proxy statements and LexisNexis Corporate Affiliations.  
Board size squared.  Research has demonstrated a curvilinear relationship between 
board size and firm performance (Coles et al., 2008).  Therefore, a board size squared 
variable was included as an element of structure.  
Independent board members.  The presence of a high number of outside members on 
the overall board can indicate a greater potential to independently monitor the management 
of the firm (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Byrd Kent & John, 1992; Daily et al., 2003).  It is an 
important variable for this research given the change under SOX that requires a majority of 
the board to be outside directors.  While board independence is included as one of the 
independent variables for this study as per the SOX changes, as I develop the dimensions of 
the board independence power construct, it is important to determine whether board 
independence loads as part of the board independence power dimension.  Thus, I include 
this variable which is the number of members of the board who are independent (neither 
affiliated nor management).  This data are available from RiskMetrics.  If board 
independence does load onto the board independence structural power dimension, it will be 
so noted but not included in the testing in hypotheses that include the board independence 
variable.   
Board committees.  The number of committees may impact the control dynamics of 
the overall board; boards that have created and then delegated responsibility to a large 
number of committees have a more decentralized model than boards with a small number of 
committees where power remains vested in the overall board.  I include the number of 
committees in recognition of the possibility of increased communication as the result of the 
presence of other committees (e.g. Executive, Safety) that may exist as part of a board 
substructure.  The number of board committees as of the company’s annual year-end was 
obtained through BoardEx, the Bloomberg database, LexisNexis Corporate Affiliations and 
RiskMetrics.   
Superdirectors.  As noted, I consider superdirectors to be completely independent 
directors who serve on all three of the audit, nominating and compensation committees.  
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While they may have also existed prior to SOX, the fundamental difference is now these 
superdirectors do not have a direct power struggle on the SOX committees as a management 
presence is prohibited.  As a result, they may act as a power foil to the management 
representatives on the board.  To construct this variable, I count the number of independent 
directors who sit on all three of the audit, nominating and compensation committees with a 
minimum count of 0 if a company has no superdirectors and the actual number of 
superdirectors if any exist.  This data are available from the Bloomberg database and 
RiskMetrics. 
Lead independent director.  The presence of a designated lead independent director 
may indicate the presence of a director who could serve as a power foil to the management 
members of the board, particularly in the context of a CEO who is also the board 
chairperson (CEO duality).   As a result, there are a number of possible scenarios where the 
presence or absence of a lead independent director could impact the structural power of the 
independent members of the board.  In order to recognize this complexity, the variable will 
be coded 0 if there is no lead independent director and there is CEO duality, 1 if there is no 
lead independent director and the Chairman is a former CEO of the focal firm, 2 if there is 
no lead independent director and the CEO is an affiliated director, 3 if there is a lead 
independent director and there is CEO duality, 4 if there is a lead independent director and 
the  Chairman is a former CEO of the focal firm, 5 if there is a lead independent director and 
there is an affiliated director chair and 6 if there is an independent board chair and no lead 
director.  If there is an independent board chair, there is no lead independent director 
required as an independent chair by definition is also an independent director.  The ordering 
of this variable represents the theorized influence of an independent lead director (from least 
to highest) on board decisions.  This data are available from RiskMetrics and Compustat.    
 Director appointment.  The length of time since a director was appointed to the 
board may be a function of their relationship with the CEO and impact their independence.  
As a measure of director independence, it is important to recognize whether the current 
directors are beholden to the CEO for their appointment as this may compromise their 
monitoring role (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999).  The director appointment variable is the 
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percentage of independent directors who were appointed prior to the current CEO.   The data 
are available from the RiskMetrics database. 
Director compensation.  How much a director is paid may influence their willingness 
to spend time monitoring the behaviour of management.  Boyd (1994) suggested that 
director compensation would have a negative relationship with board control and measured 
compensation as the average director cash pay which included the director’s annual retainer 
and their per meeting fee.  Committee pay was not included as not all directors sit on 
committees.  I measure director compensation following Boyd’s methodology by taking the 
average of the director annual retainer and the per meeting fee of the independent members 
of the board.  The data are available from the ExecuComp and RiskMetrics databases.   
Chairperson independence.  While similar to CEO duality, this measure captures 
whether the chairperson of the home company is an independent member of the board.  An 
independent board chair may be more likely to insist on strong monitoring provisions than a 
board chair who is a top management team member (often the CEO) or an affiliated director.  
This will not simply be the inverse of the CEO duality measure as there may be chairpersons 
who are affiliated directors.  The variable was coded “1” if the chairperson is an independent 
director and “0” if they are not.  This data are available from the Bloomberg database, 
RiskMetrics and LexisNexis Corporate Affiliations.   
5.3.3.2  Board independence ownership power 
Board independence ownership power is expected to be positively related to the willingness 
of independent board members to monitor management behaviour to ensure strong firm 
performance.  I capture this measure through the cumulative equity holdings in the home 
firm by independent directors and by the number of directors who are institutional (block) 
shareholders. 
Board independence equity.  The larger the number of shares in the firm held by 
independent directors, the stronger their incentive to ensure legitimate management 
behaviour that supports board governance practices that uphold shareholder value (Bhagat & 
Black, 1999; Boyd et al., 2011; McClain, 2011).  Indeed, Bhagat and Black  (2008: 259) 
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suggest that “efforts to improve corporate governance should focus on director stock 
ownership – since it is positively related to both future operating performance and to the 
probability of disciplinary management turnover in poorly performing firms” (emphasis 
theirs).  I measure this variable as the percentage of shares cumulatively held by independent 
directors.  This data are available through the Compustat, ExecuComp and RiskMetrics 
databases.   
Blockshareholder independence.  Corporate governance literature has also 
considered the role of institutional directors, often referred to as blockshareholders as 
another means of control over management (Combs et al., 2007; Conyon & Peck, 1998; 
Shen & Cannella, 2002).   Directors who represent institutional shareholders are directly 
aligned with shareholder interests and have a vested interest in rigorously monitoring 
management behaviour to ensure it maximizes shareholder value.  I consider 
blockshareholders to be individuals or organizations who hold over five per cent of 
outstanding shares and consider that it is not just the total share held, but also the number of 
independent board members who are also blockshareholders that may impact board 
independence ownership power.  I include a variable that is a count of the number of 
independent directors who own more than five per cent of the home firm’s outstanding 
shares.   This data are available from the Blockholders database, RiskMetrics and through 
Compustat.    
5.3.3.3  Board independence expertise power 
The ability of the independent directors of the board to perform their monitoring function 
and their willingness and ability to represent the best interests of shareholders may be 
dependent on their expertise.  I include the following variables in determining board 
independence expertise power. 
Director age.  The older a director, the more likely they are to have to have broad 
expertise that will assist in monitoring management behaviour (Koehn & Ueng, 2005; 
Sonnenfeld, 2004; Tompkins & Hendershott, 2012).  In addition, the defence sometimes 
afforded to older individuals can assist independent directors who are older in influencing 
the other members of the board when it comes to decisions related to governance.  The age 
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of independent board members was collated for each company and then averaged for each 
firm.  This data are available through RiskMetrics and Compustat.   
Director age squared.  While the age of a board member may indicate more 
experience and as a result, higher monitoring effectiveness, it may also be true that there is 
an age plateau over which effectiveness begins to decrease.  Directors become set in their 
ways which could cause board inertia.  Therefore, an age squared variable was included as 
an element of expertise power.  This was compiled by first calculating the average age of the 
independent members of the board for each year of data and then squaring the term.   
Director tenure.  As noted in Chapter 3, the length of time an independent director 
spends on the board may provide them with a stronger knowledge of the organization and 
thus be a better monitor.  However, directors remaining on a board for increased periods of 
time may become entrenched and coopted by management representatives (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1998; Hillman et al., 2011).  As a result, this variable was constructed as the 
length of time each independent board member has served as an independent director on the 
home board. These tenure counts were averaged for each board.  This data are available 
through RiskMetrics 
 Director tenure squared. The value for director tenure was squared to test the 
hypothesized curvilinear (inverted-U shape) relationship between tenure and selected 
governance practices at the board level that are associated with protecting shareholder value.  
This data are available through RiskMetrics.   
 Independent directors with financial experience. Directors who have a financial 
background may have greater expertise when it comes to monitoring management behaviour 
and therefore be more vigilant when it comes to preventing board decisions that do not 
support governance decisions associated with protecting shareholder value (Finegold, 
Benson, & Hecht, 2007; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003).  This variable is an aggregated 
count of the number of independent board members with financial experience.  Each 
independent board member received a “1” if they have a degree from a post-secondary 
institution at the undergraduate or graduate level in an area related to business, finance or 
accounting (e.g. commerce, accounting or economics degrees, MBA, PhD in management) 
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and a “0” if they do not.  This data are available through BoardEx and LexisNexis 
Academic.   
 Independent directors who are CEOs.  Directors who are CEOs themselves also 
may have a greater expertise in determining when the governance behaviour of management 
is appropriate.  Given their “power” position in their home firm and the respect afforded to 
them as having the CEO title (Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz, 2010), independent directors who 
are also CEOs may also be less likely to be swayed by management influence and as such, 
should be considered a positive contributor to board independence expertise power.  
However, there is a school of thought that suggests that the director pool in North America 
is relatively small (Withers, Hillman, & Cannella, 2012) and directors who are CEOs 
themselves can be socially sanctioned if they do not behave in a way that supports 
management behaviour (Westphal & Khanna, 2003; Westphal & Zajac, 1997).  As such, I 
will note the directionality of the contribution of CEO experience in terms of how it 
contributes to board power.  This variable is an aggregated count of the number of 
independent board members who are currently CEOs.  Each independent board member 
received a “1” if they were a CEO in the focal year and a “0” if they were not.  This data are 
available through RiskMetrics, Compustat and LexisNexis Academic.   
5.3.3.4  Board independence prestige power 
The final power dimension reflects the power and deferral that may be afforded independent 
directors due to cachet related to current appointments or prestige education. I include two 
elements in the consideration of board independence prestige power. 
Appointments to boards.  Directors attain more regard in the view of their colleagues 
and shareholders when they are asked to sit on multiple boards; board directorship is viewed 
as a measure of distinction and recognition of structure/prestige and stature from the 
business community.  This variable is an aggregated count of the number of boards on 
which independent directors sit on outside the home firm.  This data are available from 
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters and LexisNexis Academic.   
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Appointments to boards squared.  The number of board appointments has been also 
been criticized as taking away from a director’s attention (Daily & Dalton, 2002; Hillman et 
al., 2011; Jiraporn et al., 2009).  Therefore, while prestige may be gained by directors sitting 
on other notable boards which adds to their influence over members of the home board and 
contributes positively to board independence prestige power, it will be important to watch 
whether there is a negative secondary effect as a result of director business.  This variable is 
an aggregated count of the number of boards on which independent directors sit on outside 
their home firm.  It was then squared to test for a curvilinear relationship (inverted-U shape).  
This data are available from Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters and LexisNexis Academic.   
Elite education.  In a similar vein, attendance at a prestigious academic institution 
provides directors with an aura of capability and respect (Erkens & Bonner, 2013).  In many 
ways, it is a signal of belonging to an intellectual community and matriculation from these 
schools can be considered to be a formative element of reputation.  Research has measured 
elite education through a number of methods.  Finkelstein (1992) created a list of elite U.S. 
educational institutions to construct his top management power variable.  While it is true 
that list was generated 20 years ago, recent governance research (Boivie, Graffin, & Pollock, 
2012) has either employed lists even less recent than this one such as those suggested by 
Useem and Karabel (1986) and Domhoff (Domhoff, 1970), used a subset of the Finkelstein 
(1992) list (Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2011; Erkens & Bonner, 2013), or did not clearly 
define which academic institutions were included (Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 2013).  Essen 
et al. (2013) determined that elite education, as compiled annually from U.S. News and 
World Report college rankings of the top 25 academic institutions generated similar results 
from that of Finkelstein (1992).  QS world university rankings, upon which the U.S. News 
and World Report is based, only began publishing rankings in 2004 and there are no other 
world university rankings that were undertaken prior to 2004 (e.g. Academic Ranking of 
World Universities, Times Higher Education World University Rankings).  The Finkelstein 
(1992) list of elite educational institutions only included schools in the United States.   
In order to present a more holistic and global representation of elite education, I use the 
institutions included in the Financial Times (FT) 1999 - 2009 rankings of the top 50 global 
business schools (Butler & Gurun, 2012; Muller-Kahle & Schiehll, 2013).  Academic 
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institutions were included if during this 11 year timeframe they existed in the rankings a 
majority of the time (six or more occurrences). This created a list of 50 schools.  I use 1999 
as the start year for two reasons: the FT began publishing rankings of global business 
schools in 1999 and it is the year of the start of this study.  The timeframe ends at 2009 as 
that is the last year of the data collection for the study so schools included after that period 
would not impact director selection.  The schools are provided in Table 4.  For each board, 
an independent director was coded with a “1” if they graduated from an elite school (at the 
undergraduate or graduate level) and “0” if they did not.  These numbers will then be 
aggregated for all of the independent directors on each board.  This data are available from 
BoardEx and LexisNexis Academic.   
Table 4:  Elite Academic Institutions (Financial Times, 1999-2009) 
Academic Institutions Cambridge University, U.K. Pennsylvania State University, U.S. Carnegie Mellon, U.S. Purdue University, U.S. Columbia University, U.S. Rice University, U.S. Cornell University, U.S. Stanford University, U.S. Cranfield University, U.K. Universite Bocconi, Italy Dartmouth College, U.S. University of California at Berkeley, U.S. Duke University, U.S. University of California at Los Angeles, U.S. Emory University, U.S. University of Chicago, U.S. Erasmus University, Netherlands University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, U.S. Georgetown University, U.S. University of Iowa, U.S. Harvard University, U.S. University of Maryland, U.S. HEC Paris, France University of Michigan, U.S. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, China University of Minnesota, U.S. Imperial College, U.K. University of Navarra, Spain Insead, France University of North Carolina, U.S. Instituto de Empreso (IE), Spain University of Pennsylvania, U.S. International Institute for Management Development (IMD), Switzerland University of Rochester, U.S. Lancaster University, U.K. University of Texas at Austin, U.S. London Business School, U.K. University of Toronto, Canada Manchester University, U.K. University of Virginia, U.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, U.S. University of Western Ontario, Canada 
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5.3.3.5  Board independence power index 
The preceding section outlined the variables that were included in the testing of the four 
proposed dimensions of board independence power.  These elements were tested as an index 
as “indexes incorporate measures of one or more dimensions of a construct into a single 
item, commonly using a summative approach” (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005: 245).  The index 
was constructed by first standardizing (within each year) and adding all of the items for each 
of the power dimensions of board independence power as determined through the factor 
analysis.  Then the value for each power dimension was summed to create an overall board 
independence power index that reflects the cumulative effect of the power dimensions.     
5.3.4 Control Variables 
In order to ensure that the performance effects being observed were related to the 
phenomena of interest, I include a number of control variables in my analysis.   
5.3.4.1  Management  power 
The latent or exercised power of management members on the board can directly impact the 
behaviour, decision-making and culture of the board and is reflected in governance literature 
as CEO control or CEO power (Albuquerque & Miao, 2006; Chikh & Filbien, 2011; Combs 
et al., 2007; Dalton et al., 1999; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Haynes & Hillman, 2010; 
Lewellyn & Muller‐Kahle, 2012; Liu & Jiraporn, 2010; Tang et al., 2011; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996b).  Finkelstein (1992: 506) defines top management 
team power as “the capacity of individual actors to exert their will” and constructs top 
management power as consisting of structure, ownership, expertise, and prestige power.  As 
previously outlined in Chapter 4, Finkelstein robustly theorizes and measures these power 
dimensions using the role of the CEO.   Given the opportunity for management to influence 
the oversight role of the board, it is important to include a measure of CEO power as a 
 83  
control in this analysis.  I operationalize the influence of management on the board by 
creating an index based on Finkelstein’s (2002) conceptualization of CEO power using the 
areas of structure, ownership, expertise, and prestige power.   
CEO Structural Power.  CEO structure is a measure of three variables:  CEO duality, 
CEO compensation and CEO titles.  While CEOs are prohibited from sitting on the three 
SOX-mandated committees, as discussed in Chapter 3 they are still an important influence 
on the board, particularly if they also serve in a Chairperson role.  CEO duality as of the 
company’s year-end was obtained through Compustat and constructed as a binary variable 
where if the CEO and Chairperson are the same individual it was coded as “1” and if they 
were not, it was coded as “0”.   CEO compensation is the total of the CEO’s annual cash 
compensation, their bonus and any other financial remuneration as part of their employment 
contract.  While increasingly long-term compensations such as stock options are being used 
as part of compensation packages, research conducted using cash only measures has been 
found to produce similar results (Tang et al., 2011).  Thus, the cash compensation measure 
was used to contribute to this measure.  This data are available from ExecuComp and 
Compustat.  Finally, the number of titles held by CEOs related to their current role can be a 
reflection of the number of areas over which they have functional control (Finkelstein, 1992; 
Tang et al., 2011).  As examples, in 2002 at the aluminum producer and recycler Alcoa, 
Alain J. P. Belda held titles of Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive 
Officer of the company. Similarly, in 2002 at construction machinery manufacturer 
Caterpillar, Glen A. Barton held Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer titles.  
The CEO title variable was a count of the number of separate titles currently held by the 
CEO of the home firm.  The data are available from the BoardEx database.   
CEO Ownership Power.  The amount of equity in the company held by inside 
directors can indicate the level of commitment to the success of the organization.  
Finkelstein (1992:509) suggests that “a top manager with significant shareholders in an 
organization will be more powerful than a manager without such a base of control”.  As a 
measure of this power, I include a variable that captures the percentage of outstanding shares 
owned by the CEO.   This data are available from RiskMetrics and Compustat.    
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CEO Expertise Power.  To capture the expertise of the CEO, I follow Finkelstein 
(1992) by including the age of the CEO and how long they have been in the CEO role.  The 
age of a CEO can impact the level of risk they are willing to undertake; as this could include 
organizational decisions impacting governance.  In addition, age can be a reflection of the 
gravitas of an individual which garners the respect of other board members and is a proxy 
for experience and capability (Simsek, 2007), although there are many examples of powerful 
CEOs who were relatively young when they held the position.  Therefore, age could be 
considered as a positive element of CEO power.  However, it also may be true that as CEOs 
get older, they may be less likely to undertake strategic change (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 
2010).  Matta and Beamish (2008) found that as CEOs approach retirement, those with 
higher levels of equity holding and unexercised options in their company are less likely to 
engage in higher-risk behaviour such as international acquisitions.  This may suggest that 
there may be a curvilinear relationship (inverted-U shape).  I include both the CEO age and 
the age of the CEO squared in order to consider both potential relationships.  This construct 
was created using data from the Bloomberg and Compustat databases.  Corporate 
governance literature has recognized the influence of CEO tenure on the operations of a 
board with the CEO gaining power the longer they hold the post (Boone et al., 2007; 
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  I construct CEO tenure as the 
length of time in years the CEO at the focal firm has held that role.  The data were obtained 
through Compustat and the Bloomberg database. 
CEO Prestige Power.  The aura of power around a CEO may also be gained by their 
perceived demand outside of the firm and perception of belonging.   I include a count of the 
number of external directorships held by the CEO.   By holding multiple directorships, 
CEOs can gain more information as well as build and maintain their own personal business 
networks (Useem, 1984).  This data are available from the Bloomberg database and from 
Compustat.  Prior attendance at an elite educational institution may add to the prestige of a 
CEO in the eyes of the independent members on the board, or may include them in social 
networks in which the independent directors are also members.  Institutions were included 
as elite schools if they appear in the Financial Times (FT) 1999 - 2009 rankings of the top 
50 global business schools at least six times during the 11 year timeframe of the study.  I use 
these schools to create an adapted variable to capture CEO elite education.  It was be coded 
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1 if the CEO attended an elite academic institution and 0 if they did not. The information 
about elite education was available through BoardEx. 
CEO Power Index.  Each measure of the index was first standardized within each 
year and then added together.  Each element of the index (structure, ownership, expertise, 
prestige) was then added together for the CEO power index (Combs et al., 2007; Shen & 
Cannella, 2002).  This measure was tested in the models in two ways:  first as a complete 
index; and, secondly as each CEO power dimension.  As similar results were obtained, I 
only present models that include each of the individual CEO power dimensions to better 
illustrate their impact.   
5.3.4.2  Board level 
Controls for board size and board size squared are included in models where they are not 
included as part of the construction of interaction terms (board independence structure 
power and board independence power index).     
5.3.4.3  Firm level 
I include a number of firm level variables in my research including firm size and past 
performance.  An organizational size control is often included in studies of board 
composition given its impact on organizational actions (Boone et al., 2007; Markarian & 
Parbonetti, 2007; Pearce & Zahra, 1992).  The size control variable was operationalized two 
ways:  through the firm’s market equity, calculated by taking the number of common shares 
outstanding at the company’s year-end and multiplying it by their year-end closing share 
price; and by the number of employees of the firm.  The natural log of market equity was 
used to ensure the normality of the data  (Boone et al., 2007).  Both numbers were obtained 
through Compustat.  Firm age was included as mature firms have been shown to have 
stronger governance practices  (O'Connor et al., 2015).  In addition, the  length of time the 
organization has been in existence may impact its ability to attract directors; older, 
established firms have years of reputation and pose less of a risk to directors’ reputation 
(Deutsch & Ross, 2003).  I calculate the age of the organization by subtracting the year the 
firm was established by the focal year in the dataset; this information were available from 
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BoardEx.  In addition, past performance may impact present day actions.  In this study, prior 
performance was controlled for by including the firm’s Tobin’s Q at t-1.     
5.3.4.4  Industry level 
Industry effects have been shown to have an impact on organizations such as on financial 
performance (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Rumelt, 1982).  In order to control for effects from 
specific industries, I constructed dummy variables for the nine industry categories (GIC 
codes) included in the S&P 500 industry index.  Table 5 provides a summary of the 
hypothesized variables for this study. 
Table 5:  Summary of Variables Included in the Study 
Variable Description Measurement Data Source(s) Dependent Variables Selected Governance Practices at the Board Level Associated with Protecting Shareholder Value 
 E-Index    Coded 0 to 6 for presence of governance entrenchment indicators, tested individually and added to be tested as an index (See Table 2 for a list of the six indicators and their description) 
Bebchuk Database  
Independent Variable Board Independence  Level of independence of the board 
 Percentage of board members who are independent (neither affiliated nor management) 
RiskMetrics 
Mandated Committee Presence  Existence of audit, nominating and compensation committees 
 Binary coded for the presence of each committee, then totalled and again converted to a “1” if all 3 committees are present and “0” if they are not   
BoardEx RiskMetrics  
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Committee Independence  Audit, nominating and compensation committees are comprised of only  independent members 
 Each of the audit, nominating and compensation committees are binary coded where 1= fully independent and 0=not fully independent.  These numbers are then added together for the consideration of all three committees  
RiskMetrics 
Moderator- Board Independence Power (anticipated structure)4 Board Independence Structural Power:   Board Size   Board Size2    Board independence 
    Committees   Superdirectors         Lead Independent Director     
   Number of people on the board  Square of number of people on the board  Members of the board who are neither management nor affiliated directors  Number of board committees  Number of independent directors who sit on all three mandated committees    Independent director who has been appointed as the lead director   
   Count of board members  Square of the number of board members  Percentage of board members who are independent (neither  affiliated nor management)  Count of board committees  Count of the number of independent directors who sit on all three of the audit, nominating and compensation committees  0=No lead independent director, CEO chair;  1=No lead independent director, Chair 
  BoardEx ExecuComp LexisNexis Corporate Affiliations RiskMetrics SEC Proxy Filings 
                                                 4 This list includes all of the hypothesized variables for each element of board independence power.  The list of the variables that were actually included as confirmed through a factor analysis are detailed in Chapter 6.   
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                Director Appointment     Director Compensation    Chairperson Independence   
                Independent directors were appointed prior to existing CEO   Outside director fees    Current board chair is an independent member of the board 
former CEO;  2=No lead independent director, Affiliated director chair; 3 = Lead independent director, CEO chair; 4=Lead independent director, Affiliated director chair; 5 = Lead independent director, Affiliated director chair; 6=No lead director, Independent chair  Percentage of independent directors  who were appointed prior to the existing CEO  Director annual retainer + per meeting fee in dollars  Current board chair is an independent member of the board= 1; board chair is not an independent member = 0 Board Independence Ownership Power  Board Independence Equity    Blockshareholder Independence  
   Equity held by independent directors   Independent directors who are also blockshareholders 
   Percentage of shares cumulatively held by independent directors  Number of independent directors who are also blockshareholders     
  Blockholders Database RiskMetrics  
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Board Independence Expertise Power  Director Age    Director Age2     Director Tenure      Director Tenure2  
 
  Financial Experience      CEO Experience 
   Average age of independent board members  Average age of independent board members squared   Average number of years independent board members have held directorship  Average tenure of independent board members squared   Independent board member has degree in finance or held a financial position in an organization  Independent board members who are a CEO of another firm 
   Age of independent  board members in years, averaged  Age of board members in years, averaged and then squared  Number of years independent board members have held positions on the board, averaged  Tenure of board members in years, averaged and then squared  Aggregated count of number of independent board members with financial experience   Aggregated count of number of independent board members who are currently CEOs of other firms 
  LexisNexis Academic RiskMetrics Thomson Reuters BoardEx  
Board Independence Prestige Power  Appointments to  Boards      Appointments to Boards2  
 
 
   
   Independent directors are also directors on other boards    Independent directors are also on other boards      
   Count of the number of boards independent directors sit on outside the home firm  Count of the number of boards independent directors sit on outside the home firm, squared   
  BoardEx Financial Times LexisNexis Academic RiskMetrics   
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 Elite Education  Independent directors graduated from an elite post-secondary institution at the graduate and/or undergraduate level  
 Categorized using Financial Times (1999-2009) 50 Top Ranking list of elite schools as follows: 1=graduated from an elite school and 0=did not graduate from an elite school.  These numbers are aggregated for all independent directors Control Variables CEO Power: CEO Structural Power  CEO Duality    Former CEO Duality    CEO Compensation    CEO Titles     CEO Ownership Power  CEO Equity  CEO Expertise Power  CEO Age   CEO Age2   CEO Tenure      
   CEO also chair of the board of directors  Chairman is a former CEO of the firm   CEO’s total cash compensation    Titles currently held by the CEO      CEO’s stock ownership   Age of the CEO   Square of the age of the CEO  Time CEO has held position     
   CEO and Chair = 1; CEO only=0   Former CEO and Chair =1; not Chair=0   CEO’s Total  cash salary + bonuses in millions of dollars  Count of the number of separate titles currently held by the CEO    Percentage of outstanding shares owned by CEO  Age of the CEO in years  Age of the CEO in years, squared  Time in years since CEO obtained position    
  Compustat  BoardEx ExecuComp Financial Times LexisNexis Corporate Affiliations RiskMetrics Thomson Reuters 
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CEO Prestige Power  Directorships    Elite Education  
  Directorships at companies held by CEO  CEO attended elite post-secondary institution at either the undergraduate or graduate level 
  Count of number of directorships held by CEO  Categorized using Financial Times (1999-2009) Top 50 Ranking  list of elite schools where 1=attended elite school and 0=did not attend an elite school Board Size  (included in models where it is not part of the interaction term) 
 Size of the board  Count of the number of board members RiskMetrics BoardEx 
Board Size2 (included in models where it is not part of the interaction term) 
 Size of the board, squared  The size of the board, squared RiskMetrics Board Ex 
Firm Size  Market equity of firm   Number of employees 
 End of year share price multiplied by outstanding shares  Number of employees  
Compustat 
Firm Age  Age of firm  Year firm was established minus focal year  
BoardEx 
Past Performance  Financial performance of the firm in the year prior to the target year 
 Tobin’s Q at t-1 Compustat 
Industry  The industry group in which the company participates 
 S&P 500 Industry Index Compustat 
Time  Year   Constructed as a wave for each year, resulting in 11 separate waves for the total dataset 
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6.  RESULTS 
I begin by presenting the result of the development of the board independence power 
construct, demonstrating both empirical and face validity.  I then provide the results for the 
main effect hypotheses (Hypotheses 1 to 4) followed by those involving the board 
independence power interaction term (Hypotheses 5 to 9).   For each hypothesis, I detail the 
complete results for the pre-SOX timeframe followed by the post-SOX timeframe.   
In order to test the hypotheses put forward in this study, I created a panel dataset with 
information on the dependent variables from 1999 to 2011 to allow for testing of lagged 
models (Tang et al., 2011) and from 1999 to 2009 for all independent and control variables.  
For the past performance control variable, the data collection was for years 1998 to 2008.  
The panel dataset was then divided into two smaller panels to allow for the identification of 
changes among time periods to be more evident.  These subsets included 1999 to 2003 (pre-
SOX) and 2004 to 2009 (post-SOX).  I first explored the overall dataset, testing the 
normality of the data and performing appropriate transformations.  Given that a number of 
the models (Hypotheses 5 to 9) included interaction terms, all continuous independent and 
control variables were centered within each year where appropriate to eliminate non-
essential multi-collinearity (Aiken & West, 1991).  For the construction of the interaction 
terms, the main effects were centered within each year and then the centered terms were 
multiplied together to construct the respective interaction terms.   
I used Stata (version 13.1) to run the analysis, performing statistical tests to identify the most 
appropriate model (fixed-effects or random-effects) for the analysis (Allison, 2009).  The 
dependent variable was first tested as an index (aggregated count data) and then as each 
individual measure (binary data).  As such, I used Stata to run panel Poisson regression 
models for the testing of the complete E-Index and panel logistic regression models for the 
testing of each of the six items in the Bebchuk index given that they are binary. Poisson 
regression was selected because as noted by Coxe, West and Aiken (2009: 121), “In cases in 
which the outcome variable is a count with a low arithmetic mean (typically <10), standard 
ordinary least squares regression may produce biased results”. All of the Poisson models had 
significant Wald chi-square statistics (p<.001) indicating that the models were valid.  
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6.1   Board Independence Power Construct  
While the concept of board power has been used in governance literature (Horner, 2009; 
Tang et al., 2011), I proposed the creation of the more nuanced construct of board 
independence power and developed the theoretical framework as outlined in Chapter 4.   To 
create the construct of board independence power, I followed the methodology of 
Finkelstein (1992) in his development and testing of the power types of top management 
power which included four factors: structural; ownership; expertise; and prestige.  This type 
of factor analysis was different than that used in other business disciplines as it was built 
from historic data rather than questionnaires with multiple questions assessing a single 
dimension. Other governance research has created board power measures with limited items 
in their index.  Shen and Canella (2002) constructed a board power index which only 
included the percentage of outside directors and the sum of the percentage of firm share held 
by outside directors and blockshareholders.  In addition, specific tests for inter-rater 
reliability were not conducted as this construct was developed with archival data based on 
historic fact rather than opinion.        
Using the dataset of 335 companies from 1999 to 2011 I collected a number of variables 
(outlined in Table 5) that related to boards (e.g. size), committees (e.g. number) and 
characteristics of independent directors (e.g. age, education, tenure) given that a priori it 
was impossible to know which variables would need to be included.  Using the theorized 
variables (see Table 5), I performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with a varimax 
rotation using SPSS Statistics (Version 23).  The EFA was initially performed on a random 
sample of 735 observations (approximately 20% of the dataset); however, given concerns 
with autocorrelation, the EFA was further conducted on each year of the data (1999-2009) 
resulting in 11 individual EFAs.  For each of the 11 EFAs, the same groupings were 
achieved suggesting an overall consistency in the finding.  In addition, the EFA for each 
year of analysis had a Kaiser Meyer Olkin Measure of Sampling that was equal to or greater 
than 0.7 suggesting the sample size used was appropriate for the factor analysis (Kaiser, 
1970). It was important to perform this test because the sample was below 400 for each year 
which has been suggested to be a reasonable sample size  (Osborne, Costello, & Kellow, 
2008)  Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (p<0.001) for each year of the data 
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suggesting a high probability of significant relationships between the variables and thus a 
greater confidence to continue with the factor analysis.   
It was uncertain before the analysis was conducted how many groupings would be suggested 
and whether the relationship would be in the suggested direction; I a priori theorized in 
Chapter 4 that they would be similar to the result achieved in top management team/CEO 
power analyses (Finkelstein, 1992; Tang, 2007).  The EFAs conducted for this study 
suggested convergent validity related to four factors with eigenvalues greater than one, 
similar but not identical to the factors created for the CEO Power Indices.   For parsimony, I 
do not provide the rotated component matrices for each year of the study. Table 6 provides 
the rotated component matrix for the random sample of 735 firms.  Tables 7, 8 and 9 provide 
the rotated component matrix for 1999, 2005 and 2009 respectively.  All four tables only 
report factors greater than or equal to 0.7.  
Table 6:  Rotated Component Matrix for Board Independence Power (Random Sample 
of N=735)  
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Table 7:  Rotated Component Matrix for Board Independence Power (1998) 
 
Table 8:  Rotated Component Matrix for Board Independence Power (2005) 
 
1 2 3 4
Board Size 0.83
Lead Outside Director 0.80
Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.66Average Indep. Director Equity 0.95Number of Indep. Blockshareholders 0.94Average age of Indep. Board Members 0.82Average Tenure of Indep. Board Members 0.72
Number of Indep. Directors 0.89
Number of Indep. Directors with Financial Experience 0.70Number of Indep. Directors with Elite Education 0.77Total Number of Board Memberships of Indep. Directors 0.75
N=333
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax w ith Kaiser Normalization.Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
1 2 3 4
Board Size 0.80
Lead Outside Director 0.74
Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.70Average Indep. Director Equity 0.99Number of Indep. Blockshareholders 0.98Average age of Indep. Board Members 0.81Average Tenure of Indep. Board Members 0.78
Number of Indep. Directors 0.90
Number of Indep. Directors with Financial Experience 0.70Number of Indep. Directors with Elite Education 0.76Total Number of Board Memberships of Indep. Directors 0.72
N=334
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax w ith Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 4 iterations.
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Table 9:  Rotated Component Matrix for Board Independence Power (2009) 
 
In the first analysis, it appeared that the four components identified through the factor 
analysis were broadly similar to the hypothesized categories, particularly in component 2 
which included the theorized elements of ownership power (equity and blockshareholders) 
and component 3 which included the theorized elements of expertise (age and tenure).  
However, component 1 combined the elements of structure and prestige (board size, number 
of independent directors, financial experience, elite education, and board memberships), and 
in the majority of years tested, component 4 presented an untheorized combination of the 
presence of a lead independent director and director compensation.  I renamed component 1 
board independence structure/prestige power for clarity throughout the rest of the analysis in 
this study. 
For the random sample of 735 firms as well as for each individual year of the study, I then 
tested the four suggested components for discriminant validity by ensuring that each of the 
1 2 3 4
Board Size 0.834
Lead Outside Director 0.798
Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.66Average Indep. Director Equity 0.951Number of Indep. Blockshareholders 0.943Average age of Indep. Board Members 0.824Average Tenure of Indep. Board Members 0.724
Number of Indep. Directors 0.886
Number of Indep. Directors with Financial Experience 0.699Number of Indep. Directors with Elite Education 0.765Total Number of Board Memberships of Indep. Directors 0.748
N=333
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax w ith Kaiser Normalization.Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
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items only loaded on one component and each item was more highly correlated with its own 
dimension than with other dimensions. To ensure that the items included in each dimension 
measure the same thing, they should be correlated with each other.  Examining the pattern 
matrix for each year, variables only loaded significantly on one factor.  In addition, there 
were no loadings above 0.7 between factors.   
To establish reliability, I looked at Cronbach’s alphas for each dimension, using a threshold 
of 0.6 (Van de Ven & Ferry, 1980).  I performed this analysis for each year of the study (11 
different consistency tests) as well as for the random sample of 735 firms.  Table 10 
provides the results for the random sample, while for parsimony, Tables 11, 12 and 13 
present the results from 2002, 2005 and 2009 respectively. 
Table 10:  Reliability Measures of Internal Consistency (Chronbach's Alpha) for 
Random Sample (N=735) 
 
Table 11:  Reliability Measures of Internal Consistency (Chronbach's Alpha) for 2002 
 
 
 
 
Component Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
1 0.75 5
2 0.94 2
3 0.60 2
4 0.44 2
n=735
Component Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
1 0.73 5
2 0.91 2
3 0.60 2
4 0.12 2
n=334
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Table 12:  Reliability Measures of Internal Consistency (Chronbach's Alpha) for 2005 
 
Table 13:  Reliability Measures of Internal Consistency (Chronbach's Alpha) for 2009 
 
The results from these analyses are consistent across the random sample and the individual 
years. Tables 10-13 demonstrate an internal consistency for components 1, 2 and 3; however 
there was no internal consistency evident in the measures for component 4.  As such, 
reliability for component 4 could not be established and it was not included in the overall 
board independent power construct.  However, given the high factor loadings for the two 
elements included in component 4 (presence of a lead independent director and average 
director compensation), they were both included as board-level control variables in all 
models that were tested in this study.   
Finally, I moved beyond statistical tests and worked to determine face validity of the board 
independence power construct through a mixed method approach by interviewing seven 
directors of publicly traded American companies and two Toronto-based lawyers whose 
field of expertise is corporate governance about the dimensions suggested through the 
principal components analysis.  This mixed method approach allowed for the strongest 
validation of this new construct.  Where the phenomenon requires a description both in a 
global and an individual context, mixed methods are very useful in reaching research 
conclusions (Morse & Niehaus, 2009).  They also can be used to corroborate data and obtain 
Component Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
1 0.72 5
2 0.62 2
3 0.59 2
4 0.23 2
n=334
Component Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
1 0.76 5
2 0.90 2
3 0.60 2
4 0.10 2
n=333
 99  
convergent validity to more fully explain the results of analysis or to guide further data 
collection (Mengoli, Pazzaglia, & Sapienza, 2009; Yauch & Steudel, 2003). Furthermore, it 
is a useful methodology for instances where there is limited research into a phenomenon 
(Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2009; Mengoli et al., 2009).  All of these elements were relevant to 
this study. There were four main areas covered in the interview:  do board members believe 
there to be a difference between management power and board independence power; do 
board members believe the categories identified for board independence power (namely 
structure/prestige, ownership and expertise) to be appropriate based on their experience; do 
board members believe that the elements in the construction of each of the three categories 
(structure/prestige, ownership and expertise) are appropriately categorized; and, are there 
other dimensions not included in the current conceptualization of board independence power 
that should also be considered?   
Of the seven board directors interviewed, five were located in Canada (London (1), Toronto 
(3), Calgary (1)) and two were located in the United States (New York City).  All of the 
board interviewees were current or past members of boards of publicly traded American 
companies which included the following industry sectors:  automotive, energy, insurance, 
healthcare, hotels, oil and gas, real estate, telecommunications, and publishing. I limited the 
interviews to board members of for-profit firms as the board construction of not-for-profit 
firms is not subject to the same regulatory restrictions.  Both of the corporate governance 
lawyers interviewed were located in Canada (Toronto); the corporate governance lawyers 
had a combined experience with over 150 privately held companies in both Canada and the 
United States.  Given the geographic dispersion of the individuals that were interviewed, 
only one of the interviews was conducted in person and all of the rest were conducted by 
phone.   Each individual was interviewed once and the interviews lasted between half an 
hour and an hour.  Appendix A provides the ethics approval for these interviews. 
6.1.1. Interviews with Independent Board Members and Corporate Governance Lawyers 
All interviewees were asked what they considered to be the most important role of an 
independent board member of a publicly-traded company.  A board member from Toronto 
suggested it was “having sound business judgement and scepticism regarding management 
initiatives” while a board member from Calgary felt that independent board members 
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“should have some knowledge of finance and need to understand the trends in business 
rather than have a lot of governance expertise…the role is really one of strategic advice 
rather than just strictly monitoring if there is a partnership between the board and the CEO”.  
A lawyer from Toronto suggested that the role of independent board members was to: 
 Think independently.  To ask questions and not just accept what is presented. And in that context to consider the public shareholders/debtholders’ interests when looking at actions proposed by management, whether it be an acquisition or their personal compensation.     
6.1.2  Management Power vs. Board Independence Power 
Overall, both the independent board members and the corporate governance lawyers 
suggested that there are positive elements of having both management members and 
independent members working together because a lot more could get accomplished; it was 
not necessarily an “us versus them” scenario but more of a partnership.  It is likely this 
theme emerged because a number of the independent board members interviewed were also 
CEOs in their home firm.  However, a few of the independent board members felt that there 
were some differences.  A director from Toronto thought that “the difference between 
management directors and independent directors is that management directors are much less 
likely to admit that an initiative has failed or is failing”.   A director from London felt that 
“SOX shook up board members.  It raised the consciousness of the board and the duties of 
what independent board members are and should do.  Members take the monitoring and 
reporting role more seriously now and just want to get through their term unscathed”.   A 
director from New York suggested that the power of the independent members was not 
static: 
I was on a board where three new board members were brought in at one time.  The power shifted because they have experience, relevant experience to what was happening and the other board members respected that.   
6.1.3  Categorization of Board Independence Power 
The interviewees broadly felt that the three dimensions of structure/prestige, ownership and 
expertise power could contribute to the perception of the power of individual board 
members.  Three of the board members in particular thought ownership was important 
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relating to block ownership and their representatives on the board.  The idea of expertise 
related to financial and prior board experience (which they considered as expertise) was also 
raised as why some independent board members were perceived as having more power, or 
why they were asked to be on the board in the first place.    
6.1.4  Construction of Dimensions of Board Independence Power 
Interviewees largely considered the elements in the construction of the three dimensions of 
board independence power (structure/prestige, ownership, expertise) as a whole rather than 
in groupings.   
The attorneys interviewed felt that age, board tenure, board size, serving as board chair, 
number of other board appointments, and having some share ownership were important 
aspects of independent board members that gave them more potential power.  One of the 
attorneys commented that “power is lower in the first year on a board, unless the board 
member was put on by a shareholder group”.  They did not believe that an elite education, 
serving as the lead independent director or being the CEO of another company lent 
additional potential power.  This was not reflected in the views of the independent board 
members interviewed who felt that it was helpful if the independent board member also had 
CEO experience.  A board member from Calgary commented that “board members with 
CEO experience make the best board members.  They can stand in the moment and offer an 
independent assessment of what needs to be considered and help them think through how to 
get there”.       
It was unanimous amongst interviewees (both board members and corporate governance 
lawyers) that financial experience was important.  Many felt that companies were becoming 
more complex and a number of the strategies required involved complicated financial 
measures that the board would need to be able to evaluate.  An attorney commented: 
For a large corporation there should be at least one person with a high level of financial experience, whether it’s an accountant or in corporate finance or having worked in the financial department of another company.  Other board members should have some financial training/background, even if they don’t want to say they are a financial expert, because the board members’ job is to look after public shareholders’ money.  
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Board members were largely in agreement that age, tenure, and experience with other boards 
were important factors in providing insight to board decisions; however, there was a tipping 
point where directors could become too busy.  A director from London felt that “limits on 
boards could be in the area of “overboarding”.  If you are not on so many boards, there is 
more time to think about the issues relating to each one”.   It was also suggested that there 
was an age cap for individuals on boards who were over 65 because they were brought up in 
a different governance era.    
6.1.5  Other Factors 
Both independent board members and the corporate governance lawyers suggested that an 
important factor in the power of independent board members is that of their individual 
personalities and how that impacts the chemistry of the overall board.  A board member 
from Toronto suggested that “bad boards have cliques with an in crowd and an out crowd”.  
A board member from New York suggested that one of the biggest elements was 
determining whether individuals were extroverts or introverts and effective board chairs 
actively sought out input from board members individually because at board meetings: 
Generally only the loud people get heard.  So you have good people who are quiet because they are more introverted and then you miss out on good advice unless you go and seek it out maybe during a break or if you give them a call before or after the meeting.  When board chairs do that, the board can work really well.      
Three board members raised the idea that the power of board members depended on where 
the company was in its lifecycle or what was going on with the business.  A board member 
from New York commented on this suggesting that “power is a combination of experience, 
chairmanship, personality and what is going on in the company at that time (e.g. merger, 
acquisition or sale)”.   
The idea of board diversity was raised by a number of directors.  A director from London 
suggested that “good diversity means the ability to cover a breadth of issues” while the 
director from Calgary commented that “boards should not be created by the numbers so that 
you can tick off boxes.  You need to make sure people can actually contribute which is way 
more important than your gender or where you are from”.  Board members also raised that 
you have to look at why independent directors want to be on the board in the first place, 
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suggesting that some were there for the wrong reasons (e.g. money, prestige, help career, or 
networking).  A director from New York felt that sometimes this was perpetuated by 
companies who wanted board members for their “star power more than their ability to help 
guide the company”.       
Directors also felt that while still present, the “cronyism” of board appointments was being 
reduced over time.  A director from London commented that “when you are made an 
independent director of a company you are putting your reputation on the line.  There are 
concerns about that so it controls the risk of it just being the CEO’s social network being 
appointed”.   
Finally, board members were divided on whether sector experience was important to the 
idea of board independence power.  A board member from Toronto suggested that it was a 
critical element, while a board member from Calgary thought it was more important to 
include individuals who bring a different perspective to the board. A board member from 
New York thought there needed to be a balance noting, “Some sector experience is good but 
if there is too much, the board member can second guess the CEO.  If there is too little, they 
aren’t able to evaluate the CEO”.  This was supported by an attorney from Toronto who 
stated, “having some sector experience is helpful in board make-up, but there is also value in 
having people from different sectors as this will help minimize groupthink”.     
6.1.6  Conclusions from Interviews 
Overall, board members thought that the three areas of structure/prestige, ownership and 
expertise were valid contributors to the potential power of independent board members, with 
a focus on expertise and ownership.  The interviewees felt that board independent power 
should encapsulate age, tenure, financial experience, other board appointments, share 
ownership/block shareholders, and board size; this had been supported in the quantitative 
factor analysis as well.  While a majority of directors did not think elite education was a key 
factor in board independence power, a few of them believed that there was a prestige 
associated with an elite education that at some level, impacted how they were perceived on 
the board or the networks they were able to access.   
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Given the results of the interviews with the independent directors and the corporate 
governance attorneys, the board independence power construct has been supported with face 
validity.  Therefore, the final board independence power construct is composed of three 
dimensions:  structure/prestige power; ownership power; and, expertise power.   
6.2   Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Prior to the testing of my hypotheses, I examined descriptive statistics at the board and 
board committee level for each year included in this study (provided in tables 14 to 22 
below for dependent and independent continuous or count variables included in the study).   
This allowed for the confirmation of board and committee structure and membership 
composition, providing a stronger context for the hypotheses testing and supported research 
examining changes in board composition both pre and post-SOX (Cianci et al., 2011; Liao 
& Hsu, 2013; Linck et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2009).  The analysis was conducted within 
firms and not between firms. 
While every effort was made to have complete data for each variable for each observation, 
given that the data were sourced from historic archival data (rather than an experimental 
study), that was not always possible.  According to the taxonomy of missingness (Rubin, 
1976), there are three categories of missing data:  missing completely at random (MCAR); 
missing at random (MAR); and, not missing at random (NMAR).  Howell (2008:210) 
describes MCAR as where “any observation on a variable is as likely to be missing as any 
other.  If you are going to have missing data, this is the ideal case because treatment of the 
existing data does not lead to bias in the estimated parameters”.   
The data used in this study are for some of the world’s largest companies who have public 
reporting requirements; thus, missing data are not likely to be the result of a bias in terms of 
reporting information but rather a limitation of the databases used.  The data used in this 
study are different than survey data where respondents have an ability to answer or not 
answer the survey question and the choice related to answering is value-driven in some way.   
Wherever possible, I attempted to locate the missing data if it were not included for a 
particular company for a particular year in the source dataset.  Therefore, as the existence of 
data in this study is not related to any values for the variables, I treat the data as MCAR and 
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ignorable where “ignorability basically means that there is no need to model the missing 
data mechanism as part of the estimation process.  However, special techniques certainly are 
needed to utilize the data in an efficient manner” (Allison, 2002: 5).  While all methods 
related to dealing with missing data have their pros and cons (Allison, 2002), I have selected 
to remove observations with missing data through listwise deletion rather than imputing 
values. I chose listwise deletion as it is preferred to pairwise deletion in that the parameter 
estimation is done on a consistent sample (Howell, 2008).  Howell further notes that 
researchers should be careful as listwise deletion can lead to a loss in power.  As outlined 
below, I confirmed there was appropriate power to conduct the analysis required for this 
study.   
As referenced previously, the total number of firms in the sample is 335.  However, as seen 
in tables 14 to 22, there is not always an N of 335 for each variable for every year.  This is 
due to two reasons.  First, firms remained in the sample if they were in existence for a 
majority of years in both the pre and post-SOX timeframes, rather than being in existence 
for all of the years of the study.  As a result, not all firms were in the sample for each year, 
reducing the total N.  Secondly, firms may have been in existence for all of the years, but 
complete data were not always available for each variable for each firm observation.  Again, 
if data were available for each variable for a majority of the years, the observations 
remained in the dataset.  This resulted in a different N for each variable for each year of the 
study.        
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Table 14:  Descriptive Statistics for E-Index (1999-2009) 
Year N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Pre-SOX (1999-2003) 1999 295 2.0 1.3 0 5 2000 292 2.0 1.3 0 5 2001 328 2.2 1.3 0 5 2002 328 2.2 1.3 0 5 2003 333 2.2 1.3 0 5 Post-SOX (2004-2009) 2004 333 2.2 1.3 0 5 2005 331 2.0 1.3 0 5 2006 332 2.1 1.3 0 5 2007 327 3.6 1.3 0 6 2008 332 3.6 1.3 0 6 2009 332 3.7 1.2 0 6 
 
 
Table 15:  Descriptive Statistics for Percentage of Board Independence (1999-2009) 
Year N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Pre-SOX (1999-2003) 1999 290 65.5 18.0 10.0 100 2000 321 66.6 18.0 0.0 100 2001 329 69.1 18.1 11.1 100 2002 330 70.0 16.8 0.0 100 2003 332 72.0 15.0 14.0 94.5 Post-SOX (2004-2009) 2004 331 73.6 13.8 22.0 94.0 2005 332 74.9 13.3 22.0 100.0 2006 331 75.2 13.7 18.0 100.0 2007 332 80.4 10.1 44.0 100.0 2008 334 81.5 10.0 40.0 93.0 2009 332 81.7 11.8 40.0 93.0 
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Table 16:  Descriptive Statistics for Board Size (1999-2009) 
Year N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Pre-SOX (1999-2003) 1999 290 10.2 3.0 3 17 2000 321 10.0 3.0 3 20 2001 329 10.0 2.9 3 19 2002 330 10.3 2.6 5 19 2003 332 10.2 2.5 4 19 Post-SOX (2004-2009) 2004 331 10.3 2.3 5 16 2005 332 10.2 2.1 5 17 2006 331 10.3 2.1 5 18 2007 332 10.2 2.1 5 17 2008 334 10.5 2.1 5 17 2009 332 10.5 2.0 5 17  
 
 
Table 17:  Descriptive Statistics for Average Director Compensation (1999-2009) 
Year N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Pre-SOX (1999-2003) 1999 305 $23,554 $15,254 $15,000 $100,000 2000 327 $23,508 $17,861 $15,000 $100,000 2001 326 $25,271 $18,499 $15,000 $100,000 2002 326 $27,259 $19,602 $15,000 $100,000 2003 326 $32,686 $21,368 $15,000 $121,500 Post-SOX (2004-2009) 2004 327 $37,747 $22,626 $15,000 $150,000 2005 325 $43,918 $24,826 $15,000 $164,600 2006 325 $80,445 $39,890 $15,000 $279,680 2007 325 $85,477 $43,336 $15,000 $418,850 2008 326 $90,616 $46,797 $15,000 $375,130 2009 325 $91,444 $40,703 $15,000 $363,660 
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Table 18:  Descriptive Statistics for Age of Firm in Years (1999-2009) 
Year N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Pre-SOX (1999-2003) 1999 331 57.5 43.9 1 197 2000 332 58.4 43.9 1 198 2001 333 59.2 44.0 1 199 2002 333 60.2 44.0 2 200 2003 333 61.2 44.0 2 201 Post-SOX (2004-2009) 2004 334 61.4 44.0 3 202 2005 334 63.0 44.0 4 203 2006 334 64.0 44.1 5 204 2007 334 65.0 44.1 6 205 2008 334 66.0 44.1 7 206 2009 333 66.9 44.1 8 207 
 
 
Table 19:  Descriptive Statistics for Number of Employees (1999-2009) 
Year N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Pre-SOX (1999-2003) 1999 315 41,424 85,179 151 1,140,000 2000 321 44,995 91,847 316 1,244,000 2001 321 45,759 97,217 366 1,383,000 2002 323 46,510 98,595 347 1,400,000 2003 324 46,967 102,942 336 1,500,000 Post-SOX (2004-2009) 2004 324 48,500 112,447 346 1,700,000 2005 325 50,662 118,45 354 1,800,000 2006 324 53,438 125,136 374 1,900,000 2007 326 54,324 133,784 404 2,100,000 2008 327 54,364 133,505 560 2,100,000 2009 326 53,078 133,033 567 2,100,000 
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Table 20:  Descriptive Statistics for Market Equity (in Millions $) (1999-2009) 
Year N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Pre-SOX (1999-2003) 1999 318 22,028.9 53,779.0 141.2 508,329.4 2000 319 24,105.2 58,525.4 153.1 476,115.5 2001 324 20,677.5 18,400.0 127.1 397,832.0 2002 321 16,502.6 35,530.4 60.8 293,137.3 2003 321 20,568.4 41,341.6 167.0 311,755.5 Post-SOX (2004-2009) 2004 323 22,712.3 43,881.6 384.3 386,402.1 2005 325 23,299.3 41,544.9 839.2 364,473.6 2006 321 25,535.6 46,580.4 1,414.6 439,013.3 2007 323 27,479.9 50,822.8 1,789.7 504,239.6 2008 321 18,897.5 38,140.7 548.8 397,234.1 2009 320 21,783.9 37,406.0 1,167.0 322,334.1 
 
Table 21:  Descriptive Statistics for Past Performance (Tobin's Q) (1999-2009) 
Year N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Pre-SOX (1999-2003) 1999 299 3.6 7.1 0.7 105.1 2000 319 3.9 7.5 0.7 78.6 2001 319 2.9 2.6 0.8 19.7 2002 325 2.5 1.7 0.8 11.2 2003 322 2.0 1.3 .7 10.0 Post-SOX (2004-2009) 2004 322 2.3 1.4 1.0 11.3 2005 324 2.3 1.4 1.0 10.4 2006 326 2.3 1.4 1.0 11.3 2007 322 2.3 1.2 1.0 8.2 2008 324 2.2 1.2 0.8 8.4 2009 327 1.9 1.0 0.6 7.9  
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Table 22:  Descriptive Statistics for Number of Committees (1999-2009) 
Year N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Pre-SOX (1999-2003) 1999 293 3.1 1.2 1 8 2000 323 4.0 1.4 1 8 2001 330 4.2 1.3 2 8 2002 330 4.3 1.3 2 8 2003 331 4.3 1.2 1 8 Post-SOX (2004-2009) 2004 332 4.3 1.2 1 8 2005 333 4.3 1.2 1 7 2006 333 4.4 1.1 2 7 2007 333 4.3 1.2 2 8 2008 333 4.3 1.2 2 8 2009 331 4.3 1.2 1 8  
The descriptive statistics illustrate clear trends in the data prior to any analysis.  First, post-
SOX the average for the E-Index has been rising from the pre-SOX values from an average 
of 2.0 in 1999 to 3.7 in 2009 out of a possible total of 6.0 (Table 14).  This indicates that 
from this sample of some of the world’s largest firms, boards are increasingly taking 
decisions that support management entrenchment, contrary to accepted corporate 
governance practices.  This finding supports the trend noted by Bhagat and Bolton (2009) in 
the rise of the G-Index in post-SOX timeframes.  The data also shows a clear trend toward 
board independence (Table 15) as it has gone from an average of 65.5 percent in 1999 to a 
high of 81.7 percent in 2009.  It should be noted that the non-independent members include 
both management and affiliated directors; while beyond the scope of this study, the trend of 
higher independent members has largely come by eliminating affiliated directors on boards, 
although it is not difficult over time to be able to overcome legislated and regulatory 
provisions related to affiliated directors.  There is also a significant trend related to average 
director compensation which has almost quadrupled during the study period (Table 17).  
Given the increased requirements and potential liabilities post-SOX for independent 
directors, it is likely companies offered more in compensation to directors to reflect the 
increased time required to perform the role appropriately.  Average board size has stayed 
remarkably constant at around 10 board members, although the maximum board size is 
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lower in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period.  The number of committees 
created by boards was also consistent pre and post-SOX.  Finally, while firm size as 
measured through the number of employees and market equity demonstrated an increase 
over time, the financial crisis in 2008 had a significant negative impact on the average 
market equity for firms in the sample for that year.   
It was important to ensure that there was enough power to find a significant relationship if it 
existed.  A power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Version 3.1.9.2) (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) using the two-tailed z test for Poisson regression to a priori 
determine an appropriate sample size given a desired power of 0.9 and a significance of 
α=0.01.  Effect size was estimated following Cohen (1969) who suggested 0.2 as a small 
effect, 0.5 as a medium effect and 0.8 as a large effect.  As I did not theorize a large effect, I 
conducted the power analysis using an estimated effect size of 0.2 while recognizing that 
this was a rough measure.   It was hypothesized that SOX would decrease the E-Index 
(reflecting an improvement in governance) so the power analysis was modelled to reflect a 
decrease of 0.2 (Exp(β1)).  An analysis of the E-Index for the entire pre-SOX period was 
conducted to determine a base rate exp (β0) of 2.13 (the mean event rate assumed under 
H0). A mean exposure of 1 year was used.  Based on this analysis, it was suggested the 
minimum sample size of 137 would be required to detect significance of 0.01 at a desired 
power of 0.9.  Thus, on the point of a null hypothesis, with approximately 335 observations 
per year, I believe I have enough power in the study to find a significant difference between 
the two groups if there is one to be found.   
Table 24 provides a correlation matrix for the study.  The correlation matrix was constructed 
for each year of the study with similar results.  For parsimony, only the correlation matrix 
for 2004 is provided as it was a midpoint of the total sample.  The variables with the high 
correlation were board size and board size squared; this relationship is not surprising.  From 
a theoretical perspective, it was important to control for the possibility of both a linear and a 
curvilinear relationship related to the size of the board as both the academic literature and 
the qualitative interviews that were conducted from this study suggested that there is an 
optimal board size of around 8 or 9 members.  One of the lawyers interviewed for this study 
commented about board size: 
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When boards get too big they lose accountability.  It is easy to hide in a crowd and board members don’t want to look stupid in front of others.  Smaller boards are not good either because you don’t see the diversity of board members – women in particular.  Independent board members tend to begin to work together when there is a critical mass as there is safety in numbers.  But the board can’t grow too big so that it is unwieldly.   
As such, both board size and board size squared were kept in the model.  It should be noted 
that they were not included in hypothesis testing that included the board independence 
structure/prestige power and board independence power index variables as these variables 
were constructed using board size.  A discussion of the limitation related to this approach is 
provided in Section 7.   For all of the models (both pre and post-SOX) at all times (t, t+1 and 
t+2), the control variable for organizational size (market equity) was significant (p<.01).   
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6.3   Results of Hypotheses Testing 
The units of analysis are the panel of 335 S&P companies operative in the study period. As 
each company was followed over a number of years and the dependent variable (E-Index) 
was a count variable rather than continuous or binary, panel Poisson regression was used to 
analyze the data. For this purpose the STATA statistical software (MP 13.1) –xtpoisson– 
subroutine was used, with the company as the panel identifier to estimate random-effects 
Poisson models. The random-effects model was selected after conducting a Hausman 
specification test on the full sample, as well as the pre-SOX and post-SOX samples.  As 
tested with the full sample, it was determined random-effects was more applicable than 
fixed-effects (chi2=8.16, p>0.1); similar results were obtained for the pre-SOX sample 
(chi2=13.07, p>0.1) and the post-SOX sample (chi2=8.48, p>0.1).  As noted, for each 
hypothesis each of the six elements of the E-Index was also individually tested.  For these 
analyses, panel logistic regression was used given that each of the governance elements as 
outlined in Table 2 was binary (it was either present or not).     
For the hypotheses involving main effects (Hypotheses 1 to 3) I first tested for differences in 
the groups pre and post-SOX.   I created a single full-sample model over the whole sample 
period, adding in a dummy variable for the pre/post period and interacting it with each 
predictor variable.  I then used the post-estimation command in Stata to save coefficients 
from the pre-SOX timeframe and compare them to coefficients in the post-SOX timeframe 
to determine whether they were statistically significantly different from each other.  I did 
this test for each of the predictor variables tested in Hypotheses 1 to 3 to establish whether 
pre-relationships significantly differ from post-relationships; the null hypothesis suggests 
that the slopes and intercepts are the same for the two groups.  I find significant differences 
between the pre and post-SOX groups for all three main effects:  committee independence 
(chi2(2)=60.59, p<0.001), presence of mandatory committees (chi2(2)=57.33, p<0.001) and 
independence of mandatory committees (chi2(2)=56.84, p<0.001).   While there is difference 
between groups, it is important to understand more closely what this difference may 
represent; therefore, I explored the hypotheses and their relationships within each of the two 
time periods.   
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I tested all of the hypotheses using the two separate pre and post panel Poisson models.  
Table 24 provides the results for Hypotheses 1 to 4 in the pre-SOX timeframe at time “t” 
reporting coefficients while Table 25 provides the same results but reports incidence 
response ratios (IRR) for ease of interpretation.  Table 26 provides the results for 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 in the post-SOX timeframe at time “t” reporting coefficients while Table 
27 provides the same results but reports IRR.   For parsimony, the results do not report the 
dummy variable results for industry.   Given that the dependent variable (E-Index) was a 
nonnegative count variable, Poisson regression models the log of the expected count as a 
function of the predictor variable in order to create the coefficient.  As such, for one unit 
change in the predictor variable, the different in the logs of the expected counts is expected 
to change by the respective regression coefficient as other predictor variables are held 
constant.  The incident rate ratio is a ratio based on the rate or incidence of counts and is 
obtained by exponentiating the Poisson regression coefficient.  As panel Poisson regression 
does not have an equivalent to the “R2” as found in OLS regression (pseudo-R2 are provided 
in non-panel Poisson models), no measure is included.   
The E-Index is a count of six governance provisions that signify management entrenchment.  
As such, a positive significant relationship between predictor variables and the E-Index 
reflects a causal relationship between the variable and the likelihood for high management 
entrenchment.  The results obtained using the G-Index as the dependent variable at times 
“t”, “t+1” and “t+2” were almost identical to those using the E-Index.  Therefore, for 
parsimony these are not reproduced in this document but are available upon request.   There 
were only a few significant results at times “t+1” and “t+2” in the pre and post-SOX 
timeframes; only these will be reported but again, the full analysis including the non-
significant results is available upon request. 
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Table 24:  Results for Hypotheses 1-4 Pre-SOX (Reporting Coefficients) at "t" 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef.
St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 0.09 0.03 2.5* 0.10 0.04 2.49**Presence of all 3 Committees 0.21 0.10 2.31* 0.20 0.09 2.16*Total Indep. Of 3 Committees 0.02 0.03 0.67 -0.04 0.03 -1.08
Age of Firm 0.04 0.04 0.98 0.03 0.04 0.70 0.03 0.04 0.75 0.04 0.04 0.96 0.02 0.04 0.46
Board Size 0.27 0.10 2.68** 0.26 0.10 2.5* 0.21 0.11 1.99* 0.26 0.10 2.58** 0.20 0.11 1.88
Board Size Squared -0.28 0.13 -2.14* -0.36 0.13 -2.03* -0.21 0.13 -1.58 -0.26 0.13 -2.06* -0.20 0.13 -1.51Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.001 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.04Presence of a Lead Outside Director -0.11 0.08 -1.33 -0.10 0.08 -1.28 -0.10 0.08 -1.31 -0.11 0.08 -1.36 -0.10 0.08 -1.22CEO Structural Power 0.03 0.02 -1.69 0.020 0.02 1.07 0.03 0.02 1.33 0.03 0.09 1.36 0.02 0.02 0.99CEO Ownership Power 0.00 0.03 -1.69 0.004 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.15CEO Expertise Power -0.01 0.01 -0.80 -0.003 0.01 -0.57 0.00 0.01 -0.65 0.00 0.07 -0.63 0.00 0.01 -0.59CEO Prestige Power 0.01 0.02 -0.81 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.01 0.02 0.59 0.01 0.06 0.61 -0.01 0.02 0.61Number of Employees -0.02 0.03 -0.51 -0.14 0.03 -0.47 -0.02 0.03 -0.52 -0.02 0.03 -0.49 -0.02 0.03 -0.55
Market Equity -0.14 0.04 -3.78*** -0.15 0.04 -3.89*** -0.15 0.04 -3.96*** -0.14 0.04-3.77*** -0.14 0.04 -4.01***
Past Performance -0.02 0.04 -0.60 -0.17 0.04 -0.47 -0.01 0.04 0.75 -0.19 0.04 -0.55 -0.01 0.04 -0.25
Wave 1 -0.14 0.08 -1.69 -0.15 0.09 -1.77 -0.10 0.09 -1.11 -0.13 0.09 -1.52 -0.13 0.09 -1.44
Wave 2 -0.12 0.07 -1.69 -0.12 0.07 -1.78 -0.09 0.07 -1.20 -0.11 0.07 -1.58 -0.10 0.07 -1.48
Wave 3 -0.05 0.07 -0.79 -0.06 0.07 -0.82 -0.03 0.07 0.46 -0.05 0.07 -0.72 -0.45 0.07 -0.65
Wave 4 -0.05 0.06 -0.81 -0.06 0.06 -0.87 -0.03 0.06 -0.48 -0.05 0.06 -0.70 -0.45 0.06 -0.70
Constant 0.77 0.15 5.24*** 0.75 0.14 5.24*** 0.60 0.17 3.32*** 0.72 0.16 4.53*** 0.64 0.18 3.63***
N 
Log Liklihood
***. Correlation is significant  at  the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at  the 0.05 level (2 
tailed)
-1639.91 -1636.81 -1637.24 -1636.07 -1630.57
1064.00 1064.00 1064.00 1062.00 1061.00
Controls Only Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
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Table 25:  Results for Hypotheses 1-4 Pre-SOX (Reporting IRR) at "t" 
 
 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index IRR
St. Error z IRR S t. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 1.09 0.04 2.5* 1.10 0.04 2.49**
Presence of all 3 Committees 1.23 0.11 2.31* 1.23 1.20 2.16*
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees 1.02 0.03 0.67 0.96 0.03 -1.08
Age of Firm 1.04 0.04 0.98 1.02 0.04 0.70 1.03 0.04 0.75 1.04 0.04 0.96 1.02 0.04 0.46
Board Size 1.31 0.13 2.68** 1.30 1.31 2.5* 1.23 0.13 1.99* 1.30 0.13 2.58** 1.20 0.13 1.88
Board Size Squared 0.76 0.10 -2.14* 0.77 0.10 -2.03* 0.81 0.11 -1.58 0.78 0.10 -2.06* 0.82 0.11 -1.51
Average Indep. Director Compensation 1.00 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.02 0.04 1.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.01 1.00 0.02 -0.04
Presence of a Lead Outside Director 0.90 0.07 -1.33 0.90 0.07 -1.28 0.90 0.07 -1.31 0.90 0.07 -1.36 0.91 0.07 -1.22
CEO Structural Power 1.02 0.02 -1.69 1.02 0.02 1.07 1.02 0.02 1.33 1.03 0.02 1.36 1.02 0.02 0.99
CEO Ownership Power 1.00 0.03 -1.69 1.00 0.03 0.12 1.00 0.03 0.12 1.00 0.03 0.05 1.00 0.03 0.15
CEO Expertise Power 1.00 0.01 -0.80 1.00 0.01 -0.57 1.00 0.01 -0.65 1.00 0.01 -0.63 1.00 0.01 -0.59
CEO Prestige Power 1.01 0.02 -0.81 1.01 0.02 0.63 1.01 0.02 0.59 1.01 0.02 0.61 1.01 0.02 0.61
Number of Employees 0.98 0.03 -0.51 0.98 0.03 -0.47 0.98 0.03 -0.52 0.99 0.03 -0.49 0.98 0.04 -0.55
Market Equity 0.87 0.03 -3.78*** 0.86 0.03 -3.89*** 0.86 0.03 -3.96*** 0.87 0.03 -3.77*** 0.86 0.03 -4.01***
Past Performance 0.98 0.04 -0.60 0.98 0.04 -0.47 1.00 0.04 0.75 0.98 0.04 -0.55 0.99 0.04 -0.25
Wave 1 0.87 0.07 -1.69 0.85 0.07 -1.77 0.91 0.08 -1.11 0.88 0.07 -1.52 0.88 0.08 -1.44
Wave 2 0.89 0.06 -1.69 0.88 0.06 -1.78 0.92 0.07 -1.20 0.89 0.06 -1.58 0.90 0.06 -1.48
Wave 3 0.95 0.06 -0.79 0.95 0.06 -0.82 0.97 0.07 0.46 0.95 0.07 -0.72 0.96 0.06 -0.65
Wave 4 0.95 0.06 -0.81 0.95 0.06 -0.87 0.97 0.06 -0.48 0.96 0.06 -0.70 0.96 0.06 -0.70
Constant 2.14 0.31 5.24*** 2.12 0.30 5.24*** 1.74 0.29 3.32*** 2.05 0.33 4.53*** 1.89 0.33 3.63***
N 
Log Liklihood
***. Correlat ion is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at  the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
Controls Only Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
1064.00 1064.00 1064.00 1062.00 1061.00
-1639.91 -1636.81 -1637.24 -1636.07 -1630.57
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Table 26:  Results for Hypotheses 1-4 Post-SOX (Reporting Coefficients) at "t" 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 0.02 0.02 0.94 0.03 0.02 1.18Presence of all 3 Committees 0.54 0.24 2.23* 0.70 0.30 2.37*Total Indep. Of 3 Committees -0.03 0.03 -0.84 -0.04 0.03 -1.50
Age of Firm 0.05 0.02 0.63 0.01 0.02 0.47 0.01 0.02 0.61 0.02 0.02 0.65 0.01 0.02 0.44
Board Size 0.35 0.15 2.31* 0.34 0.15 2.22* 0.35 0.15 2.35* 0.34 0.15 2.28* 0.33 0.15 2.16*
Board Size Squared -0.33 0.15 -2.19* -0.32 0.15 -2.10* -0.34 0.15 -2.24* -0.33 0.15 2.16* -0.31 0.15 -2.06*
Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.00 0.01 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.46
Presence of a Lead Outside Director -0.08 0.04 -1.84 -0.08 0.04 -1.79 -0.08 0.04 -1.85 -0.08 0.43 -1.86 -0.08 0.04 -1.74
CEO Structural Power 0.01 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.70 0.01 0.02 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.57
CEO Ownership Power 0.02 0.02 0.93 0.02 0.02 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.84 0.02 0.02 0.85 0.20 0.02 0.72CEO Expertise Power -0.01 0.01 -1.20 -0.01 0.01 -1.22 -0.01 0.01 -1.30 -0.01 0.01 -1.21 -0.01 0.01 -1.30
CEO Prestige Power 0.03 0.02 1.61 0.02 0.02 1.56 0.02 0.02 1.51 0.03 0.02 1.63 0.02 0.02 1.50
Number of Employees 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.00 0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.11
Market Equity -0.07 0.02 -3.41*** -0.07 0.02 -3.45*** -0.72 0.02 -3.51*** -0.07 0.02 -3.42*** -0.07 0.02 -3.56***
Past Performance -0.06 0.03 0.63 -0.06 0.03 -1.76 -0.06 0.03 -1.70 -0.06 0.03 -1.85 -0.06 0.03 -1.61
Wave 1 -0.51 0.07 -7.26*** -0.51 0.07 -7.23*** -0.51 0.07 -7.21*** -0.52 0.07 -7.28*** -0.52 0.07 -7.31***
Wave 2 -0.58 0.08 7.70*** -0.57 0.08 -7.58*** -0.58 0.08 -7.65*** -0.58 0.08 -7.64*** -0.59 0.08 -7.74***
Wave 3 -0.54 0.08 -6.63*** -0.54 0.08 -6.60*** -0.53 0.08 -6.51*** -0.54 0.08 -6.63*** -0.54 0.08 -6.66***
Wave 4 0.02 0.07 0.26 0.02 0.07 0.26 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.30 0.02 0.07 0.26
Wave 5 0.02 0.07 0.23 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.02 0.07 0.30 0.01 0.07 0.14
Constant 1.27 0.11 11.73*** 0.33 0.43 0.78 0.74 0.26 2.82** 1.34 0.14 9.63*** 0.73 0.32 2.27*
N 
Log Liklihood
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
-1930.97 -1926.52-1934.13-1936.55-1937.00
1159.00 1159.00 1159.00 1155.00 1155.00
Controls Only Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
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Table 27:  Results from Hypotheses 1-4 Post-SOX (Reporting IRR) at "t” 
 
6.4   Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive relationship between the level of board independence and 
selected practices of the board that protect shareholder value.5  If the SOX provisions 
worked to strengthen corporate governance, this relationship should be even stronger in the 
                                                 5 While the hypotheses are worded in a way that suggests a positive relationship between the SOX structural changes and selected practices of the board that protect shareholder value, given that high values for the E-Index reflect the adoption of board practices that entrench management interests, this relationship is demonstrated when there is a negative value for the regression coefficients.  Therefore, positive coefficients in the regression models indicate the potential for board decisions that entrench management interests and are counter to best practice governance actions.     
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index IRR
St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 1.02 0.02 0.94 1.02 0.02 1.18Presence of all 3 Committees 1.70 0.42 2.23* 2.00 0.59 2.37*Total Indep. Of 3 Committees 0.98 0.03 -0.84 0.95 0.03 -1.50
Age of Firm 1.01 0.02 0.63 1.01 0.00 0.47 1.01 0.02 0.61 1.02 0.02 0.65 1.01 0.02 0.44
Board Size 1.42 0.21 2.31* 1.40 0.21 2.22* 1.42 0.21 2.35* 1.41 0.21 2.28* 1.40 0.21 2.16*
Board Size Squared 0.72 0.11 -2.19* 0.73 0.11 -2.10* 0.72 0.11 -2.24* 0.72 0.11 2.16* 0.73 0.11 -2.06*
Average Indep. Director Compensation 1.00 0.01 0.30 1.00 0.01 0.36 1.00 0.01 0.45 1.00 0.01 0.30 1.00 0.01 0.46Presence of a Lead Outside Director 0.92 0.04 -1.84 0.92 0.04 -1.79 0.92 0.04 -1.85 0.92 0.04 -1.86 0.93 0.04 -1.74
CEO Structural Power 1.01 0.02 0.72 1.01 0.01 0.70 1.01 0.02 0.66 1.01 0.02 0.72 1.01 0.02 0.57CEO Ownership Power 1.02 0.02 0.93 1.02 0.02 0.96 1.02 0.02 0.84 1.02 0.02 0.85 1.02 0.02 0.72CEO Expertise Power 0.98 0.01 -1.20 0.99 0.01 -1.22 0.99 0.01 -1.30 0.99 0.01 -1.21 0.99 0.01 -1.30
CEO Prestige Power 1.03 0.02 1.61 1.02 0.02 1.56 1.02 0.02 1.51 1.02 0.02 1.63 1.02 0.02 1.50
Number of Employees 1.00 0.02 -0.10 1.00 0.02 -0.11 1.00 0.02 -0.09 1.00 0.02 -0.11 1.00 0.02 -0.11
Market Equity 0.93 0.02 -3.41*** 0.93 0.02 -3.45*** 0.93 0.02 -3.51*** 0.93 0.02 -3.42*** 0.93 0.02 -3.56***
Past Performance 0.94 0.03 0.63 0.94 0.03 -1.76 0.94 0.03 -1.70 0.94 0.03 -1.85 0.95 0.03 -1.61
Wave 1 0.60 0.04 -7.26*** 0.60 0.04 -7.23*** 0.06 0.04 -7.21*** 0.60 0.04 -7.28*** 0.60 0.04 -7.31***
Wave 2 0.56 0.04 7.70*** 0.56 0.04 -7.58*** 0.56 0.04 -7.65*** 0.56 0.04 -7.64*** 0.55 0.04 -7.74***
Wave 3 0.58 0.05 -6.63*** 0.59 0.05 -6.60*** 0.59 0.05 -6.51*** 0.58 0.05 -6.63*** 0.58 0.05 -6.66***
Wave 4 1.02 0.07 0.26 1.02 0.07 0.26 1.01 0.07 0.20 1.02 0.07 0.30 1.02 0.07 0.26
Wave 5 1.02 0.07 0.23 1.01 0.07 0.17 1.01 0.07 0.17 1.02 0.07 0.30 1.01 0.07 0.14
Constant 3.50 0.38 11.73*** 3.54 0.38 0.78 2.09 0.55 2.82** 3.80 0.53 9.63*** 2.01 0.66 2.27*
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlation is significant  at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant  at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant  at the 0.05 level (2 
tailed)
-1937.00 -1936.55 -1934.13 -1930.97 -1926.52
Controls Only Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
1159.00 1159.00 1159.00 1155.00 1155.00
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post-SOX timeframe. 
In the pre-SOX timeframe, there was a significant relationship (β=0.09; z=2.5, p<.05) 
between the level of board independence and the likelihood of board decisions entrenching 
management interests.  For a one unit change in the percentage of independent directors on a 
board, the difference in the logs of expected counts for the E-Index is expected to increase 
by 0.09 unit, given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant. There was 
also a significant main effect with the lagged dependent variable at both “t+1” (β=0.08; 
z=2.39, p<.05) and “t+2” (β=0.07; z=2.13, p<.05) in the same direction as at “t”.   Table 28 
provides the results from these two models.   
Table 28:  Results for Hypothesis 1 (Pre-SOX) at "t+1" and "t+2" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef. S t. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors  0.08 0.03 2.39* 0.07 0.03 2.13*
Age of Firm 0.04 0.04 1.11 0.03 0.04 0.83 0.04 0.04 1.17 0.03 0.04 0.90
Board Size 0.22 0.08 2.8** 0.20 0.08 2.5* 0.20 0.08 2.54** 0.17 0.08 2.27*
Board Size Squared -0.01 0.00 -2.49* -0.01 0.00 -2.22* -0.01 0.00 -2.18* -0.01 0.00 -1.94*Average Indep. Director Compensation -0.01 0.02 -0.40 -0.01 0.02 -0.37 0.00 0.02 -0.18 0.00 0.02 -0.15Lead Outside Director -0.07 0.02 -0.86 -0.06 0.08 -0.80 -0.08 0.08 -1.09 -0.08 0.08 -1.04CEO Structural Power 0.03 0.08 1.40 0.02 0.02 1.12 0.02 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.02 0.74CEO Ownership Power -0.01 0.02 -0.25 0.00 0.03 -0.14 -0.03 0.03 -1.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.94CEO Expertise Power 0.00 0.03 -0.43 0.00 0.01 -0.33 -0.01 0.01 -0.98 -0.01 0.01 -0.91CEO Prestige Power 0.01 0.01 0.74 0.01 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.57 0.01 0.02 0.56Number of Employees -0.01 0.02 -0.43 -0.01 0.03 -0.38 -0.01 0.03 -0.46 -0.01 0.03 -0.42
Market Equity -0.15 0.03 -4.09*** -0.15 0.04 -4.19*** -0.16 0.04 -4.22 -0.16 0.04 -4.31***
Past Performance -0.02 0.04 -0.54 -0.02 0.04 -0.45 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07
Wave 1 -0.12 0.08 -1.41 -0.13 0.09 -1.50 -0.02 0.15 -0.24 -0.03 0.08 -0.33
Wave 2 -0.07 0.07 -0.98 -0.07 0.07 -1.07 0.04 0.07 0.53 0.03 0.07 0.45
Wave 3 -0.02 0.07 -0.23 -0.02 0.07 -0.23 0.03 0.07 0.49 0.03 0.07 0.48
Wave 4 -0.05 0.07 -0.82 -0.06 0.07 -0.88 0.02 0.06 0.37 0.02 0.06 0.31
Constant -0.57 0.45 -1.26 -0.44 0.45 -0.99 -0.44 0.44 -0.99 -0.33 0.44 -0.75
N 
Log Likelihood -1639.24 -1673.73-1636.40 -1671.48
***. Correlat ion is significant  at  the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant  at  the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlat ion is significant  at  the 0.05 level (2 
tailed)
Main Effects Only (t+1) Hypothesis 1 (t+1) Main Effects Only (t+2) Hypothesis 1 (t+2)
1077.00 1082.001077.00 1082.00
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In the post-SOX timeframe, there was no significant relationship between the level of board 
independence and selected governance provisions supporting shareholder value at “t”, “t+1” 
or “t+2”.   
Therefore, while there was a significant relationship between board independence and 
selected governance provisions associated with protecting shareholder value in the pre-SOX 
period, it was not in the direction hypothesized and so Hypothesis 1 was not supported for 
either the pre-SOX or post-SOX timeframes.   
6.5   Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 suggested a positive relationship between the existence of the audit, 
nominating and compensation committees and selected governance decisions supporting 
shareholder value.  Similar to the results from Hypothesis 1, in the pre-SOX timeframe I 
found a significant but positive relationship between the existence of the audit, nominating 
and compensation committees and the E-Index at “t” (β=0.21; z=2.31, p<.05), “t+1” 
(β=0.24 z=2.73, p<.01) and “t+2” (β=0.21.; z=2.43, p<.05).6  This suggests that the presence 
of these committees in the pre-SOX timeframe has a higher likelihood of management 
entrenchment.  Table 29 provides the results pre-SOX at “t+1” and “t+2”.   
                                                 6 Please see Footnote 5 
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Table 29:  Results for Hypothesis 2 (Pre-SOX) at "t+1" and "t+2" 
 
In the post-SOX timeframe, I found a significant but positive relationship between the 
existence of the audit, nominating and compensation committees and the dependent variable 
at time “t” (β=0.54, z=2.23, p<.05) and “t+2” (β=0.45, z=2.12, p<.05).  This relationship 
suggests that the existence of the SOX structural committees creates a higher likelihood of 
management entrenchment.7  Table 30 provides the full results post-SOX at time “t+2”.    
                                                 7 Please see Footnote 5 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
Presence of All 3 Committees  0.24 0.09 2.73** 0.21 0.87 2.43*
Age of Firm 0.04 0.04 1.11 0.03 0.04 0.84 0.04 0.04 1.17 0.03 0.04 0.93
Board Size 0.22 0.08 2.8** 0.19 0.08 2.34* 0.20 0.08 2.54** 0.16 0.08 2.14*
Board Size Squared -0.01 0.00 -2.49* -0.01 0.00 -2.12* -0.01 0.00 -2.18* -0.01 0.00 -1.87Average Indep. Director Compensation -0.01 0.02 -0.40 -0.01 0.02 -0.40 0.00 0.02 -0.18 0.00 0.02 -0.18Lead Outside Director -0.07 0.02 -0.86 -0.07 0.08 -0.87 -0.08 0.08 -1.09 -0.09 0.08 -1.09CEO Structural Power 0.03 0.08 1.40 0.02 0.02 1.36 0.02 0.02 0.98 0.02 0.02 0.93CEO Ownership Power -0.01 0.02 -0.25 0.00 0.03 -0.11 -0.03 0.03 -1.02 -0.03 3.00 -0.90
CEO Experise Power 0.00 0.03 -0.43 0.00 0.01 -0.43 -0.01 0.01 -0.98 -0.01 0.01 -0.98
CEO Prestige Power 0.01 0.01 0.74 0.01 0.02 0.67 0.01 0.02 0.57 0.01 0.02 0.52Number of Employees -0.01 0.02 -0.43 -0.01 0.03 -0.45 -0.01 0.03 -0.46 -0.01 0.03 -0.47
Market Equity -0.15 0.03 -4.09*** -0.16 0.04 -4.3*** -0.16 0.04 -4.22*** -0.16 0.04 -4.38***
Past Performance -0.02 0.04 -0.54 -0.01 0.04 -0.18 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.31
Wave 1 -0.12 0.08 -1.41 -0.07 0.01 -0.83 -0.02 0.15 -0.24 0.02 0.08 0.27
Wave 2 -0.07 0.07 -0.98 -0.03 0.07 -0.42 0.04 0.07 0.53 0.07 0.07 1.01
Wave 3 -0.02 0.07 -0.23 0.01 0.07 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.49 0.06 0.07 0.85
Wave 4 -0.05 0.07 -0.82 -0.03 0.07 -0.52 0.02 0.06 0.37 0.04 0.06 0.63
Constant -0.57 0.45 -1.26 -0.59 0.44 -1.32 -0.44 0.44 -0.99 -0.45 0.44 -1.03
N 
Log Liklihood -1639.24 -1635.52 -1673.73 -1670.79
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 
tailed)
Main Effects Only (t+1) Hypothesis 2 (t+1) Main Effects Only (t+2) Hypothesis 2 (t+2)
1077.00 1077.00 1082.00 1082.00
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Table 30:  Results for Hypothesis 2 (Post-SOX) at "t+2" 
  Main Effects Only (t+2) Hypothesis 2 (t+1) 
DV= E-Index Coef. St. Error Z Coef. St. Error Z 
Variables             Presence of All 3 Committees       0.45 0.21 2.12* 
Age of Firm 0.01 0.02 0.55 0.01 0.02 0.54 
Board Size 0.11 0.07 1.60 0.11 0.01 1.63 
Board Size Squared 0.00 0.00 1.49 -0.99 0.00 -1.53 
Average Indep. Director Compensation -0.01 8.00 -0.81 -0.01 0.01 -0.64 
Lead Outside Director -0.13 0.04 -0.3*** -0.13 .-38 -3.34*** 
CEO Structural Power 0.02 0.01 1.25 0.02 0.01 1.23 CEO Ownership Power 0.02 0.02 1.08 0.02 0.02 0.99 CEO Expertise Power -0.01 0.01 -1.07 -0.09 0.01 -1.19 CEO Prestige Power 0.02 0.01 1.26 0.02 0.01 1.12 
Number of Employees 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.00 0.02 -0.08 
Market Equity -0.08 0.02 -3.95*** -0.08 0.02 -4.05*** 
Past Performance -0.02 0.03 -0.76 -0.02 0.03 -0.55 
Wave 1 0.15 0.08 1.75 1.54 0.09 1.81 
Wave 2 0.76 0.08 9.19*** 0.76 0.08 9.17*** 
Wave 3 0.68 0.09 8.02*** 0.70 0.09 8.12*** 
Wave 4 0.71 0.08 8.72*** 0.71 0.08 8.66*** 
Wave 5 0.05 0.09 0.55 0.05 0.09 0.50 
Constant -0.09 0.38 -0.24 -0.54 0.43 -1.25 
N  1159.00 1159.00 
Log Likelihood -1836.00 -1834.20 
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
Given that the results were significant but not in the direction hypothesized, Hypothesis 2 
was not supported for either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.    
6.6   Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 explored the last SOX structural main effect, predicting a positive relationship 
between the level of committee independence on the audit, nominating and compensation 
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committees and low management entrenchment.  This relationship was not significant in the 
pre-SOX timeframe or in the post-SOX timeframe at any time point.  Thus, Hypothesis 3 
was not supported in either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
6.7   Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 suggested a combined impact of all three SOX-structure variables, positing a 
positive relationship between the SOX structural changes and selected governance decisions 
supporting shareholder value.  In the pre-SOX timeframes, there was a significant effect but 
not in the direction hypothesized for board independence at time “t” (β=0.10, z=2.49, p<.01) 
and “t+1” (β=0.09, z=2.0, p<.05). There was also a significant effect but not in the direction 
hypothesized for the presence of the audit, nominating and compensation committees at time 
“t” (β=0.20, z=2.16, p<.05), “t+1” (β=0.23, z=2.5, p<.05) and “t+2” (β=0.20, z=2.23, 
p<.05).8  Table 31 provides the results for “t+1” and “t+2”.   
 
  
 
                                                 8 Please see Footnote 5. 
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Table 31:  Results for Hypothesis 4 (Pre-SOX) at "t+1" and "t+2" 
  
In the post-SOX timeframe, there was a significant effect but not in the direction 
hypothesized for the presence of the audit, nominating, and compensation committees at 
time “t” (β=0.7, z=2.37, p<.05), and “t+1” (β=0.61, z=2.24, p<.05).9  Results are presented 
in Table 32.    
 
                                                 9 Please see Footnote 5. 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables% of Independent Directors  0.09 0.04 2.2* 0.07 0.03 1.88Presence of all 3 Committees 0.23 0.09 2.51** 0.20 0.09 2.23*Total Indep. Of 3 Committees -0.03 0.00 -0.84 -0.02 0.03 -0.62
Age of Firm 0.04 0.04 1.11 0.02 0.04 0.60 0.04 0.04 1.17 0.03 0.04 0.69
Board Size 0.22 0.08 2.8** 0.17 0.08 2.08* 0.20 0.08 2.54** 0.15 0.08 1.94*
Board Size Squared -0.01 0.00 -2.49* -0.01 0.00 -1.89 -0.01 0.00 -2.18* -0.01 0.00 -1.69Average Indep. Director Compensation -0.01 0.02 -0.40 -0.01 0.02 -0.46 0.00 0.02 -0.18 0.00 0.02 -0.18Lead Outside Director -0.07 0.02 -0.86 -0.06 0.08 -0.81 -0.08 0.08 -1.09 -0.08 0.08 -1.02CEO Structural Power 0.03 0.08 1.40 0.02 0.02 1.05 0.02 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.02 0.68CEO Ownership Power -0.01 0.02 -0.25 0.00 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 -1.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.87CEO Expertise Power 0.00 0.03 -0.43 0.00 0.01 -0.35 -0.01 0.01 -0.98 -0.01 0.01 -0.93
CEO Prestige Power 0.01 0.01 0.74 0.01 0.02 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.57 0.01 0.02 0.53Number of Employees -0.01 0.02 -0.43 -0.01 0.03 -0.43 -0.01 0.03 -0.46 -0.01 0.03 -0.46
Market Equity -0.15 0.03 -4.09*** -0.16 0.04 -4.38*** -0.16 0.04 -4.22 -0.16 0.04 -4.45***
Past Performance -0.02 0.04 -0.54 -0.01 0.04 -0.14 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.33
Wave 1 -0.12 0.08 -1.41 -0.10 0.09 -1.13 -0.02 0.15 -0.24 0.00 0.09 0.02
Wave 2 -0.07 0.07 -0.98 -0.05 0.07 -0.70 0.04 0.07 0.53 0.05 0.07 0.78
Wave 3 -0.02 0.07 -0.23 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.49 0.05 0.07 0.73
Wave 4 -0.05 0.07 -0.82 -0.05 0.07 -0.68 0.02 0.06 0.37 0.03 64.00 0.48
Constant -0.57 0.45 -1.26 -0.41 0.45 -0.90 -0.44 0.44 -0.99 -0.32 0.44 -0.72
N 
Log Likelihood -1639.24 -1629.70 -1673.73 -1665.16
***. Correlat ion is significant at  the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant  at  the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at  the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
Main Effects Only (t+1) Hypothesis 4 (t+1) Main Effects Only (t+2) Hypothesis 4 (t+2)
1077.00 1074.00 1082.00 1079.00
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Table 32:  Results for Hypothesis 4 (Post-SOX) at "t+1" 
  Main Effects Only (t+1) Hypothesis 4 (t+1) 
DV= E-Index Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error Z 
Variables             
% of Independent Directors       0.04 0.02 1.80 
Presence of all 3 Committees       0.62 0.27 2.24* 
Total Indep. of 3 Committees       -0.05 0.03 -1.44 
Age of Firm 0.02 0.02 0.86 0.01 0.02 0.55 
Board Size 0.16 0.07 2.37* 0.15 0.07 2.11* 
Board Size Squared -0.01 0.00 -2.23* -0.01 0.00 -1.98* Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.00 0.01 -0.40 0.00 0.01 -0.22 
Lead Outside Director -0.10 0.04 -2.46 -0.09 0.04 -2.3* 
CEO Structural Power 0.01 0.01 0.93 0.01 0.01 0.84 
CEO Ownership Power 0.02 0.02 1.05 0.02 0.02 0.93 
CEO Expertise Power -0.01 0.01 -1.10 -0.01 0.01 -1.23 
CEO Prestige Power 0.02 0.01 1.63 0.02 0.01 1.48 
Number of Employees -0.02 0.16 -0.95 -0.02 0.02 -0.96 
Market Equity -0.08 0.02 -3.8*** -0.08 0.02 -4.02*** 
Past Performance -0.49 0.01 -1.56 -0.04 0.03 -1.26 
Wave 1 0.19 0.08 2.24 0.17 0.08 2.04* 
Wave 2 -0.33 0.10 -3.34*** -0.34 0.09 -3.58*** 
Wave 3 0.77 0.08 9.22*** 0.76 0.08 9.0*** 
Wave 4 0.77 0.08 9.8*** 0.77 0.08 9.77*** 
Wave 5 0.77 0.08 9.48*** 0.76 0.08 9.37*** 
Constant -0.44 0.40 -1.09 -0.81 0.49 -1.63 
N  1152.00 1148.00 
Log Likelihood -1834.76 -1823.07 
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)  
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Therefore, when considering the main effects hypotheses, there is no evidence that the SOX 
structural changes created a higher likelihood of selected governance practices that support 
shareholder value whether they were voluntarily adopted in the pre-SOX timeframe or 
legislatively required in the post-SOX timeframe.     
6.8   Hypothesis 5 
Hypotheses 5-9 suggested a positive moderating impact of each of the elements of the board 
independence power index (as created in Chapter 6.1) and the index in its totality on the 
three SOX-mandated structural changes and corporate governance practices as measured 
through the E-Index.    
Hypothesis 5 explored the hypothesized positive moderating influence of the renamed board 
independence structure/prestige power on the SOX structural changes and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value.  Table 33 presents the results for 
Hypotheses 5a-d at time “t” for pre-SOX reporting coefficients while Table 34 presents the 
same results reporting IRR.  Table 35 presents the results for Hypotheses 5a-d at time “t” in 
the post-SOX period reporting coefficients while Table 36 presents the same results 
reporting IRR.  Given that board size was included in the construction of the interaction 
term (board independence structure/prestige power), it was not also included as a control 
variable in the testing of Hypothesis 5. 
 
 128  
Table 33:  Results for Hypotheses 5a-d Pre-SOX (Reporting Coefficients) at "t" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef.
St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent 
Directors 0.08 0.05 1.80 0.08 0.04 1.81 0.10 0.05 1.84
Presence of all 3 
Committees 0.24 0.09 0.27**  0.29 0.10 2.97**  0.30 0.10 2.91**
Total Indep. Of 3 
Commitees -0.04 0.03 -1.12 0.29 0.04 0.74 -0.05 0.05 -1.02
Board Indep. 
Structure/ Prestige 
Power  0.01 0.01 0.93 0.01 0.01 1.46 0.04 0.02 2.23* 0.03 0.01 2.26* 0.02 0.02 1.27
% of Independent 
Directors x Board 
Indep. Structure/ 
Prestige Power -0.01 0.01 -1.07  0.00 0.01 -0.67
Presence of all 3 
Committees x Board 
Indep. Structure/ 
Prestige Power 0.00 0.00 -1.57 -0.02 0.02 -1.37
Total Indep. Of 3 
Commitees x Board 
Indep. Structure/ 
Prestige Power 0.00 0.00 -1.07 0.00 0.01 0.40
Age of Firm 0.02 0.04 0.49 0.03 0.04 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.04 0.04 0.90 0.02 0.04 0.49
Board Size
Board Size Squared
Average Indep. 
Director 
Compensation 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.001 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.11 -0.001 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.09
Presence of a Lead 
Outside Director -0.09 0.08 -1.12 -0.98 0.08 -1.18 -0.10 .-79 -1.26 -0.09 0.08 -1.20 -0.10 0.08 -1.21
CEO Structural Power 0.02 0.02 0.98 0.022 0.02 1.12 0.03 0.02 1.36 0.025 19.00 1.31 0.02 0.02 1.08
CEO Ownership 
Power 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.000 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.001 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01
CEO Expert ise Power 0.00 0.01 -0.56 -0.002 0.01 -0.56 0.00 0.01 -0.56 -0.002 0.01 -0.56 0.00 0.01 -0.56
CEO Prest ige Power 0.01 0.02 0.69 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.01 0.02 0.59 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.01 0.02 -61.00
Number of Employees -0.01 0.03 -0.49 -0.01 0.03 -0.39 -0.16 0.03 -0.54 0.02 0.03 -0.53 -0.01 0.03 -0.46
Market  Equity -0.14 0.04 -3.85*** -0.14 0.04-3.71*** -0.14 0.04 -4.00*** -0.14 0.04 -3.76*** -0.14 0.04 -3.89***
Past Performance 0.01 0.04 -0.37 -0.02 0.04 -0.66 -0.01 0.04 -0.24 -0.02 0.04 -0.69 -0.01 0.04 -0.22
Wave 1 0.10 0.09 -1.13 -0.12 0.08 -1.44 -0.07 0.09 -0.78 -0.11 0.09 -1.27 -0.10 0.09 -1.12
Wave 2 -0.10 0.07 -1.32 -0.11 0.07 -1.62 -0.07 0.07 -1.04 -0.11 0.07 -1.52 -0.09 0.07 -1.28
Wave 3 -0.05 0.07 -0.66 -0.06 0.07 -0.95 -0.03 0.07 -0.51 -0.06 0.07 -0.09 -0.05 0.07 -0.69
Wave 4 -0.02 0.06 -0.38 -0.03 0.06 -0.52 -0.02 0.06 -0.26 -0.03 0.06 -0.50 -0.03 0.06 -0.43
 
Constant 0.59 0.18 3.26*** 0.74 0.15 4.79*** 0.45 0.17 2.65** 0.64 0.17 3.82*** 0.59 0.19 3.11**
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlat ion is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant  at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant  at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
-1636.82 -1631.13
Main Effects O nly Hypothesis 5a Hypothesis 5b Hypothesis 5c Hypothesis 5d
1061.00 1061.001061.00 1064.00 1065.00
-1632.47 -1639.42 -1636.60
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Table 34:  Results for Hypotheses 5a-d Pre-SOX (Reporting IRR) at "t" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index IRR
St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 1.08 0.05 1.80 1.08 0.05 1.81 1.09 0.06 1.84
Presence of all 3 Committees 1.28 0.12 0.27** 1.33 0.13 0.10 1.34 0.14 2.91**
Total Indep. Of 3 Commitees 0.96 0.03 -1.12 1.03 0.04 0.74 0.95 0.05 -1.02
Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power  1.01 0.01 0.93 1.01 0.01 1.46 1.03 0.02 0.02 1.03 0.01 2.26* 1.02 0.02 1.27
% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power 1.00 0.01 -1.07    1.00 0.01 -0.67
Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power 0.97 0.02 0.02 0.98 0.02 -1.37
Total Indep. Of 3 Commitees x Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power 1.00 0.00 -1.07 1.00 0.01 0.40
Age of Firm 1.01 0.04 0.49 1.03 0.04 0.79 1.02 0.04 0.04 1.04 0.04 0.90 1.02 0.04 0.49
Board Size
Board Size Squared
Average Indep. Director Compensation 1.00 0.02 -0.03 1.00 0.02 0.01 1.00 0.02 -0.11 0.99 0.02 -0.03 1.00 0.02 -0.09
Presence of a Lead Outside Director 0.92 0.07 -1.12 0.91 0.07 -1.18 0.91 0.07 -1.26 0.90 0.07 -1.20 0.91 0.07 -1.21
CEO Structural Power 1.02 0.02 0.98 1.02 0.02 1.12 1.02 0.02 1.36 1.02 0.02 1.31 1.02 0.02 1.08
CEO Ownership Power 1.00 0.03 0.04 1.00 0.03 -0.01 1.00 0.03 0.15 1.00 0.03 0.02 1.00 0.03 0.01
CEO Expertise Power 1.00 0.01 -0.56 1.00 0.01 -0.56 1.00 0.01 -0.56 1.00 0.01 -0.56 1.00 0.01 -0.56
CEO Prestige Power 1.01 0.02 0.69 1.01 0.02 0.63 1.01 0.02 0.59 1.01 0.02 0.63 1.01 0.02 -0.61
Number of Employees 0.99 0.03 -0.49 0.99 0.03 -0.39 0.98 0.03 -0.54 0.98 0.03 -0.53 0.99 0.03 -0.46
Market Equity 0.87 0.03 -3.85*** 0.87 0.03 -3.71*** 0.86 0.03 -4.00*** 0.87 0.03 -3.76*** 0.87 0.03 -3.89***
Past Performance 0.99 0.04 -0.37 0.98 0.04 -0.66 0.99 0.04 -0.24 0.98 0.04 -0.69 0.99 0.04 -0.22
Wave 1 0.90 0.08 -1.13 0.89 0.08 -1.44 0.93 0.08 -0.78 0.89 0.08 -1.27 0.91 0.08 -1.12
Wave 2 0.91 0.07 -1.32 0.89 0.06 -1.62 0.93 0.07 -1.04 0.89 0.06 -1.52 0.91 0.07 -1.28
Wave 3 0.96 0.07 -0.66 0.94 0.06 -0.95 0.97 0.07 -0.51 0.94 0.06 -0.09 0.95 0.07 -0.69
Wave 4 0.98 0.06 -0.38 0.97 0.06 -0.52 0.98 0.06 -0.26 0.97 0.06 -0.50 0.97 0.06 -0.43
 
Constant 1.80 0.33 3.26*** 2.10 0.33 4.79*** 1.58 0.28 2.65** 1.89 0.32 3.82*** 1.80 0.34 3.11**
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
-1639.42 -1636.60 -1636.82 -1631.13
1064.00 1064.00 1061.00 1061.00
Main Effects Only Hypothesis 5a Hypothesis 5b Hypothesis 5c Hypothesis 5d
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Table 35:  Results for Hypotheses 5a-d Post-SOX (Reporting Coefficients) at "t” 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef. St. Error z Coef.
St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 0.02 0.03 1.11 0.04 0.03 1.17 0.03 0.03 0.86
Presence of all 3 Committees 0.68 0.29 2.34* 0.91 0.36 2.51 0.93 0.38 2.44*
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees -0.06 0.03 -1.70 0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.67
Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power  0.00 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.01 0.71 0.08 0.05 1.76 0.02 0.02 1.36 0.09 -0.58 1.53
% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power 0.00 0.00 -0.97       -0.01 0.00 -0.25
Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power -0.01 0.01 -1.70  -0.08 0.06 -1.35
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees x Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power -0.01 0.01 -1.09 0.00 0.01 -0.51
Age of Firm 0.02 0.02 0.66 0.02 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.02 0.76 0.02 0.02 0.82 0.02 0.02 0.65
Board Size  
Board Size Squared
Average Indep. Director Compensation -0.01 0.01 0.53 0.004 0.01 0.47 0.01 0.01 0.51 0.004 0.01 0.41 0.01 0.01 0.57Lead Outside Director -0.07 0.04 -1.71 -0.78 0.04 -1.77 -0.08 0.04 -1.79 -0.08 0.04 -1.84 -0.08 0.04 -1.75CEO Structural Power 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.009 0.02 0.62 0.01 -0.16 0.61 0.013 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.55CEO Ownership Power 0.01 0.02 0.52 0.015 0.02 0.74 0.01 0.02 0.56 0.016 0.02 0.75 0.01 0.02 0.47CEO Expertise Power -0.01 0.01 -1.33 -0.011 0.01 -1.24 -0.01 0.01 -1.34 .-.0115 0.01 -1.25 -0.01 0.01 -1.36CEO Prestige Power 0.02 0.02 1.54 0.02 0.02 1.59 0.02 0.02 1.55 0.03 0.02 1.60 0.02 0.02 1.57Number of Employees 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.92 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.00 0.02 -0.04
Market Equity -0.07 0.02 -3.67*** -0.07 0.02 -3.59*** -0.08 0.02 -3.70*** -0.08 0.02 -3.6*** -0.08 0.02 -3.73***
Past Performance -0.06 0.03 -1.79 -0.07 0.03 -1.91* -0.62 0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.03 -1.96* -0.06 0.03 -1.71
Wave 1 -0.48 0.07 -6.88*** -0.45 0.07 6.78*** -0.45 0.07 -6.71*** -0.47 0.07 -6.86*** -0.48 0.07 -6.91***
Wave 2 -0.54 0.07 -7.36*** -0.53 0.07 -7.20*** -0.52 0.07 -7.21*** -0.53 0.07 -7.23*** -0.55 0.07 -7.38***
Wave 3 -0.48 0.08 -6.23*** -0.47 0.08 -6.16*** -0.46 0.08 -6.09*** -0.48 0.08 -6.17*** -0.49 0.08 6.27***
Wave 4 0.06 0.06 0.92 0.06 0.06 0.91 0.05 0.08 0.88 0.07 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.88
Wave 5 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.76 0.01 0.07 0.15
Constant 0.75 0.32 2.32* 1.25 0.12 10.64*** 0.36 0.37 0.96 1.23 0.17 7.24*** 0.45 0.42 1.07
N 
Log Likelihood -1927.59
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant  at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlat ion is significant  at  the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
Hypothesis 5d
1155.00 1159.00 1159.00 1155.00 1155.00
Main Effects Only Hypothesis 5a Hypothesis 5b Hypothesis 5c
-1928.89 -1930.63 -1935.22 -1932.41
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Table 36:  Results for Hypotheses 5a-d Post-SOX (Reporting IRR) at "t" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR
St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 1.03 0.03 1.11 1.04 0.03 1.17 1.03 0.04 0.86
Presence of all 3 Committees 1.98 0.60 2.34* 2.50 0.89 2.51 2.53 0.97 2.44*
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees 0.95 0.03 -1.70 1.00 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.67
Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige  Power  1.00 0.49 1.00 0.01 0.71 1.09 0.05 1.76 1.03 1.36 1.10 0.06 1.53
% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige  Power 1.00 0.00 -0.97    1.00 0.00 -0.25
Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power 0.92 0.04 -1.70 0.93 0.05 -1.35
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees x Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power 0.99 0.02 -1.09 1.00 0.01 -0.51
Age of Firm 1.02 0.02 0.66 1.02 0.02 0.73 1.01 0.02 0.76 1.01 0.01 0.82 1.02 0.02 0.65
Board Size  
Board Size Squared
Average Indep. Director Compensation 1.01 0.01 0.53 1.00 0.01 0.47 1.00 0.01 0.51 1.00 0.01 0.41 1.00 0.01 0.57
Presence of a Lead Outside Director 0.93 0.04 -1.71 0.93 0.04 -1.77 0.92 0.04 -1.79 0.93 0.04 -1.84 0.93 0.04 -1.75
CEO Structural Power 1.00 0.02 0.54 1.00 0.02 0.62 1.00 0.16 0.61 1.01 0.02 0.72 1.00 0.02 0.55
CEO Ownership Power 1.01 0.02 0.52 1.02 0.02 0.74 1.00 0.02 0.56 1.02 0.02 0.75 1.01 0.02 0.47
CEO Expertise Power 0.99 0.01 -1.33 1.00 0.01 -1.24 0.98 0.01 -1.34 1.00 0.01 -1.25 0.99 0.01 -1.36
CEO Prestige Power 1.02 0.02 1.54 1.03 0.02 1.59 1.02 0.02 1.55 1.03 0.02 1.60 1.02 0.02 1.57
Number of Employees 1.00 0.02 -0.06 1.00 0.02 -0.92 0.99 0.02 -0.04 1.00 0.02 -0.10 0.99 0.02 -0.04
Market Equity 0.93 0.02 -3.67*** 0.93 0.02 -3.59*** 0.93 0.02 -3.70*** 0.93 0.02 -3.6*** 0.93 0.02 -3.73***
Past Performance 0.94 0.03 -1.79 0.94 0.03 -1.91* 0.94 0.03 0.07 0.93 0.03 -1.96* 0.94 0.03 -1.71
Wave 1 0.62 0.04 -6.88*** 0.63 0.04 6.78*** 0.64 0.04 -6.71*** 0.62 0.04 -6.86*** 0.62 0.43 -6.91***
Wave 2 0.57 0.04 -7.36*** 0.58 0.04 -7.20*** 0.59 0.04 -7.21*** 0.59 0.04 -7.23*** 0.58 0.43 -7.38***
Wave 3 0.62 0.05 -6.23*** 0.62 0.05 -6.16*** 0.63 0.05 -6.09*** 0.62 0.05 -6.17*** 0.62 0.48 6.27***
Wave 4 1.05 0.07 0.92 1.05 0.07 0.91 1.05 0.07 0.88 1.06 0.07 0.23 1.05 0.67 0.88
Wave 5 1.01 0.07 0.16 1.01 0.07 0.16 1.43 0.07 0.15 1.02 0.07 0.76 1.01 0.66 0.15
Constant 2.10 0.68 2.32* 3.50 0.42 10.64*** 1.43 0.53 0.96 3.42 0.58 7.24*** 1.56 0.65 1.07
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
1159.00 1159.00 1155.00 1155.00
-1930.63 -1935.00 -1932.42 -1927.59
Hypothesis 5a Hypothesis 5b Hypothesis 5c Hypothesis 5dMain Effects Only
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6.8.1  Hypothesis 5a 
Hypothesis 5a suggested that the relationship between board independence and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by board 
independence structure/prestige power.  This relationship was not significant in the pre-SOX 
timeframe or in the post-SOX timeframe at any time point.  Thus, Hypothesis 5a was not 
supported for either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
6.8.2  Hypothesis 5b 
Hypothesis 5b suggested that the relationship between the existence of the audit, nominating 
and compensation committees and selected governance practices that support shareholder 
value is positively moderated by board independence structure/prestige power.  
While there were no significant relationships found at time “t” in either the pre-SOX or post-
SOX periods, there were significant lagged effects for the interaction in the direction 
hypothesized at time “t+1” (β= -0.03, z=-1.98, p<.05) and “t+2” (β= -0.03 z=-2.1, p<.05) in 
the pre-SOX period (Table 37).   As such, boards that have all three mandated committees 
are associated with an increase in the E-Index by a factor of 1.38 (or 38 percent) when there 
is no board independence structure/prestige power.  This effect of the presence of the three 
mandated committees on the E-Index decreases at “t+1” by a factor of 0.97 (or 3 percent) 
for every unit increase in board independence structure/prestige power.  At “t+2”, the effect 
of the presence of the three mandated committees on the E-Index decreases by a factor of 
0.97 (or 3 percent). 
The likelihood of the interaction effect grows in the post-SOX period although the impact is 
again only significant when the E-Index is lagged at “t+1” (β= -0.1, z=-2.29, p<.05) (Table 
38).  Thus, boards that have all three mandated committees are associated with an increase 
in the E-Index by a factor of 2.62 (or 162 percent) when there is no board independence 
structure/prestige power.  This effect of the presence on the three mandated committees on 
the E-Index decreases by a factor of 0.90 (or 10 percent) for every unit increase in board 
independence structure/prestige power.  
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Table 37:  Results for Hypothesis 5b Pre-SOX at "t+1" and "t+2" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index
Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent 
Directors
Presence of all 3 
Committees -0.06 0.05 -1.25 -0.04 0.05 -0.82
Total Indep. Of 3 
Committees
Board Indep. 
Structure/ Prestige 
Power  0.03 0.02 1.31 0.03 0.02 1.59
% of Independent 
Directors x Board 
Indep. Structure/ 
Prestige Power
Presence of all 3 
Committees x Board 
Indep. Structure/ 
Prestige Power -0.03 0.02 -1.98* -0.03 0.02 -1.95*
Total Indep. Of 3 
Committees x Board 
Indep. Structure/ 
Prestige Power
Age of Firm 0.02 0.04 0.55 0.03 -0.37 0.71
Average Indep. 
Director 
Compensation -0.01 0.02 -0.49 0.00 0.02 -0.21
Presence of a Lead 
Outside Director -0.07 0.08 -0.85 -0.09 0.08 -1.09
CEO Structural Power 0.02 0.02 1.12 0.01 0.02 0.76
CEO Ownership 
Power -0.01 0.03 -0.16 -0.03 0.03 -0.92
CEO Expertise Power 0.00 0.01 -0.34 -0.01 0.01 -0.93
CEO Prestige Power 0.01 0.02 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.54
Number of 
Employees -0.01 0.03 -0.27 -0.01 0.03 -0.27
Market  Equity -0.16 0.04 -4.33*** -0.16 0.04 -4.35***
Past  Performance 0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.07
Wave 1 -0.10 0.09 -1.06 0.01 0.09 0.14
Wave 2 -0.05 0.07 -0.62 0.06 0.07 0.90
Wave 3 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.77
Wave 4 -0.04 0.07 -0.62 0.03 0.07 0.53
Wave 5
Constant 0.49 0.19 2.64** 0.51 0.18 2.77**
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant  at the 0.01 level 
(2-tailed), *. Correlat ion is significant  at  the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
1074.00 1079.00
-1629.73 -1665.02
Pre-SOX
Hypothesis 5b T+1 Hypothesis 5b T+2
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Table 38:  Results for Hypothesis 5b Post-SOX at "t+1" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
Presence of all 3 Committees 0.34 0.20 1.49 0.96 0.38 2.55*Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power  0.01 0.00 1.44 0.11 0.04 2.41*Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Structure/ Prestige Power -0.10 0.04 -2.29*
Age of Firm 0.02 0.02 0.66 0.02 0.02 0.34
Board Size
Board Size SquaredAverage Indep. Director Compensation -0.01 0.01 0.53 0.00 0.01 -0.20Lead Outside Director -0.07 0.04 -1.71 -0.10 0.04 -2.45*CEO Structural Power 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.01 0.01 0.87CEO Ownership Power 0.01 0.02 0.52 0.01 0.02 0.75CEO Expertise Power -0.01 0.01 -1.33 -0.01 0.01 -1.22CEO Prestige Power 0.02 0.02 1.54 0.02 0.01 1.55Number of Employees 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.95
Market Equity -0.07 0.02 -3.67*** -0.09 0.02 -4.23***
Past Performance -0.06 0.03 -1.79 .-044 0.94 -1.42
Wave 1 0.19 0.07 2.28*** 0.19 0.08 2.27*
Wave 2 -0.32 0.07 -3.39*** -0.33 0.10 -3.42***
Wave 3 0.78 0.08 9.37*** 0.78 0.08 9.25***
Wave 4 0.77 0.06 9.76*** 0.77 0.08 9.71***
Wave 5 0.77 0.07 9.46*** 0.76 0.08 9.41***
Constant 0.11 0.23 0.48 -0.49 0.39 -1.27
N 
Log Likelihood -1928.89 -1832.18
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant  at the 0.01 
level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant  at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
Main Effects Only Hypothesis 5b (T+1)
1155.00 1152.00
 135  
Therefore, Hypothesis 5b was supported at “t+1” and “t+2” in the pre-SOX period and at 
“t+1” in the post-SOX period.   
6.8.3  Hypothesis 5c 
Hypothesis 5c posited that the relationship between the level of committee independence on 
the audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected governance practices that 
support shareholder value is positively moderated by board independence structure/prestige 
power.  The interaction was neither significant in the pre-SOX timeframe nor in the post-
SOX timeframe at any time point.  Thus, Hypothesis 5c was not supported for either the pre 
or post-SOX timeframes.   
6.8.4  Hypothesis 5d 
Hypothesis 5d suggested that the relationship between each of the SOX structural changes 
and selected governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
board independence structure/prestige power.  This regression included three interaction 
terms constructed for each of the SOX structural changes and board independent 
structure/prestige power to see whether the impact changed in the presence of each other.  
There were no significant interactions found at time “t” in either the pre-SOX or post-SOX 
period.  However, similar to the results of Hypothesis 5b, there were significant lagged 
effects in the direction hypothesized for the same interaction term (the presence of the 
mandated committees and board independence structure/prestige power) at time “t+1” (β=-
0.03 , z=-1.98, p<.05) and “t+2” (β=-0.03, z=-1.95, p<.05) in the pre-SOX period and at 
“t+1” (β=-0.10, z=-1.97, p<.05) and at “t+2” (β=-0.09, z=-1.94, p<.05) in the post-SOX 
period (Table 39).  
 136  
Table 39:  Results for Hypotheses 5d Pre-SOX and Post-SOX at "t+1" and "t+2" 
 
Therefore, Hypothesis 5d is partially proven at “t+1” and “t+2” in the pre-SOX and post-
SOX period.  
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index
Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 0.09 0.05 1.79 0.07 0.05 1.49 0.07 0.04 1.85 0.05 0.03 1.45Presence of all 3 
Committees -0.06 0.05 -1.25 -0.04 0.05 -0.82 -0.08 0.05 -1.49 -0.06 0.05 -1.24T otal Indep. Of 3 
Commitees 0.34 0.10 0.34 0.30 0.10 3.04** 1.04 0.41 2.55** 0.87 0.36 2.45*
Board Indep. Structure/ 
Prestige Power  0.03 0.02 1.31 0.03 0.02 1.59 0.10 0.05 1.81 0.09 0.36 1.83
% of Independent Directors 
x Board Indep. Structure/ 
Prestige Power -0.002 0.01 -0.44 0.00 0.01 -0.61 -0.004 0.00 -1.97* 0.00 0.05 -0.89
Presence of all 3 
Committees x Board Indep. 
Structure/ Prestige Power -0.03 0.02 -1.98* -0.03 0.02 -1.95* -0.10 0.05 0.53 -0.09 0.00 -1.94*
T otal Indep. Of 3 
Commitees x Board Indep. 
Structure/ Prestige Power 0.01 0.01 0.95 0.00 0.01 0.58 0.00 0.01 0.74 0.00 0.05 0.29
Age of Firm 0.02 0.04 0.55 0.03 -0.37 0.71 0.02 0.02 0.74 0.01 0.01 0.49
Average Indep. Director 
Compensation -0.01 0.02 -0.49 0.00 0.02 -0.21 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.44
Presence of a Lead Outside 
Director -0.07 0.08 -0.85 -0.09 0.08 -1.09 -0.09 0.04 -2.40 -0.13 0.04 -3.30
CEO Structural Power 0.02 0.02 1.12 0.01 0.02 0.76 0.01 0.01 0.78 0.01 0.01 1.02
CEO Ownership Power -0.01 0.03 -0.16 -0.03 0.03 -0.92 0.01 0.02 0.62 0.01 0.02 0.65
CEO Expertise Power 0.00 0.01 -0.34 -0.01 0.01 -0.93 -0.11 0.01 -1.25 -0.01 0.01 -1.25
CEO Prestige Power 0.01 0.02 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.02 0.01 1.58 .-168 0.01 1.18
Number of Employees -0.01 0.03 -0.27 -0.01 0.03 -0.27 -0.01 0.02 -0.91 0.00 0.02 0.04
Market  Equity -0.16 0.04 -4.33*** -0.16 0.04 -4.35*** -0.09 0.02 -4.30*** -0.09 0.02 -4.29***
Past  Performance 0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 0.03 -1.28 -0.01 0.03 -0.35
Wave 1 -0.10 0.09 -1.06 0.01 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.08 1.94* 0.13 0.09 1.44
Wave 2 -0.05 0.07 -0.62 0.06 0.07 0.90 -0.35 0.10 -3.61*** 0.74 0.08 8.82***
Wave 3 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.77 0.76 0.08 8.94*** 0.68 0.09 7.77***
Wave 4 -0.04 0.07 -0.62 0.03 0.07 0.53 0.76 0.08 9.69*** 0.70 0.08 8.55***
Wave 5 0.76 0.08 9.35*** 0.04 0.09 0.42
Constant 0.49 0.19 2.64** 0.51 0.18 2.77** -0.35 0.44 -0.79 -0.18 0.38 -0.47
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlat ion is significant  at  the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant  at  the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlat ion is significant at  the 0.05 
level (2 tailed)
-1822.00 -1825.18
Pre-SOX Post-SOX
Hypothesis 5d T+1 Hypothesis 5d T+2
1148.00 1155.00
Hypothesis 5d T+1 Hypothesis 5d T+2
1074.00 1079.00
-1629.73 -1665.02
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6.9  Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 explored the hypothesized positive moderating influence of board 
independence ownership power on the SOX structural changes and selected governance 
practices that support shareholder value.  Table 40 presents the results for Hypotheses 6a-d 
at time “t” for pre-SOX reporting coefficients while Table 41 presents the same results 
reporting IRR.  Table 42 presents the results for Hypotheses 6a-d at time “t” in the post-
SOX period reporting coefficients while Table 43 presents the same results reporting IRR.   
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Table 40:  Results for Hypotheses 6a-d Pre-SOX (Reporting Coefficients) at "t" 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef.
St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. S t. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 0.98 0.04 2.36* 0.08 0.03 2.34* 0.10 0.04 2.38Presence of all 3 Committees 0.21 0.09 2.31*  0.22 0.09 2.37* 0.21 0.94 2.24*
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees -0.04 0.03 -1.09 0.02 0.03 0.63 -0.04 0.03 -1.09
Board Independence Ownership Power -0.01 0.02 -0.34 -0.01 0.02 -0.27 -0.01 0.05 -0.25 0.02 0.04 0.41 0.00 0.06 0.02% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Ownership Power    0.00 0.02 -0.11 0.01 0.02 0.29Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Ownership Power 0.01 0.05 0.29 0.02 0.05 0.45Total Indep. Of 3 Committees x Board Indep. Ownership Power -0.01 0.02 -0.44 -0.01 0.02 -0.65
Age of Firm 0.02 0.04 0.45 0.03 0.04 0.69 0.03 0.04 0.75 0.04 0.04 0.97 0.02 0.04 0.48
Board Size 0.18 0.08 2.2* 0.21 0.08 2.57** 0.20 0.00 2.49* 0.22 0.08 2.72* 0.17 0.08 2.17*
Board Size Squared -0.01 0.00 1.93* -0.01 0.00 -2.23* -0.01 0.02 -2.22* -0.01 0.00 -2.37* -0.01 0.00 -1.91
Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.00 0.02 -0.11 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.11Lead Outside Director -0.09 0.08 -1.17 -0.10 0.08 -1.20 -1.00 0.08 -1.27 -1.00 0.08 -1.27 -0.92 0.08 -1.17CEO Structural Power 0.02 0.02 1.01 0.02 0.02 1.10 0.03 0.02 1.35 0.03 0.02 1.36 0.02 0.02 1.02CEO Ownership Power 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.21CEO Expertise Power 0.00 0.01 -0.56 0.00 0.01 -0.53 0.00 0.01 -0.62 0.00 0.01 -0.58 0.00 0.01 -0.57CEO Prestige Power 0.01 0.02 0.61 0.01 0.02 0.64 0.01 0.02 0.60 0.01 0.02 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.63Number of Employees -0.02 0.03 -0.68 -0.02 0.03 -0.62 -0.02 0.03 -0.64 -0.02 0.03 -0.62 -0.02 0.03 -0.71
Market Equity -0.14 0.04 -4.00*** -0.15 0.04 -3.86*** -0.15 0.04 -3.88*** -0.14 0.04 -3.71*** -0.15 0.04 -4.02***
Past Performance -0.01 0.04 -2.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.44 -0.01 0.04 -0.26 -0.02 0.04 -0.51 -0.01 0.04 -0.16
Wave 1 -0.11 0.09 -1.24 -0.13 0.08 -1.54 -0.07 0.09 -0.89 -0.11 0.09 -1.30 -0.11 0.09 -1.27
Wave 2 -0.10 0.07 -1.40 -0.12 0.07 -1.70 -0.08 0.07 -1.10 -0.11 0.07 -1.51 -0.10 0.07 -1.40
Wave 3 -0.05 0.07 -0.72 0.06 0.07 -0.93 -0.04 0.07 -0.52 -0.06 0.07 -0.84 -0.05 0.07 -0.73
Wave 4 -0.03 0.06 -0.49 -0.04 0.06 -0.60 -0.02 0.06 -0.24 -0.03 0.06 -0.44 -0.03 0.06 -0.53
 
Constant -0.38 0.45 -0.83 -0.43 0.46 -0.95 -0.57 0.45 -1.27 -0.52 0.46 -1.15 -0.37 0.46 -0.81
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlat ion is significant  at  the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant  at  the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlat ion is significant at  the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
-1629.75 -1636.27 -1635.16 -1629.45
1061.00 1064.00 1061.00 1061.00
Main Effects Only Hypothesis 6a Hypothesis 6b Hypothesis 6c Hypothesis 6d
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Table 41:  Results for Hypotheses 6a-d Pre-SOX (Reporting IRR) at "t" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR
St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 1.09 0.04 2.36* 1.08 0.04 2.34* 1.10 0.04 2.38Presence of all 3 Committees 1.23 0.11 2.31* 1.24 0.11 2.37* 1.23 0.12 2.24*Total Indep. Of 3 Commitees 0.96 0.03 -1.09 0.06 0.03 0.63 0.96 0.03 -1.09Board Indep. Ownership Power  0.99 0.02 -0.34 0.99 0.02 -0.27 0.99 0.05 -0.25 1.02 0.04 0.41 1.00 0.06 0.02% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Ownership Power  1.00 0.02 -0.11 1.01 0.02 0.29Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Ownership Power 1.01 0.05 0.29 1.02 0.05 0.45Total Indep. Of 3 Commitees x Board Indep. Ownership Power 0.99 0.02 -0.44 0.99 0.02 -0.65
Age of Firm 1.02 0.04 0.45 1.03 0.04 0.69 1.03 0.04 0.75 1.03 0.04 0.97 1.02 0.04 0.48
Board Size 1.19 0.10 2.2* 1.22 0.11 2.57** 0.99 0.10 2.49* 1.24 0.10 2.72* 1.19 0.10 2.17*
Board Size Squared 0.99 0.00 1.93* 0.99 0.00 -2.23* 1.00 0.00 -2.22* 0.99 0.00 -2.37* 0.99 0.00 -1.91
Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.99 0.02 -0.11 1.00 0.02 -0.04 1.00 0.02 -0.07 1.00 0.02 -0.06 1.00 0.02 -0.11Lead Outside Director 0.91 0.07 -1.17 0.91 0.07 -1.20 0.90 0.07 -1.27 0.90 0.07 -1.27 0.91 0.07 -1.17CEO Structural Power 1.02 0.02 1.01 1.02 0.02 1.10 1.03 0.02 1.35 1.02 0.02 1.36 1.02 0.02 1.02CEO Ownership Power 1.00 0.03 0.02 1.00 0.03 0.14 1.00 0.03 0.16 1.00 0.03 0.05 1.01 0.03 0.21CEO Expertise Power 1.00 0.01 -0.56 1.00 0.01 -0.53 1.00 0.01 -0.62 1.00 0.01 -0.58 1.00 0.01 -0.57
CEO Prestige Power 1.01 0.02 0.61 1.01 0.02 0.64 1.01 0.02 0.60 1.01 0.02 0.66 1.01 0.02 0.63
Number of Employees 0.98 0.03 -0.68 0.98 0.03 -0.62 0.98 0.03 -0.64 1.00 0.03 -0.62 0.98 0.03 -0.71
Market Equity 0.86 0.03 -4.00*** 0.86 0.03 -3.86*** 0.86 0.03 -3.88*** 0.87 0.03 -3.71*** 0.86 0.03 -4.02***
Past Performance 0.99 0.04 -2.00 0.98 0.04 -0.44 0.99 0.04 -0.26 0.98 0.04 -0.51 0.99 0.04 -0.16
Wave 1 0.89 0.08 -1.24 0.87 0.07 -1.54 0.93 0.08 -0.89 0.89 0.08 -1.30 0.89 0.08 -1.27
Wave 2 0.90 0.06 -1.40 0.89 0.06 -1.70 0.92 0.07 -1.10 0.90 0.06 -1.51 0.90 0.07 -1.40
Wave 3 0.95 0.07 -0.72 0.94 0.06 -0.93 0.96 0.07 -0.52 0.94 0.06 -0.84 0.95 0.07 -0.73
Wave 4 0.68 0.06 -0.49 0.96 0.06 -0.60 0.98 0.06 -0.24 0.97 0.06 -0.44 0.97 0.06 -0.53
 
Constant 0.68 0.31 -0.83 0.65 0.30 -0.95 0.56 0.25 -1.27 0.59 0.27 -1.15 -1.56 0.16 -0.81
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
-1629.75 -1636.27 -1636.01 -1635.16 -1629.45
1061.00 1064.00 1064.00 1061.00 1061.00
Main Effects Only Hypothesis 6a Hypothesis 6b Hypothesis 6c Hypothesis 6d
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Table 42:  Results for Hypotheses 6a-d Post-SOX (Reporting Coefficients) at "t" 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef.
St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. S t. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 0.03 0.02 1.14 0.02 0.02 0.88 0.03 0.02 1.37Presence of all 3 Committees 0.70 0.29 2.39*  0.71 0.30 2.4* 0.97 0.40 2.44*
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees -0.05 0.03 -1.50 -0.02 0.03 -0.91 -0.05 0.03 -1.61
Board Indep. Ownership Power  0.01 0.01 0.82 0.01 0.01 0.51 -0.41 2.10 -1.97* 0.01 0.02 -0.30 -0.48 0.27 -1.79
% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Ownership Power 0.01 0.01 0.65 0.01 0.02 0.65Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Ownership Power 0.42 0.21 2.03* 0.53 0.26 2.02*Total Indep. Of 3 Committees x Board Indep. Ownership Power 0.01 0.02 0.50 -0.02 0.23 0.45
Age of Firm 0.17 0.08 0.44 0.01 0.02 0.45 0.02 0.02 0.57 0.02 0.02 0.65 0.01 0.02 0.45
Board Size 0.17 0.08 2.23* 0.17 0.08 2.29* 0.18 0.08 2.42* 0.18 0.08 2.37* 1.65 0.76 2.17*
Board Size Squared -0.01 0.00 -2.13* -0.76 0.00 -2.18* -0.01 0.00 -2.30* -0.01 0.00 -2.25* -0.01 0.00 -2.08*
Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.01 ..43 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.48Lead Outside Director -0.08 0.04 -1.72 -0.07 0.48 -1.74 -0.08 0.04 -1.88 -0.08 0.04 -1.82 -0.08 0.04 -1.76CEO Structural Power 0.01 0.02 0.61 0.11 0.02 0.74 0.01 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.74 0.01 0.02 0.64CEO Ownership Power 0.01 0.02 0.67 0.02 0.02 0.91 0.02 0.02 0.87 0.02 0.02 0.82 0.02 0.02 0.71CEO Expertise Power -0.01 0.01 -1.31 -0.11 0.01 -1.23 -0.01 0.01 -1.36 -0.01 0.01 -1.21 -0.01 0.01 -1.36CEO Prestige Power 0.02 0.02 1.50 0.02 0.02 1.54 0.02 0.02 1.52 0.03 0.02 1.60 0.02 0.02 1.53Number of Employees 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.02 -0.13
Market Equity -0.07 0.02 -3.39*** -0.07 0.02 -3.21*** -0.07 0.02 -3.29 -0.07 0.02 -3.23*** -0.07 0.02 3.34***
Past Performance -0.06 0.02 0.61 -0.06 0.03 -1.81 -0.06 0.03 -1.60 -0.07 0.03 -1.90 -0.05 0.03 -0.16
Wave 1 -0.47 0.07 -.681*** -0.45 0.07 -6.72*** -0.44 0.07 -6.62*** -0.46 0.07 -6.76*** -0.47 0.07 -6.77***
Wave 2 -0.54 0.07 -7.37*** -0.53 0.07 -7.19*** -0.53 0.07 -7.19*** -0.54 0.07 -7.27*** 0.54 0.07 -7.31***
Wave 3 -0.48 0.08 -6.33*** -0.47 0.08 -6.23*** -0.47 0.08 -6.12*** -0.49 0.77 6.28*** -0.49 0.08 -6.27***
Wave 4 0.06 0.60 0.96 0.06 0.06 1.01 0.06 0.03 0.96 0.06 0.06 1.02 0.06 0.70 0.99
Wave 5 0.01 0.66 0.14 0.01 0.07 -0.19 0.01 0.07 0.21 0.02 0.07 0.26 0.01 0.70 0.20
Constant -0.20 0.53 -0.38 0.31 0.43 0.71 0.42 0.52 -0.82 0.35 0.44 0.82 -0.43 0.59 -0.73
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
1159.00 1159.00 1155.00 1155.00
-1926.19 -1936.04 -1930.00 -1930.50 -1922.17
Hypothesis 6a Hypothesis 6b Hypothesis 6c Hypothesis 6d
1155.00
Main Effects Only
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Table 43:  Results for Hypotheses 6a-d Post-SOX (Reporting IRR) at "t” 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index IRR St. Error z IRR
St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 1.03 0.04 1.14 1.02 0.21 0.88 1.03 0.00 1.37Presence of all 3 Committees 2.00 0.60 2.39* 2.04 0.60 2.4* 2.65 0.06 2.44*Total Indep. Of 3 Committees 0.95 0.03 -1.50 0.97 0.03 -0.91 0.95 0.03 -1.61Board Indep. Ownership Power  1.01 0.01 0.82 1.01 0.01 0.51 0.67 0.14 -1.97* 0.98 0.06 -0.30 0.62 0.10 -1.79% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Ownership Power 1.01 0.01 0.65   1.01 0.65Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Ownership Power 1.52 0.32 2.03* 1.70 2.02*Total Indep. Of 3 Committees x Board Indep. Ownership Power 1.01 0.02 0.50 0.98 0.45
Age of Firm 1.01 0.09 0.44 1.01 0.02 0.45 1.01 0.02 0.57 1.02 0.02 0.65 1.01 0.02 0.45
Board Size 1.18 0.00 2.23* 1.12 0.09 2.29* 1.19 0.09 2.42* 1.19 0.09 2.37* 1.78 0.09 2.17*
Board Size Squared 1.00 0.04 -2.13* 0.99 0.00 -2.18* 0.99 0.00 -2.30* 0.99 0.00 -2.25* 0.99 0.00 -2.08*
Average Indep. Director Compensation 1.00 0.01 0.45 1.00 0.01 0.36 1.00 0.01 0.43 1.00 0.01 0.29 1.00 0.01 0.48Lead Outside Director 0.92 0.04 -1.72 0.93 0.04 -1.74 0.92 0.04 -1.88 0.92 0.04 -1.82 0.93 0.04 -1.76CEO Structural Power 1.00 0.02 0.61 1.01 0.02 0.74 1.01 0.02 0.72 1.01 0.02 0.74 1.01 0.02 0.64CEO Ownership Power 1.01 0.02 0.67 1.02 0.02 0.91 1.01 0.02 0.87 1.01 0.02 0.82 1.02 0.02 0.71CEO Expertise Power 0.99 0.01 -1.31 0.99 0.01 -1.23 0.99 0.01 -1.36 0.99 0.01 -1.21 0.87 0.01 -1.36CEO Prestige Power 1.02 0.02 1.50 1.02 0.02 1.54 1.02 0.02 1.52 1.02 0.02 1.60 1.02 16.00 1.53Number of Employees 1.00 0.02 -0.06 1.00 0.02 -0.01 1.00 0.02 -0.09 1.00 0.02 -0.07 1.00 0.02 -0.13
Market Equity 0.93 0.02 -3.39*** 0.93 0.02 -3.21*** 0.93 0.02 -3.29 0.93 0.02 -3.23*** 0.93 0.19 3.34***
Past Performance 0.94 0.03 0.61 0.93 0.03 -1.81 0.46 0.03 -1.60 0.94 0.02 -1.90 0.95 0.04 -0.16
Wave 1 0.63 0.04 -.681*** 0.64 0.04 -6.72*** 0.64 0.04 -6.62*** 0.62 0.04 -6.76*** 0.63 0.04 -6.77***
Wave 2 0.58 0.04 -7.37*** 0.59 0.04 -7.19*** 0.59 0.04 -7.19*** 0.59 0.04 -7.27*** 0.58 0.04 -7.31***
Wave 3 0.61 0.05 -6.33*** 0.62 0.05 -6.23*** 0.63 0.58 -6.12*** 0.61 0.05 6.28*** 0.61 0.05 -6.27***
Wave 4 1.06 0.07 0.96 1.07 0.07 1.01 0.17 0.67 0.96 1.07 0.07 1.02 1.06 0.07 0.99
Wave 5 1.01 0.07 0.14 1.01 0.07 -0.19 1.01 0.67 0.21 1.02 0.07 0.26 1.01 0.07 0.20
Constant 0.82 0.43 -0.38 1.36 0.58 0.71 0.65 0.34 -0.82 1.43 0.63 0.82 0.65 0.39 -0.73
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
1159.00 1159.00 1155.00 1155.00
-1926.19 -1936.04 -1930.00 -1930.50 -1922.17
Hypothesis 6a Hypothesis 6b Hypothesis 6c Hypothesis 6d
1155.00
Main Effects Only
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6.9.1  Hypothesis 6a 
Hypothesis 6a suggested that the relationship between board independence and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by board 
independence ownership power.  This relationship was not significant in the pre-SOX 
timeframe or in the post-SOX timeframe at any time point.  Thus, Hypothesis 6a was not 
supported for either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
6.9.2  Hypothesis 6b 
Hypothesis 6b suggested that the relationship between the existence of the audit, nominating 
and compensation committees and selected governance practices that support shareholder 
value is positively moderated by board independence ownership power.  There was no 
significant interaction during the pre-SOX timeframe.  In the post-SOX timeframe at time 
“t”, the interaction term was significant (β=0.42, z=2.03, p<.05), but it was not in the 
direction hypothesized.  Specifically, boards that have all three mandated committees are 
associated with an increase in the E-Index by a factor of 2.04 (or 104 percent) when there is 
no board ownership power.  This effect of the presence of the three mandated committees on 
the E-Index increased at “t” by a factor of 1.52 (or 52 percent) for every unit increase in 
board independence ownership power.   
 As a result, Hypothesis 6b was not supported. 
6.9.3  Hypothesis 6c 
Hypothesis 6c posited that the relationship between the level of committee independence on 
the audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected governance practices that 
support shareholder value is positively moderated by board independence ownership power.  
This relationship was not significant in the pre or post-SOX timeframes at any time point.  
Thus, Hypothesis 6c was not supported for either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
6.9.4  Hypothesis 6d 
Hypothesis 6d suggested that the relationship between each of the SOX structural changes 
and selected governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by 
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board independence ownership power. This regression included three interaction terms 
constructed for each of the SOX structural changes and board independent ownership power 
to see whether the impact changed in the presence of each other.  There were no significant 
interactions in the pre-SOX period at any time interval.  During the post-SOX period, there 
was a significant result at time “t” (β=0.53, z=2.02, p<.05) for the same interaction term at 
Hypothesis 6b (the presence of the mandated committees and board independence 
ownership power).  However, it was not in the direction hypothesized and a result, 
Hypothesis 6d was not supported.   
6.10   Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 explored the hypothesized positive moderating influence of the board 
independence expertise power on the SOX structural changes and selected governance 
practices that support shareholder value.  Table 44 presents the results for Hypotheses 7a-d 
at time “t” for pre-SOX reporting coefficients while Table 45 presents the same results 
reporting IRR.  Table 46 presents the results for Hypotheses 7a-d at time “t” in the post-
SOX period reporting coefficients while Table 47 presents the same results reporting IRR.   
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Table 44:  Results for Hypotheses 7a-d Pre-SOX (Reporting Coefficients) at "t" 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef.
St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 0.09 0.04 2.36* 0.08 0.03 2.31* 0.09 0.04 2.33*Presence of all 3 Committees 0.21 0.09 2.30* 0.22 0.09 2.45* 0.22 0.09 2.33*Total Indep. Of 3 Commitees -0.04 0.03 -1.09  0.02 0.03 0.61 -0.36 0.03 -1.08Board Indep. Expertise Power  0.02 0.02 0.92 0.02 0.02 0.68 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.81 0.01 0.05 0.19
% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Expertise Power -0.07 0.02 -0.48   -0.01 0.02 -0.32Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Expertise Power 0.00 0.04 0.31 0.02 0.04 0.52Total Indep. Of 3 Commitees x Board Indep. Expertise Power  -0.01 0.02 -0.35 -0.01 0.02 -0.30
Age of Firm 0.01 0.04 0.38 0.02 0.04 0.61 0.03 -0.38 0.66 0.03 0.04 0.38 0.01 0.04 0.36
Board Size 0.17 0.08 2.19* 0.20 0.08 2.54** 0.20 0.08 2.44* 0.22 0.08 2.72** 0.17 0.08 2.15*
Board Size Squared -0.01 0.00 -1.91* -0.01 0.00 -2.23* -0.01 0.00 -2.18* -0.01 0.00 -2.39* -0.01 0.00 -1.92*Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.19 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01Lead Outside Director -0.09 0.08 -1.17 -0.09 0.08 -1.19 -0.01 0.08 -1.25 -0.10 0.08 -1.28 -0.09 0.08 -1.15CEO Structural Power 0.02 0.02 1.03 0.02 0.02 1.11 0.03 0.02 1.34 0.03 0.02 1.37 0.02 0.02 0.99CEO Ownership Power 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.31 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.17CEO Expertise Power 0.00 0.01 -0.61 0.00 0.01 -0.58 0.00 0.01 -0.67 0.00 0.01 -0.62 0.00 0.01 -0.59CEO Expertise Power 0.01 0.19 0.61 0.01 0.02 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.61 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.01 0.02 0.64Number of Employees -0.02 0.03 -0.60 -0.02 0.03 -0.55 -0.02 0.03 -0.59 -0.02 0.03 -0.58 -0.02 0.03 -0.60
Market Equity -0.15 0.04 -4.01*** -0.14 0.04-3.87*** -0.15 0.04 -3.95*** -0.14 0.04 -3.76*** -0.14 0.04 -4.00***
Past Performance -0.01 0.04 -0.19 -0.01 0.04 -0.42 -0.01 0.04 -0.27 -0.02 0.04 -0.50 -0.01 0.04 -0.22
Wave 1 -0.11 0.09 -1.23 -0.13 0.08 -1.53 -0.08 0.09 -0.91 -0.11 0.09 -1.29 -0.11 0.09 -1.26
Wave 2 -0.10 0.07 -1.41 -0.12 0.07 -1.73 -0.08 0.07 -1.12 0.11 0.07 -1.53 -0.10 0.07 -1.43
Wave 3 .-049 0.07 -0.72 -0.06 0.07 -0.93 -0.04 0.07 -0.53 -0.06 0.07 -0.08 -0.05 0.07 0.71
Wave 4 -0.03 0.06 -0.47 -0.04 -0.63 -0.60 -0.01 0.06 -0.23 -0.03 0.06 -0.40 -0.03 0.06 -0.46
 
Constant -0.34 0.46 -0.76 -0.40 -0.46 -0.88 -0.55 0.45 -1.23 -0.52 0.45 -1.13 -0.34 0.46 -0.76
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlation is significant at  the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at  the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at  the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
-1629.38 -1635.80 -1635.67 -1634.82 -1629.14
1061.00 1064.00 1064.00 1061.00 1061.00
Main Effects Only Hypothesis 7a Hypothesis 7b Hypothesis 7c Hypothesis 7d
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Table 45:  Results for Hypotheses 7a-d Pre-SOX (Reporting IRR) at "t" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index IRR
St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 1.09 0.04 2.36* 1.08 0.04 2.31* 1.10 0.04 2.33*Presence of all 3 Committees 1.23 0.11 2.3* 1.25 0.11 2.45* 1.24 0.12 2.33*Total Indep. Of 3 Commitees 0.96 0.03 -1.09 1.01 0.03 0.61 0.96 0.03 -1.08Board Indep. Expertise Power  1.02 0.02 0.92 1.02 0.02 0.68 1.00 0.04 0.20 1.02 0.04 0.81 1.01 0.05 0.19% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Expertise Power 0.99 0.02 -0.48   1.00 0.02 -0.32Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Expertise Power 1.01 0.04 0.31 1.02 0.45 0.52Total Indep. Of 3 Commitees x Board Indep. Expertise Power 0.99 0.02 -0.35 0.99 0.02 -0.30
Age of Firm 1.01 0.04 0.38 1.02 0.04 0.61 1.02 0.04 0.66 1.03 0.04 0.38 1.01 0.04 0.36
Board Size 1.18 0.10 2.16* 1.22 0.10 2.54** 1.21 0.10 2.44* 1.24 0.10 2.72** 1.18 0.10 2.15*
Board Size Squared 0.99 0.00 -1.91* 0.99 0.02 -2.23* 0.99 0.00 -2.18* 0.99 0.00 -2.39* 0.99 0.00 -1.92*Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.99 0.02 -0.06 1.00 0.02 -0.01 1.00 0.02 -0.04 0.99 0.02 -0.03 1.00 0.02 -0.01Lead Outside Director 0.91 0.07 -1.17 0.91 0.07 -1.19 0.91 0.07 -1.25 0.90 0.07 -1.28 0.91 0.07 -1.15CEO Structural Power 1.02 0.02 1.03 1.02 0.02 1.11 1.02 0.02 1.34 1.02 0.02 1.37 1.02 0.02 0.99CEO Ownership Power 1.01 0.03 0.19 1.00 0.03 0.12 1.01 0.03 0.17 1.00 0.03 0.10 1.01 0.03 0.17CEO Expertise Power 1.00 0.01 -0.61 1.00 0.01 -0.58 1.00 0.01 -0.67 1.00 0.01 -0.62 1.00 0.01 -0.59CEO Prestige Power 1.01 0.02 0.61 1.01 0.02 0.66 1.01 0.02 0.61 1.01 0.02 0.63 1.01 0.02 0.64Number of Employees 0.98 0.03 -0.60 0.98 0.03 -0.55 0.98 0.03 -0.59 0.98 0.03 -0.58 0.98 0.03 -0.60
Market Equity 0.86 0.03 -4.01*** 0.87 0.03 -3.87*** 0.86 0.03 -3.95*** 0.87 0.03 -3.76*** 0.86 0.03 -4.00***
Past Performance 0.99 0.04 -0.19 0.99 0.04 -0.42 0.99 0.04 -0.27 0.98 0.04 -0.50 0.99 0.04 -0.22
Wave 1 0.89 0.08 -1.23 0.88 0.07 -1.53 0.93 0.08 -0.91 0.90 0.08 -1.29 0.90 0.08 -1.26
Wave 2 0.90 0.07 -1.41 0.89 0.06 -1.73 0.92 0.07 -1.12 0.90 0.06 -1.53 0.90 0.07 -1.43
Wave 3 0.95 0.07 -0.72 0.94 0.06 -0.93 0.96 0.07 -0.53 0.94 0.06 -0.08 0.95 0.07 0.71
Wave 4 0.97 0.06 -0.47 0.97 0.06 -0.60 0.96 0.06 -0.23 0.97 0.06 -0.40 0.97 0.06 -0.46
  
Constant 0.71 0.32 -0.76 0.67 -0.88 0.57 0.26 -1.23 0.59 0.27 -1.13 0.71 0.32 -0.76
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlat ion is significant  at  the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant  at  the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlat ion is significant  at  the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
-1629.38 -1635.81 -1635.67 -1634.82 -1629.14
1061.00 1064.00 1064.00 1061.00 1061.00
Main Effects Only Hypothesis 7a Hypothesis 7b Hypothesis 7c Hypothesis 7d
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Table 46:  Results for Hypotheses 7a-d Post-SOX (Reporting Coefficients) at "t" 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef. St. Error z Coef.
S t. Error z Coef. S t. Error z Coef. S t. Error z Coef. S t. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 0.03 0.02 1.20 0.02 0.21 1.04 0.03 0.37 1.29
Presence of all 3 Committees 0.69 0.29 2.36* 0.54 0.24 2.22* 0.94 0.03 2.56
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees -0.05 0.03 -1.49 -0.03 0.03 -0.87 -0.06 0.19 -1.65
Board Indep. Expertise Power  0.01 0.01 0.33 -0.01 0.01 0.35 -0.11 0.13 -0.88 -0.02 0.05 -0.37 -3.65 0.01 -1.90
% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Expertise Power -0.01 0.19 -0.51 -0.01 0.19 -0.83
Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Expertise Power 0.01 0.02 0.58 0.34 0.02 1.80
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees x Board Indep. Expertise Power 0.01 0.02 0.48 0.01 0.02 0.53
Age of Firm 0.01 0.02 0.40 0.01 0.02 0.42 0.01 0.02 0.58 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.10 0.02 0.43
Board Size 0.16 0.08 2.18* 0.17 0.08 2.27* 0.18 0.08 2.38* 0.17 0.07 2.3* 0.17 0.08 2.24*
Board Size Squared -0.01 0.00 -2.07* -0.01 0.00 -2.14* -0.01 0.00 -2.27* -0.01 0.00 -2.18* -0.01 0.00 -2.14*
Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.46Lead Outside Director -0.08 0.04 -1.73 -0.08 0.04 -1.75 -0.81 0.04 -1.87 -0.08 0.04 -1.87 -0.07 0.04 -1.72CEO Structural Power 0.01 0.02 0.56 0.01 0.02 0.69 0.01 0.02 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.56CEO Ownership Power 0.02 0.02 0.70 0.02 0.02 0.94 0.02 0.02 0.80 0.02 0.02 0.82 0.02 0.02 0.68CEO Expertise Power -0.01 0.01 -1.32 -0.01 0.01 -1.28 -0.12 0.01 -1.35 -0.01 0.01 -1.26 -0.01 0.01 -1.43CEO Expertise Power 0.02 0.02 1.50 0.02 0.02 1.56 0.02 0.02 1.52 0.03 0.02 1.62 0.02 0.02 1.52Number of Employees 0.00 0.02 -0.13 0.00 0.02 -0.13 0.00 0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.14 0.00 0.02 -0.15
Market Equity -0.07 0.02 -3.56*** -0.07 0.02 -3.44*** -0.07 0.02 -3.52*** -0.01 0.02 -3.41*** -0.07 0.02 -3.57***
Past Performance -0.06 0.01 -1.64 -0.06 0.04 -1.82 -0.06 0.04 -1.69 -0.08 0.03 -1.89 -0.06 0.03 -1.60
Wave 1 -0.46 0.07 -.675*** -0.44 0.07 -6.65*** -0.44 0.07 -6.64*** -0.46 0.07 -6.7*** -0.47 0.07 -6.79***
Wave 2 -0.54 0.07 -7.35*** -0.52 0.07 -7.17*** -0.53 0.07 -7.22*** -0.53 0.07 -7.22*** -0.54 0.07 -7.34***
Wave 3 -0.48 0.08 -6.25*** -0.47 0.08 -6.17*** -0.46 0.08 -6.04*** -0.48 0.08 -6.2*** -0.48 0.08 -6.27***
Wave 4 0.06 0.06 1.00 0.07 0.06 1.05 0.06 0.06 0.99 0.07 0.06 1.09 0.06 0.06 1.00
Wave 5 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.28 0.01 0.07 0.14
Constant -0.18 0.53 -0.34 0.31 0.43 0.71 -0.25 0.49 -0.51 0.38 0.44 0.86 -0.43 0.58 -0.76
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlat ion is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlat ion is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
1159.00 1159.00 1155.00 1155.00
-1926.45 -1936.32 -1933.62 -1930.80 -1924.08
Hypothesis 7a Hypothesis 7b Hypothesis 7c Hypothesis 7d
1155.00
Main Effects Only
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Table 47:  Results for Hypotheses 7a-d Post-SOX (Reporting IRR) at "t" 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 1.02 0.02 1.20 1.02 0.02 1.04 1.03 0.03 1.29
Presence of all 3 Committees 2.00 0.58 2.36* 1.71 0.52 2.22* 2.55 0.94 2.56
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees 0.95 0.03 -1.49   0.97 0.03 -0.87 0.94 0.03 -1.65
Board Indep. Expertise Power  1.00 0.01 0.33 1.00 0.01 0.35 0.90 0.11 -0.88 0.98 0.05 -0.37 0.69 0.12 -1.90
% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Expertise Power 0.99 0.01 -0.51 0.99 0.01 -0.83
Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Expertise Power 1.12 0.14 0.58 1.40 0.26 1.80
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees x Board Indep. Expertise Power 1.01 0.02 0.48 1.01 0.02 0.53
Age of Firm 1.00 0.02 0.40 1.01 0.02 0.42 1.01 0.02 0.58 1.01 0.02 0.63 1.01 0.03 0.43
Board Size 1.78 0.89 2.18* 1.19 0.09 2.27* 1.12 0.09 2.38* 1.19 0.09 2.3* 1.18 89.00 2.24*
Board Size Squared 0.99 0.00 -2.07* 0.99 0.00 -2.14* 0.99 0.03 -2.27* 0.99 0.00 -2.18* 0.99 0.00 -2.14*
Average Indep. Director Compensation 1.00 0.01 0.45 1.00 0.01 0.35 1.00 0.01 0.44 1.00 0.01 0.29 1.00 0.01 0.46
Lead Outside Director 0.93 0.04 -1.73 0.93 0.04 -1.75 0.92 0.04 -1.87 0.92 0.04 -1.87 0.93 0.04 -1.72
CEO Structural Power 1.00 0.02 0.56 1.01 0.02 0.69 1.01 0.02 0.66 1.01 0.02 0.72 1.01 0.02 0.56
CEO Ownership Power 1.02 0.02 0.70 1.02 0.02 0.94 1.02 0.02 0.80 1.02 0.02 0.82 1.01 0.02 0.68
CEO Expertise Power 0.98 0.01 -1.32 0.99 0.01 -1.28 0.99 0.01 -1.35 0.99 0.01 -1.26 0.99 0.01 -1.43
CEO Prestige Power 1.02 0.02 1.50 1.02 0.02 1.56 1.02 0.02 1.52 1.03 0.02 1.62 1.02 0.02 1.52
Number of Employees 1.00 0.01 -0.13 1.00 0.02 -0.13 1.00 0.02 -0.11 1.00 0.02 -0.14 1.00 0.01 -0.15
M arket Equity 0.93 0.02 -3.56*** 0.93 0.02 -3.44*** 0.93 0.01 -3.52*** 0.93 0.02 -3.41*** 0.93 0.02 -3.57***
Past Performance 0.94 0.03 -1.64 0.93 0.03 -1.82 0.94 0.03 -1.69 0.04 0.03 -1.89 0.95 0.03 -1.60
Wave 1 0.62 0.04 -.675*** 0.64 0.04 -6.65*** 0.64 0.04 -6.64*** 0.63 0.04 -6.7*** 0.63 0.04 -6.79***
Wave 2 0.58 0.04 -7.35*** 0.59 0.04 -7.17*** 0.59 0.04 -7.22*** 0.58 0.04 -7.22*** 0.58 0.04 -7.34***
Wave 3 0.62 0.05 -6.25*** 0.62 0.05 -6.17*** 0.63 0.05 -6.04*** 0.62 0.05 -6.2*** 0.62 0.05 -6.27***
Wave 4 1.06 0.07 1.00 1.07 0.07 1.05 1.06 0.07 0.99 1.07 0.07 1.09 1.06 0.07 1.00
Wave 5 1.01 0.07 0.15 1.01 0.07 0.18 1.01 0.07 0.18 1.01 0.07 0.28 1.01 0.07 0.14
Constant 0.84 0.44 -0.34 1.35 0.58 0.71 0.78 0.38 -0.51 1.45 0.64 0.86 0.65 0.37 -0.76
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlat ion is significant  at  the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant at  the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at  the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
1159.00 1159.00 1155.00 1155.00
-1926.46 -1936.32 -1933.62 -1930.80 -1924.08
Hypothesis 7a Hypothesis 7b Hypothesis 7c Hypothesis 7d
1155.00
Main Effects Only
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6.10.1  Hypothesis 7a 
Hypothesis 7a suggested that the relationship between board independence and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by board 
independence expertise power.  This relationship was not significant in the pre-SOX 
timeframe or in the post-SOX timeframe at any time point.  Thus, Hypothesis 7a was not 
supported for either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
6.10.2  Hypothesis 7b 
Hypothesis 7b posited that the relationship between the existence of the audit, nominating 
and compensation committees and selected governance practices that support shareholder 
value is positively moderated by board independence ownership power.  This relationship 
was not significant in the pre-SOX timeframe or in the post-SOX timeframe at any time 
point.  Thus, Hypothesis 7b was not supported for either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
6.10.3  Hypothesis 7c 
Hypothesis 7c posited that the relationship between the level of committee independence on 
the audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected governance practices that 
support shareholder value is positively moderated by board independence expertise power.  
This relationship was not significant in the pre-SOX timeframe or in the post-SOX 
timeframe at any time point.  Thus, Hypothesis 7c was not supported for either the pre or 
post-SOX timeframes.   
6.10.4  Hypothesis 7d 
Hypothesis 7d posited that the relationship between the SOX structural changes and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by board 
independent ownership power.  This regression included three interaction terms constructed 
for each of the SOX structural changes and board independent ownership power to see 
whether the impact changed in the presence of each other.  None of the interaction terms 
were significant in the pre-SOX timeframe or in the post-SOX timeframe at any time point.  
Thus, Hypothesis 7d was not supported for either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
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6.11  Hypothesis 8 
Hypothesis 8 proposed a hypothesized positive moderating influence of board independence 
prestige power on the SOX structural changes and selected governance practices that 
support shareholder value.  However, during the creation of the board independence power 
construct, it was determined that board independence prestige power was not a separate 
factor in this construct.  As a result, the proposed hypotheses were not tested.  
6.12  Hypothesis 9 
Hypothesis 9 suggested a positive moderating influence of the overall board independence 
power index on the SOX structural changes and selected governance practices that support 
shareholder value. Table 48 presents the results for Hypotheses 9a-d at time “t” for pre-SOX 
reporting coefficients while Table 49 presents the same results reporting IRR.  Table 50 
presents the results for Hypotheses 9a-d at time “t” in the post-SOX period reporting 
coefficients while Table 51 presents the same results reporting IRR.  Given that board size 
was included in the construction of the interaction term (board independence power index), 
it was not also included as a control variable in the testing of Hypothesis 9.  
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Table 48:  Results for Hypotheses 9a-d Pre-SOX (Reporting Coefficients) at "t" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef. St. Error z Coef.
St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 0.10 0.05 1.98* 0.08 0.04 .1.85 0.09 0.05 1.83Presence of all 3 Committees 0.21 0.09 2.31*   0.27 0.10 2.83** 2.70 0.10 2.69Total Indep. Of 3 Commitees -0.04 0.03 -1.70 0.03 0.04 0.85 -0.04 0.04 -0.81Board Indep. Power Index  0.00 0.01 -0.18 0.10 0.01 1.54 0.03 0.01 1.91 0.02 0.01 2.42 0.02 0.02 1.09% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Power Index -0.01 0.00 -1.23 0.00 0.00 -0.70
Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Power Index -0.02 0.01 -1.17 -0.01 0.01 -0.85
Total Indep. Of 3 Commitees x Board Indep. Power Index -0.01 0.00 -1.25 0.00 0.00 0.06
Age of Firm 0.02 0.08 2.19 0.03 0.04 0.76 0.02 0.04 0.61 0.03 0.04 0.88 0.02 0.04 0.47
Board Size    
Board Size Squared   
Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.00 0.02 -1.00 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.04Lead Outside Director -0.09 0.08 -1.17 -0.09 0.08 -1.16 -0.96 0.08 -1.22 .-.095 0.08 -1.19 -0.09 0.08 -1.18CEO Structural Power 0.02 0.02 1.01 0.02 0.02 1.11 0.02 0.02 1.33 0.03 0.02 1.30 0.02 0.02 1.60CEO Ownership Power 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 -2.00 0.00 0.03 0.05CEO Expertise Power 0.00 0.01 -0.55 0.00 0.01 -0.58 0.00 0.01 -0.60 0.00 0.00 -0.59 0.00 0.01 -0.58
CEO Prestige Power 0.00 0.02 0.62 0.01 0.02 0.69 0.01 0.02 0.62 0.01 0.19 0.69 0.01 0.02 65.00
Number of Employees -0.19 0.03 -0.65 -0.01 0.03 -0.33 -0.14 0.03 -0.46 -0.01 0.03 -0.42 -0.01 0.03 -0.41
Market Equity -0.15 0.04 -3.99*** -0.14 0.04 -3.69*** -0.14 0.04 -3.93 -0.14 0.04 -3.69*** -0.14 0.04 -3.89***
Past Performance -0.01 0.04 -0.21 -0.02 0.04 -0.64 -0.01 36.00 -0.27 -0.02 0.04 -0.68 -0.01 0.04 -0.25
Wave 1 -0.11 0.08 -1.24 -0.12 0.08 -1.45 -0.06 0.09 -0.76 -0.11 0.09 -1.28 -0.10 0.09 -1.11
Wave 2 -0.10 0.07 -1.40 -0.12 0.07 -1.64 -0.07 0.07 -1.05 -0.11 0.07 -1.63 -0.09 0.07 -1.30
Wave 3 -0.05 0.07 -0.72 -0.06 0.07 -0.95 -0.03 0.07 -0.51 -0.06 0.07 -0.09 -0.05 0.07 -0.49
Wave 4 -0.03 0.06 -0.49 -0.03 0.06 0.51 -0.01 0.06 -0.22 -0.06 0.06 -0.48 -0.03 0.06 -0.42
 
Constant -0.40 0.47 -0.84 -0.75 0.15 4.98*** 0.47 0.17 2.81** 0.65 0.16 3.97*** 0.59 1.86 3.18***
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlat ion is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant  at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
-1629.79 -1639.09 -1637.00 -1636.48 -1631.42
1061.00 1064.00 1064.00 1061.00 1061.00
Main Effects Only Hypothesis 9a Hypothesis 9b Hypothesis 9c Hypothesis 9d
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Table 49:  Results for Hypotheses 9a-d Pre-SOX (Reporting IRR) at "t" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z
Variables% of Independent Directors 1.10 0.05 1.98* 1.08 0.05 1.85* 1.09 0.50 1.83Presence of all 3 Committees 1.24 0.11 2.31*    1.30 0.12 2.83** 1.30 0.13 2.69
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees 0.96 0.03 -1.70   1.03 0.04 0.85 0.96 0.04 -0.81Board Indep. Power Index  1.00 0.01 -0.18 1.01 0.01 1.54 1.03 0.01 1.91 1.02 0.01 2.42 1.01 0.02 1.09% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Power Index    0.99 0.00 -1.23 1.00 0.00 -0.70
Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Power Index  0.98 0.01 -1.17 0.99 0.01 -0.85Total Indep. Of 3 Committees x Board Indep. Power Index  0.99 0.00 -1.25 1.00 0.01 0.06
Age of Firm 1.01 0.04 2.19 1.02 0.04 0.76 1.02 0.04 0.61 1.03 0.04 0.88 1.00 0.04 0.47
Board Size   
Board Size Squared
Average Indep. Director Compensation 1.00 0.02 -1.00 1.00 0.02 0.09 1.00 0.02 -0.03 1.00 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.02 -0.04Lead Outside Director 0.91 0.07 -1.17 0.91 0.07 -1.16 0.91 0.07 -1.22 0.90 0.07 -1.19 0.91 0.07 -1.18CEO Structural Power 1.02 0.02 1.01 1.02 0.02 1.11 1.03 0.02 1.33 1.03 0.02 1.30 1.02 0.02 1.60CEO Ownership Power 1.00 0.03 0.16 1.00 0.03 -0.05 1.00 0.03 0.01 1.00 0.03 -2.00 1.00 0.03 0.05CEO Expertise Power 1.00 0.01 -0.55 1.00 0.01 -0.58 1.00 0.01 -0.60 1.00 0.01 -0.59 1.00 0.01 -0.58CEO Prestige Power 1.01 0.02 0.62 1.01 0.02 0.69 1.01 0.02 0.62 1.03 0.02 0.69 1.01 0.02 65.00Number of Employees 0.98 0.03 -0.65 0.99 0.03 -0.33 0.99 0.03 -0.46 0.99 0.03 -0.42 0.99 0.03 -0.41
Market Equity 0.86 0.03 -3.99*** 0.87 0.03-3.69*** 0.87 0.03 -3.93 0.87 0.03-3.69*** 0.87 0.03 -3.89***
Past Performance 0.99 0.04 -0.21 0.98 0.04 -0.64 0.99 0.04 -0.27 0.98 0.35 -0.68 0.99 0.04 -0.25
Wave 1 0.89 0.08 -1.24 0.88 0.07 -1.45 0.94 0.08 -0.76 0.90 0.08 -1.28 0.91 0.08 -1.11
Wave 2 0.90 0.07 -1.40 0.89 0.06 -1.64 0.93 0.07 -1.05 0.90 0.06 -1.63 0.91 0.06 -1.30
Wave 3 95.00 0.06 -0.72 0.93 0.06 -0.95 0.97 0.07 -0.51 0.94 0.06 -0.09 0.95 0.07 -0.49
Wave 4 0.97 0.06 -0.49 0.97 0.06 0.51 0.99 0.06 -0.22 0.97 0.06 -0.48 0.97 0.06 -0.42
 
Constant 0.67 0.32 -0.84 2.12 0.324.98*** 1.61 0.28 2.81** 1.92 0.32 3.97*** 1.80 0.33 3.18***
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlation is significant  at  the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant  at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 
tailed)
-1629.79 -1639.10 -1637.00 -1636.48 -1631.41
1061.00 1064.00 1064.00 1061.00 1061.00
Main Effects Only Hypothesis 9a Hypothesis 9b Hypothesis 9c Hypothesis 9d
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Table 50:  Results for Hypotheses 9a-d Post-SOX (Reporting Coefficients) at "t" 
 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index Coef. St. Error z Coef.
St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables
% of Independent Directors 0.02 0.03 0.88 0.03 0.03 1.09 0.04 0.03 1.04Presence of all 3 Committees 0.69 0.30 2.37* 0.58 0.30 1.93* 0.60 0.32 1.89Total Indep. Of 3 Committees -0.05 0.03 -1.52 -0.01 0.05 -0.24 -0.04 0.05 -0.81Board Indep. Power Index  0.00 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.02 0.05 0.45 0.02 0.02 1.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.23% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Power Index 0.00 0.00 -0.86 0.00 0.00 -0.36
Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Power Index -0.01 0.04 -0.35 0.02 0.05 0.45
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees x Board Indep. Power Index 0.00 0.01 -0.70 0.02 0.01 -0.38
Age of Firm 0.01 0.02 0.43 0.03 0.02 1.09 0.02 0.02 0.76 0.02 0.02 0.77 0.02 0.02 0.65
Board Size  
Board Size Squared  
Average Indep. Director Compensation 0.04 0.01 0.46 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.01 0.01 0.54Lead Outside Director -0.08 0.04 -1.73 -0.08 0.04 -1.75 -0.08 0.04 -1.79 -0.08 0.04 -1.82 -0.07 0.04 -1.71CEO Structural Power 0.01 0.02 0.57 -0.01 0.02 0.64 0.01 0.02 0.65 0.01 0.02 0.73 0.01 0.02 0.54CEO Ownership Power 0.02 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.02 0.73 0.01 0.02 0.61 0.01 0.02 0.65 0.01 0.02 0.55CEO Expertise Power -0.01 0.01 -1.30 -0.01 0.01 -1.29 -0.01 0.01 -1.36 -0.01 0.01 -1.29 -0.01 0.01 -1.36
CEO Prestige Power 0.23 0.02 1.47 0.02 0.02 1.58 0.02 0.02 1.51 0.25 0.02 1.61 0.02 0.02 1.53
Number of Employees 0.00 0.02 -12.00 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.05
Market Equity -0.07 0.02 -3.54*** -0.07 0.02 -3.61*** -0.07 0.02 -3.66*** -0.07 0.02 -3.61*** -0.07 0.02 -3.71***
Past Performance -0.05 0.03 -1.64 -0.07 0.03 -1.99 -0.07 0.03 -1.94 -0.07 0.03 -2.07 -0.06 0.03 -1.83
Wave 1 -0.46 0.07 -6.7*** -0.46 0.07 -6.75*** -0.45 0.07 -6.68*** -0.47 0.07 -6.81*** -0.47 0.07 -6.87***
Wave 2 -0.54 0.07 -7.3*** -0.53 0.07 -7.17*** -0.52 0.07 -7.18*** -0.53 0.07 -7.21*** -0.54 0.07 -7.35***
Wave 3 -0.48 8.00 -6.23*** -0.47 0.08 -6.16*** -0.45 0.08 -6.02*** -0.47 0.08 -6.16*** -0.48 0.08 -6.23***
Wave 4 0.06 0.06 1.00 0.06 0.08 0.94 0.06 0.06 0.93 0.66 0.06 1.05 0.06 0.06 0.94
Wave 5 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.30 0.01 0.06 0.17
Constant -0.15 0.53 -0.29 1.24 0.07 10.68*** 0.67 0.32 2.13* 1.26 0.17 7.45*** 0.78 0.37 2.11*
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlat ion is significant  at  the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlat ion is significant  at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
1159.00 1159.00 1155.00 1155.00
-1926.45 -1938.00 -1936.51 -1932.61 -1928.46
Hypothesis 9a Hypothesis 9b Hypothesis 9c Hypothesis 9d
1155.00
Main Effects Only
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Table 51:  Results for Hypotheses 9a-d Post-SOX (Reporting IRR) at "t" 
 
DV= Bebchuk Entrenchment Index IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z IRR St. Error z Coef. St. Error z
Variables% of Independent Directors 1.02 0.30 0.88 1.03 0.03 1.09 1.03 0.04 1.04Presence of all 3 Committees 2.00 0.59 2.37* 1.78 0.54 1.93* 1.83 0.59 1.89
Total Indep. Of 3 Committees 0.95 0.03 -1.52 0.99 0.04 -0.24 0.96 0.05 -0.81Board Indep. Power Index  1.00 0.01 0.35 1.00 0.00 0.96 1.02 0.04 0.45 1.02 0.02 1.01 0.99 0.05 -0.23% of Independent Directors x Board Indep. Power Index 1.02 0.02 -0.86 1.00 0.00 -0.36
Presence of all 3 Committees x Board Indep. Power Index 0.98 0.04 -0.35 1.02 0.05 0.45Total Indep. Of 3 Committees x Board Indep. Power Index 1.00 0.01 -0.70 1.00 0.01 -0.38
Age of Firm 1.01 0.02 0.43 1.02 0.02 1.09 1.02 0.02 0.76 1.02 0.02 0.77 1.02 0.02 0.65
Board Size
Board Size Squared
Average Indep. Director Compensation 1.00 0.01 0.46 1.00 0.01 0.44 1.00 0.01 0.50 1.00 0.01 0.38 1.01 0.01 0.54Lead Outside Director 0.93 0.40 -1.73 0.93 0.04 -1.75 0.92 0.04 -1.79 0.92 0.04 -1.82 0.93 0.04 -1.71CEO Structural Power 1.00 0.02 0.57 1.01 0.02 0.64 1.01 0.02 0.65 1.01 0.02 0.73 1.00 0.02 0.54CEO Ownership Power 1.00 0.02 0.73 1.01 0.02 0.73 1.01 0.02 0.61 1.01 0.02 0.65 1.01 0.02 0.55CEO Expertise Power 0.98 0.01 -1.30 0.99 0.01 -1.29 0.99 0.09 -1.36 0.99 0.01 -1.29 0.99 0.01 -1.36
CEO Prestige Power 1.02 0.02 1.47 1.03 0.02 1.58 1.02 0.02 1.51 1.03 0.02 1.61 1.02 0.02 1.53Number of Employees 1.00 0.01 -12.00 1.00 0.02 -0.03 1.00 0.02 -0.05 1.00 0.02 -0.09 1.00 0.01 -0.05
Market Equity 0.93 0.02 -3.54*** 0.93 0.02 -3.61*** 0.93 0.02 -3.66*** 0.93 0.02 -3.61*** 0.93 0.02 -3.71***
Past Performance 0.94 0.03 -1.64 0.93 0.03 -1.99 0.94 0.03 -1.94 0.93 0.03 -2.07 0.94 0.03 -1.83
Wave 1 0.63 0.04 -6.7*** 0.63 0.04 -6.75*** 0.64 0.04 -6.68*** 0.63 0.04 -6.81*** 0.62 0.04 -6.87***
Wave 2 0.58 0.04 -7.3*** 0.59 0.04 -7.17*** 0.59 0.04 -7.18*** 0.59 0.04 -7.21*** 0.58 0.04 -7.35***
Wave 3 0.62 0.06 -6.23*** 0.62 0.05 -6.16*** 0.63 0.05 -6.02*** 0.62 0.05 -6.16*** 0.62 0.05 -6.23***
Wave 4 1.06 0.07 1.00 1.06 0.07 0.94 1.06 0.07 0.93 1.06 0.07 1.05 1.06 0.07 0.94
Wave 5 1.01 0.06 0.16 1.01 0.07 0.16 1.01 0.07 0.19 1.02 0.07 0.30 1.01 0.07 0.17
Constant 0.86 0.45 -0.29 3.47 0.41 10.68*** -3.13 0.27 2.13* 3.50 0.60 7.45*** 2.17 0.80 2.11*
N 
Log Likelihood
***. Correlat ion is significant  at the .001 level (2-tailed) **. Correlat ion is significant  at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlat ion is significant  at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
1159.00 1159.00 1155.00 1155.00
-1924.45 -1938.57 -1936.51 -1932.61 -1928.46
Hypothesis 9a Hypothesis 9b Hypothesis 9c Hypothesis 9d
1155.00
Main Effects Only
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6.12:1  Hypothesis 9a 
Hypothesis 9a suggested that the relationship between board independence and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by the full 
board independence power index.  This relationship was not significant in the pre-SOX 
timeframe or in the post-SOX timeframe at any time point.  Thus, Hypothesis 9a was not 
supported for either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
6.12.2  Hypothesis 9b 
Hypothesis 9b suggested that the relationship between the existence of the audit, nominating 
and compensation committees and selected governance practices that support shareholder 
value is positively moderated by the full board independence power index.  This relationship 
was neither significant in the pre-SOX timeframe nor in the post-SOX timeframe at any time 
point.  Thus, Hypothesis 9b was not supported for either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
6.12.3  Hypothesis 9c 
Hypothesis 9c posited that the relationship between the level of committee independence on 
the audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected governance practices that 
support shareholder value is positively moderated by the overall board independence power 
index.  This relationship was not significant in the pre-SOX timeframe or in the post-SOX 
timeframe at any time point.  Thus, Hypothesis 9c was not supported for either the pre or 
post-SOX timeframes.   
6.12.4  Hypothesis 9d 
Hypothesis 9d posited that the relationship between the SOX structural changes and selected 
governance practices that support shareholder value is positively moderated by the overall 
board structural power index.  This regression included three interaction terms constructed 
for each of the SOX structural changes and overall board structural power index to see the 
impact changed in the presence of each other.  None of the interaction terms were significant 
in the pre-SOX timeframe or in the post-SOX timeframe at any time point.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 9d was not supported for either the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
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6.13  Post-Hoc Analysis 
6.13.1. Main Effects of Board Independent Power Index 
While outside the scope of this study, I also tested the three board independence power 
elements (structure/prestige, ownership, and expertise) and the full board independence 
power index for a causal relationship with the E-Index at time “t”, “t+1” and “t+2” in the 
pre and post-SOX periods using all of the same control variables as the main analysis of this 
study.  There were no significant direct effect between board independence ownership 
power, board independence expertise power or the full board independence power index and 
the E-Index at time “t”, “t+1” and “t+2” in the pre or post-SOX timeframes.   
There was a significant main effect between board independence structure/prestige power 
and the E-Index in the pre-SOX period at time “t” (β=0.016, z=2.61, p<05), time “t+1” 
(β=0.015, z=2.52, p<.05) and time “t+2” (β=0.014, z=2.46, p<.05).   This result suggests 
that there was a negative relationship between the element of board independence 
structure/prestige power and management entrenchment in the pre-SOX period, although it 
was a small effect.  For example, at time “t”, for one unit change in board independence 
structure/prestige power, the difference in the logs of the expected counts for the E-Index is 
expected to increase by only 0.016 as other predictor variables are held constant.   Given the 
formulation of board independence structure/prestige power, this is likely due to board size 
which was embedded in this construct; when the same models were run including board size 
and board size squared, the significance at all of the time points disappeared.  The negative 
relationship between larger board size and governance decisions supporting shareholder 
value was theoretically articulated in this study in Chapter 3.2.1.  This result was unique for 
the post-hoc testing of the main effect of board independence structure/prestige power.  
Significant effects did not disappear when board size was included in models constructed for 
Hypotheses 5a-d which also examined board independence structure/prestige power.     
6.13.2  Individual Items of E-Index 
While the analysis of the regression of the full E-Index on governance-related SOX changes 
provided interesting results for both the main effects (Hypotheses 1 to 4) and the interaction 
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terms (Hypotheses 5 to 9), panel logistic regression models were also run using the six 
individual elements that make up the E-Index, namely staggered boards, golden parachutes, 
bylaw amendment limitations, charter amendment limitations, poison pills, and 
supermajority provisions for mergers.  Each of the six individual elements were tested as the 
dependent variable using panel logistic regression and using the same control variables as 
the model testing that used the full E-index.  For the sake of parsimony, I only present 
significant results.  
Staggered boards (also called classified boards) do not allow shareholders to eliminate entire 
slates of existing directors.  As noted by Bebchuk (2012: 1), “staggered boards have long 
been a key mechanism for insulating boards of publicly traded companies from 
shareholders…by enabling shareholders to register their views on all directors each year, 
annual elections make boards more accountable to shareholders”.   Staggered boards have 
been negatively associated with firm valuation (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007; 
Frakes, 2007) and lower returns to stakeholders in a unsolicited offer (Bebchuk, 2012).  
There is a significant, inverse relationship between the percentage of independent directors 
and the presence of staggered boards at time “t” in the pre-SOX period (β=-0.38, p<.01) 
although it was not significant in the post-SOX period.  This was the only relationship 
amongst the individual provisions that comprise the Bebchuk index where any of the three 
SOX structural changes indicated a higher likelihood of a positive governance scenario in 
the pre-SOX period.  It must be remembered that this significant result was seen in a time 
period pre-SOX when there were fewer instances of activist shareholders.  Staggered boards 
may have been more for the convenience of directors, providing them with more longevity 
through multi-year terms (as opposed to annual renewal), important if the independent 
directors in the pre-SOX years were selected due to their relationships with management 
rather than for monitoring ability as discussed in Chapter 3.4.2.  Early drafts of the Dodd-
Frank Act considered prohibiting public companies from having staggered boards of 
directors but those provisions were not ultimately adopted.   
There were a number of interaction effects, both pre and post-SOX that were shown to have 
a significant result on the probability of staggered boards.  Pre-SOX, the significant 
interaction (p<.005) between the existence of the three mandated committees and board 
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independence expertise power at time “t” suggested that the effect of the presence of the 
three committees on the odds of a company having a staggered board increases by a factor 
of 4.67 for every unit increase in board independence expertise power.   This relationship 
was not significant in the post-SOX era.  Post-SOX, all of the interactions terms constructed 
with the board independence power elements served to diminish the main effect.  Thus, 
there was a significant interaction (p<.01) between the independence of the board and the 
overall board independence power index at time “t” such that the effect of the level of board 
independence on the odds of a company having a staggered board decreased by a factor of 
0.94 for every unit increase in the overall board independence power index.  At time “t+1” 
there was a significant interaction (p<.01) between the independence of the board and board 
independence ownership power such that the effect of the level of board independence on 
the odds of a company having a staggered board decreased by a factor of 0.75 for ever unit 
increase in board independence ownership power.  There was also a significant interaction 
(p<.001) when boards had full independence on their mandated committees and board 
independence ownership power such that the effect of having independent committees on 
the odds of a company having a staggered board decreased by a factor of 0.52 for every unit 
increase in board independence ownership power.  Finally, there was a significant 
interaction (p<.05) between when boards had full independence on their mandated 
committees and the overall board independence power index so that the effect of having 
independent committees on the odds of a company have a staggered board decreased by a 
factor of 0.84 for every unit increase in the overall board independence power index.     
Golden parachutes are meant to discourage hostile company takeovers by requiring a large 
payout to senior management; they are largely viewed as negatively related to shareholder 
value.  As noted by Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2014: 2), “The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act 
mandated advisory shareholder votes on all future adoptions of golden parachutes by public 
firms”. In this study there was found to be a significant relationship between the percentage 
of independent directors and the presence of golden parachutes, where the higher the 
percentage of independence, the higher the odds that the board would have golden parachute 
provisions both pre and post-SOX.  The effect size in the pre-SOX period (β=1.94, p<.001) 
was double that in the post-SOX period (β=0.96, p<.001).  The golden parachute was clearly 
an element that directly benefitted CEO and top management teams.  In the pre-SOX period, 
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given the tighter relationship between independent directors and management it was not 
surprising that contracts would contain golden parachute provisions. There were also 
significant interaction effects (p<.05) evident in the pre-SOX timeframe related to the 
presence of SOX mandated committees and both board independence structure/prestige 
power and the overall board independence index at time “t”.  There was a relationship 
between companies having all of the mandated committees and board independence 
ownership power so that the effect of all of the mandated committees on the odds of a 
company having golden parachute provisions increased by a factor of 1.6 for every unit 
increase in the board independence ownership index.  The exact same relationship was 
witnessed when the interaction term was the overall board independence power index. 
Therefore, the board independence power index augmented the effect.  There was no 
significant interaction in the post-SOX timeframe.     
Golden parachutes were a very visible benefit to shareholders and the public and so when 
breaches in corporate governance occurred (e.g. Enron), shareholders began to more closely 
monitor boards and put pressure on the independent board members to not seem to be 
rewarding management behaviour that entrenchment management interests (Weisbach, 
2007).  The role of the media as an external governance mechanism may also have impacted 
the behaviour of the independent board members (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 2015; 
Kuhnen & Niessen, 2012).   As a result, there was a potential reputation risk for directors 
who supported golden parachutes and the higher percentage of independent directors on 
boards (appointed through increasingly more neutral processes) could have resulted in a 
higher probability that golden parachutes were employed less frequently from a governance 
perspective.   For these reasons, the impact of the level of board independence on the 
likelihood of golden parachutes diminished in the post-SOX period when considering main 
effects of the SOX structural changes.      
There were also significant results (p<.001) for all three main effects and the likelihood of 
board adopting poison pills in the pre-SOX timeframe interaction effects.  However, there 
was no significant result in the post-SOX period.  This could be seen as a “win” for SOX in 
this context although there were likely other influencers given the non-significant 
relationship in the post-SOX period.  If independent directors were aligned with 
 159  
management in the pre-SOX era given management’s involvement in the selection process, 
they would want to make it difficult for management to be removed.   Poison pills are in the 
best interest of the top management team and the board (given that they would be out of a 
job if the company were to be acquired).  In the era of more public scrutiny post-SOX, the 
adoption of poison pills was perceived as very self-interested by shareholders if acquisitions 
were in the best interest of the organization.  As representatives of shareholder value, boards 
members could have felt a pressure or social shaming from shareholders were they to adopt 
poison pill provisions.  It was interesting to note that even though the main effects in the 
pre-SOX period indicated higher odds of boards adopting poison pills, there were interaction 
effects between the two of the SOX mandated structural changes (presence of the three 
committees, complete independence on the committees) and the board independence power 
elements such that the in the presence of the power elements, the impact of the main effects 
on the likelihood of board adopting poison pills was decreased.  There was no impact of the 
same interaction terms in the post-SOX environment.     
There were no significant main effects or interaction effects in the pre or post-SOX periods 
for bylaw or charter amendment provisions. This was also true for charter amendment 
provisions in the post-SOX period.  However, there was a significant main effect for the 
independence of the three mandated committees and bylaw amendment provisions in a way 
that supported low management entrenchment; the greater the independence of the three 
committees, the better the likelihood of boards not having bylaw amendment provisions.    
This could be due to the increased responsibilities and transparency of director roles on 
committees in the post-SOX timeframe.  Boards with independent committees could have 
done a better job making sure the financial house of the company was in order with the audit 
committee, management was appropriately compensated and qualified individuals were put 
forward for board positions and CEO roles.  As such, there was less risk of shareholders 
putting forward bylaws that would constrain the activities of management.  There were no 
interaction effects for any of the models either in the pre or post-SOX timeframes for bylaw 
or charter amendment provisions.   
Finally, there were no pre or post-SOX results between any of the main effects and the 
probability of supermajority provisions for mergers.  However, in the post-SOX timeframe 
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there was a significant interaction between the percentage of board independence and board 
independence structure/prestige power at time “t” (p<.05) where the effect of board 
independence on the odds of a board having supermajority provisions for mergers decreased 
by 0.86 for  every unit increase in board independence structure/prestige power.  This is a 
positive impact for governance decisions in the post-SOX era.   
6.14  Conclusions 
Overall, the results from this study were significant but not in the direction hypothesized for 
the main effects in the pre-SOX timeframe and were not significant in the post-SOX 
timeframe.  Therefore, it is difficult to claim the mandated structural changes under SOX 
had any impact on minimizing management entrenchment.  The study did find that board 
independence structure/prestige power moderated the relationship between the presence of 
the audit, nominating and compensation committees and selected governance decisions 
associated with supporting shareholder value such that it dampened the negative relationship 
found between the presence of the three committees and management entrenchment.  This 
relationship was seen both in the pre and post-SOX timeframes but only at time “t” and 
“t+1”.  The results of this study do suggest that the structural changes mandated through 
SOX have not had an impact the governance of boards. 
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7.  DISCUSSION 
7.1  Discussion  
The results of this study are interesting in that they demonstrate that the presumed 
relationship between SOX structural changes and selected governance decisions associated 
with supporting shareholder value did not exist, either when they were informally adopted 
pre-SOX or legislatively mandated post-SOX calling into question the effectiveness of the 
legislation in driving stronger corporate governance in large, publicly traded companies in 
the United States.  The deconstruction of the elements in the E-Index presented in Section 
6.12.1 demonstrate that dimensions of board independence power diminished some of the 
negative impact in the pre-SOX era but the influence largely disappeared in the post-SOX 
era.  Chapter 7 presents some of the potential reasons behind these findings, providing areas 
for additional research as well as noting limitations of the study.   
7.1.1  Main Effects:  Hypotheses 1-4 
7.1.1.1  Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 suggested a positive relationship between board independence and selected 
governance decisions supporting shareholder value both in the pre and post-SOX 
timeframes.  While there was a significant effect noted in the pre-SOX era, it was not in the 
direction hypothesized suggesting that as the level of board independence rose, the 
likelihood of management entrenchment also increased.  Given the research and anecdotal 
evidence related to independent director selection in the pre-SOX era, it may have been true 
that the independent directors were not paying as much attention to the company as the 
management and affiliated directors who were monetarily tied more closely to the success of 
the company.  They could have been selected because they were in the same social network 
as the CEO or because they were “branded” directors (e.g. politicians, celebrities); in short, 
they were on the board for any number of reasons other than to do the work the board has to 
do (e.g. monitoring).   Boards with larger numbers of inside and affiliated directors felt 
secure in their level of control of the organization and so did not feel the need to provide an 
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extra level of protection through anti-takeover or entrenchment provisions.  However, even 
when management had power to influence the appointment of directors through sitting on 
nomination committees, as the number of independent board members increased, 
entrenchment provisions were introduced ‘just in case’.  If management directors were 
present on these nomination committees and could influence the selection of new directors, 
the passage of elements such as golden parachutes and staggered boards would have been 
easier because of the effect of cronyism on the overall board.  Thus, board independence in 
the pre-SOX era could be an example of symbolically adopting measures but institutionally 
decoupling from them in terms of organizational decisions; boards looked better because 
there was a voluntary increased in the percentage of independent directors but individuals 
that were appointed were not fulfilling their governance role and allowing anti-shareholder 
provisions to be passed.  Interestingly, Bhagat and Bolton found a negative relationship 
between board independence and firm performance in the pre-SOX timeframe which they 
suggest is reflective of prior research which “has not found a positive relationship between 
board independence and firm performance prior to 2002” (2013: 107).   
In the post-SOX era, I found that with the mandated requirement for a majority of 
independent directors, there was no significance related to governance in that there was no 
difference whether management, affiliated or independent directors were dominant as 
connected to governance provisions of the board.  This result does not demonstrate the 
fulfillment of the aim of SOX structural changes to strengthen corporate governance 
provisions of boards listed on American stock exchanges.  This could be due to fact that as 
noted in the descriptive statistics for this study (Table 15), the majority of firms in this 
sample already had boards comprised of a significant majority of independent members well 
before the legislation took effect.  The percentage of independent board members has been 
increasing over time and the independence of the nominating committee in the post-SOX 
timeframe could be slowly adding independent directors instead of linked or management 
directors giving the group of independent directors more confidence at the overall board 
meetings.  As a result, one does not see the negative relationship between board 
independence and management entrenchment that one witnesses in the pre-SOX era.  
However, I did not find a positive relationship in the post-SOX so there are clearly elements 
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at play at the full board that are influencing the decisions related to management 
entrenchment.   
While it could be true that in the post-SOX era independent directors are still beholden to or 
under the influence of management elements of the board, the reasons could be less 
nefarious.  This could be related to a lack of board education for the increasing numbers of 
new independent directors related to their monitoring responsibilities.  The lack of board 
training could be related to how to appropriately monitor management as well as what type 
of decisions they could be asked to take entrench management interests.  Thus, contrary to 
the approach of the SOX structural changes, it may not be as simple as broadly categorizing 
higher levels of board independence as positive.   
7.1.1.2  Hypothesis 2 
The impact of the presence of all three mandated SOX committees (audit, nomination and 
compensation) was significant both in the pre and post-SOX timeframes. Surprisingly, the 
presence of the three mandated committees heightened the likelihood of boards adopting 
measures reflecting low management entrenchment.  Even more interesting is that this effect 
became worse post-SOX (the impact went from 0.21 to 0.54, a doubling of the effect in the 
post-SOX timeframe), suggesting again a symbolic adoption of committees that did not 
support the stronger governance goals of SOX.    
The existence of the three committees leading to worse management entrenchment in both 
timeframes is important.  Being forced to have these three committees may be detrimental 
for actually having committees that make sense for the company.  Boards have limited 
number of members with limited time.  In determining board substructures, the easy way out 
would be to just have these three committees; however, it may not be the optimal committee 
structure for the board or the operations of the company in a particular industry.  It may be 
more relevant for the company to have a risk committee or a regulatory committee.  
Through SOX, a cookie cutter approach related to committee existence is foisted on 
companies, and governance becomes worse in that independent members are not actually 
addressing issues that should be the focus of board deliberations.  The E-Index can be 
extrapolated by committee structure as an indicator of less care and attention to the actual 
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governance of the board.  These results could indicate the prioritization of form over 
function; emphasis on function would lead a board to adopt better governance procedures.  
In addition, the presence of these committees in the pre-SOX timeframe could reduce the 
scrutiny to key issues as they move the conversation from the full board to the committees 
which have smaller membership.  Forbes and Miliken (1999: 492) describe boards as “large, 
elite, and episodic decision-making groups that face complex tasks”.   Committees of boards 
are even smaller groups; members have more interaction but given the infrequency of 
committee meetings, it is still difficult to create a relationship between independent board 
members that is stronger than the information asymmetry wielded by management members 
of committees.  In the pre-SOX era where the presence of management was not prohibited 
on the audit, nominating, and compensation committees, it could have been easier for 
management to exert their influence over the other members in the smaller group setting.  
Therefore, the management members of the committees could more easily build 
relationships with the independent members of the board who were their colleagues on these 
committees which would have influenced elements such as the proposal of new members 
(sympathetic to management or at least not likely to push back on decisions that entrenched 
management interest).  A stronger relationship through shared committee membership 
would have also made it easier to pass management entrenchment provisions at the full 
board meetings as independent directors, even if they were not personally beholden to firm 
management would find it difficult to be the odd person out.            
In the post-SOX era, the same relationship was found where the presence of the audit, 
nominating and compensation committees heightened the likelihood of governance 
decisions related to management entrenchment.  Again, the presence of these mandated 
committees again could be a symbolic adoption of legal requirements while being 
undermined by inside, affiliated or management-loyal outside directors.  However, a 
limitation of this study is that it only tested the relationship between the presence of the 
three mandated committees and the likelihood of management entrenchment. The effect in 
the post-SOX era may be masking an effect of the presence of committees at all.  
Management may not be present on the audit, nominating and compensation committees but 
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they could and usually are members of other board committees such as an executive 
committee.   
7.1.1.3  Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 looked at the relationship between the SOX requirement for the independence 
of the three mandated committees and the E-Index.  This study found no relationship either 
pre or post-SOX.  Thus, the requirement to create completely independent committee had no 
impact on corporate governance decisions related to management entrenchment.  Again, 
boards may have created completely independent committees to deal with audit, nominating 
and compensation issue due to the SOX requirements and increased public and media 
scrutiny; however, decisions were still being made outside of these structures.  Directors 
interviewed for this study suggested that even though they do not formally sit on the 
nominating committee, management is heavily involved in discussions related to new 
committee members.  This was not presented in a negative context; board members 
suggested that it ensured that whoever was selected could have a positive working 
relationship with the existing board which would keep board dynamics positive and flowing.   
However, corporate governance lawyers interviewed suggested heavy management 
involvement in board member selection could also perpetuate “groupthink” if independent 
board members, once elected were not willing to stand up to management to protect the 
shareholders they purported to represent.    It could also be that the individuals who served 
as board members did not significantly change in terms of being strongly linked to 
management, even though they sat on the board as independent members.  While beyond the 
scope of this study, a next step would be to understand the personal dynamics and 
relationships of individual board members in the pre and post-SOX timeframe to determine 
whether differences noted in governance levels had more to do with the people on the board 
rather than on their formal role. The results from Hypotheses 6-9 begin to assess this 
relationship, suggesting that there is something inherent in the combined power of the 
individual board members which moves beyond just structural attributes that has a 
moderating effect on governance decisions.  
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The results for Hypothesis 3 are also interesting when juxtaposed with those for Hypothesis 
1, which found a higher likelihood for governance decisions related to management 
entrenchment as the number of independent members of the board increased in the pre-SOX 
timeframe.  As I did not control for the percentage of independent directors in the testing for 
Hypothesis 3, it suggests that while the percentage of independent directors on the board 
was positively correlated with board decisions related to management entrenchment in the 
pre-SOX era, in the post-SOX era, if the committees are independent, then there is no longer 
a significant association.  This could indicate that the independent committee structure is an 
improvement over simply putting a larger number of independent directors on the board.    
7.1.1.4  Hypothesis 4 
When all three main effects are explored together as co-existing rather than any type of 
interactive effect, the same results are achieved as those noted in the testing of Hypotheses 1 
to 3.  Both the level of board independence and the presence of the three SOX mandated 
committees are significant pre-SOX and the presence of the three SOX mandated 
committees is significant post-SOX as well.  Their existence also continues to suggest a 
higher likelihood of management entrenchment.   As such, it is difficult to see how the legal 
requirements for these structural provisions have improved corporate governance related to 
management entrenchment.  In the case of the SOX mandated committees, it is actually 
making it worse.    
7.1.1.5 Main effects:  Conclusions 
When one looks at the results of Hypotheses 1 through 4 holistically, one begins to see a 
pattern.  In the pre-SOX timeframe, there is no expectation that there are strong corporate 
governance provisions related to management entrenchment given the implicit influence of 
management as a result of few restrictions on board composition and structure.  However, it 
is because of the control that management has over board composition and structure that 
they do not need the added protection (from an agency perspective) of anti-takeover and 
entrenchment provisions.  It is only when SOX structural elements begin to be more strongly 
adopted (voluntarily in the pre-SOX period potentially for symbolic reasons) that control is 
potentially lessened and results demonstrate relationships between SOX structural elements 
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and greater levels of anti-takeover and entrenchment decisions, or no significant impact at 
all.          
7.1.2  Interactions with Board Independence Power: Hypotheses 5-9 
The results for Hypotheses 5 to 9 involved testing the moderating power of a new construct, 
board independence power which this study found to be comprised of structure/prestige, 
ownership, and expertise power.  Largely, these power dimensions did not have any impact 
on the relationship between the three SOX structural changes and the E-Index.  This study 
did find relationship in the pre and post-SOX periods between the presence of the three 
mandated committees and board independence structure/prestige power such that board 
independence structure/prestige power decreased the likelihood of the effect of the presence 
of the three mandated committees on the E-Index after a time lag (outlined in Chapter 6.8.2).   
Given that the presence of the mandated committees suggested a higher likelihood of 
management entrenchment, the muting of this impact through the board independence 
structure/prestige power dimension of board independence power is a positive sign for 
corporate governance. While the composition of board independence structure/prestige 
power contains some structural elements such as board size, it also introduces elements that 
are individualistic to directors including elite education, financial experience, and the 
number of board appointments that could impact how they are perceived by others.  It may 
be these individual characteristics of individual independent board members, rather than 
“one size fits all” structural provisions that are what can positively influence some of the 
negative impacts that the SOX structural changes may be having on governance decisions.  
The choice of the individual director becomes important and deserves greater scrutiny than 
just that categorizing them as independent given that these findings suggest that the personal 
backgrounds of independent directors have a latent power that can influence the negative 
impacts potentially caused by the existence of the SOX mandated committees.  This result 
needs to be explored in greater depth given that the existence of the SOX mandated 
committees is a legal requirement for companies trading on the NYSE (which include some 
of the world’s largest corporations); elements that can mitigate its likelihood to augment 
management entrenchment could be helpful when determining who should sit on boards as 
independent members.   
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While there were few interactive effects with the full E-Index, I also tested the moderating 
influence the board independence power index has had on individual components of the E-
Index, both in the pre and post-SOX timeframe.  With the exception of the likelihood of 
golden parachutes, where significant, the elements of board independence power and the 
index as a whole served to diminish the negative effect of SOX structural changes on the 
likelihood of the staggered boards, poison pills and supermajority requirements for mergers.  
It is particularly interesting that these relationships were observed in the pre-SOX era, as if 
they were organically working to diminish the effect of a symbolic adoption of corporate 
governance structures.  A number of these interactions became not significant in the post-
SOX era (although the same impacts were seen for staggered boards and golden parachutes), 
suggesting a tangible, negative effect related to legislating of the structural requirements.    
Therefore, this study illustrates that the link between board structures and substructures and 
the E-Index may be far more complex than it appears.  In addition, the SOX structural 
changes have not had the positive impact on corporate governance that was one of the key 
goals of the Act when introduced; evidence from the descriptive statistics alone suggests a 
rise in the E-Index post-SOX which could suggest only the symbolic adoption of SOX 
structural changes.  The new board independence power construct, particularly the board 
independence structure/prestige element is promising in its moderating impact on the 
likelihood of governance decisions related to management entrenchment.  However, this 
should be interpreted cautiously because when the E-index is deconstructed, the positive 
interaction effects of board independence power on a number of the individual measures of 
corporate governance largely disappeared in the post-SOX period.  Overall, this serves as a 
cautionary tale to regulators and governments who are looking to blindly adopt the SOX 
structural changes as a panacea for governance reform.             
7.2  Contribution to Theory 
In contemplating the research question, “have SOX-mandated structural corporate 
governance changes impacted selected governance provisions at the board level and how is 
this relationship impacted by the independent elements of the board”, I adopted a board-
centric approach deliberately and systematically.  The SOX changes were designed to 
strengthen the role of the board and make independent directors dominant; it is this concept 
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which was the focus of this study.   This approach responds to Carver (2010: 152) who 
suggests, “a theory of governance must confirm board dominance in the board-CEO dyad, 
eliminating the all-too-familiar CEO-centrism”.   
Through this study, I hope to contribute to the body of corporate governance research that 
uses agency theory to consider board practices, extending the application of existing theory 
to include a holistic governance perspective by including board committees and the potential 
power of independent directors.  This is an important distinction that allows for the 
identification of alternate intra-board power dynamics that may impact the ability of 
management to influence the adoption of corporate governance provisions that are contrary 
to the best interests of shareholders.  In addition, Hambrick, Werder and Zajac (2008) 
suggested that power differentials between directors would be a promising area of future 
corporate governance research.  I submit this study begins to addresses that request.   
I also heed the call of Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) to consider the important 
role of board committees in relation to the overall board.  Researchers have noted linkages 
between board structure (committee membership), board effectiveness and firm performance 
(Klein, 1998; Liao & Hsu, 2013; Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010), examining such elements of 
committee membership as the gender and background of board members in relation to their 
committee assignments (Dunn, 2012; Vafeas, 1999, 2000) and the frequency of committee 
meetings (Brick & Chidambaran, 2010).  In a time when an increasing level of decision-
making is being delegated to board committees granting them greater power (Alexander, 
1999) it is useful to more closely understand the intra-board overlaps manifested on SOX 
mandated board committees, particularly since these committees are further from 
management control due to their exclusively outsider membership.                 
7.3  Contribution to Practice 
From a public policy perspective, this study put forward elements of board independence 
power which may assist regulatory bodies in determining whether the goals of SOX were 
achieved, or whether all SOX accomplished was corporate governance window-dressing, 
where in practice they are decoupled from actual governance decisions by the board. This is 
a major point given the impact of SOX on stock exchange listings and IPOs.  Piotroski and 
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Srinivasan (2008) found that after the act was passed, smaller international companies were 
more likely to list on stock exchanges in Britain than those in the United States.   From a 
firm perspective, the results of this research should be useful in suggesting board elements 
that may deserve additional attention when constructing boards and board committees for 
firms who wish to improve corporate governance practices.     
It is also clear that the issue of corporate governance reform remains a public policy priority 
for regulatory bodies in North America.  In 2009, the SEC brought forward new guidelines 
that became effective February, 2010 that expanded corporate governance disclosure 
requirements around CEO duality.  In 2010, this trend toward strengthening governance at 
the board level continued in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act which reiterated the requirement of members of the compensation committee to be 
independent members of the board as per the rules of the SEC.  Insight that can be gained 
from this study in examining the effectiveness of past corporate governance legislative and 
regulatory requirements on changing (either positively or negatively) the likelihood of 
selected governance practices at the board level should be useful in informing any future 
changes considered by regulatory bodies.  The results of this study should give pause to 
automatically mandating the SOX structural changes before deeply understanding their 
ongoing impact on existing governance practices. 
7.4  Future Research and Limitations  
There are a number of potential research extensions emanating from this study.  An 
interesting body of research could involve examining compliance in relation to the SOX 
structural requirements, and trends towards board independence, committee presence and 
committee independence before they were mandated by laws and regulations.  If there are 
issues with compliance, it could begin the conversation about why firms are not adhering to 
the law and possible issues with SOX enforcement provisions and penalties.  As the 
requirement for the SOX changes are not decreasing the likelihood of management 
entrenchment, enforcement and penalties may be a logical cause.  This study could be 
validated through alternate research methodology such as an event history analysis, using 
the passage of the SOX legislation and the NYSE listing requirements as the focal events.  
This research could explore the change in board structural elements such as board size over 
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time, allowing for the consideration of whether SOX acted as an exogenous shock to the 
governance world, shifting the level and trajectory of key board variables.  As considered by 
Linck, Netter and Yang (2009), even if companies were moving towards a majority of 
independent board members prior to SOX, one would expect to see an acceleration post-
SOX.   
As this study uses governance indices as measures of selected governance practices at the 
board level, another research extension would be to survey boards and interview board 
members to determine whether they actually use such indices to self-measure their 
governance decisions, and whether there is a threshold of governance that they feel is 
acceptable.  This mix of qualitative and quantitative research would provide greater clarity 
regarding whether boards consciously choose (or not) to adopt governance measure with full 
knowledge of its potential impact and contrast what is actually used by board practitioners to 
what is employed in academic research.  This could include examining the education of 
board members, particularly when they first join a board, to determine whether they are 
informed about their monitoring responsibilities, how to appropriately perform these tasks 
and explicitly informed about aspects of board decisions that are considered to protect 
shareholder value.  It is likely that board members (independent, linked and management) 
have limited knowledge of academic research that links the elements of the GIM and E-
Index with the weakening of shareholder value.  In the absence of that knowledge it is 
difficult to be certain that the decisions by independent members to adopt the measures in 
the E-Index are a deliberate attempt to protect management and circumvent shareholder 
wishes.   By employing a broader research perspective that speaks directly to board 
members and examines board artefacts (e.g. board charters), research could begin to tangibly 
get at the fundamentals of governance through questions on governance process (including 
board education), conventions and influence.    
This study focused specifically and deliberately on the phenomenon of board independence 
power.  Future research grounded in this study could involve theorizing the relationship 
between board independence power and management power.  It would be interesting to 
explore the moderation effect of board independence power on management power and 
selected governance practices at the board level.  Similar work could be done focussing on 
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affiliated directors.  It is a natural extension of this study and would involve conceptualizing 
the interplay between management, affiliated and independent members on the board and 
how that has evolved with the introduction of a much stronger regulatory environment.   
There are a number of limitations to this study.  This study examined the structural 
governance changes mandated by SOX and their impact on selected governance practices at 
the board level that protect shareholder value.  It further considered how board 
independence power impacted this relationship.  In so doing, it did not consider the SOX 
changes for internal control systems which placed significant reporting requirements on 
companies, nor did it examine legally mandated process changes that may have had the 
same impact as structural governance changes.  Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) 
reviewed board structures in tandem with the role of directors considering the relationship 
between structure and roles.  A next step would be to look at all of these areas to determine 
how they may inform a broader conceptualization of the research question and the constructs 
of interest.   
While there are a number of theories that have been used in corporate governance research 
(Lynall et al., 2003), this study utilized only agency theory.  While I believe that this theory 
appropriately allowed for the exploration of the research question, there are other theoretical 
perspectives that could add to the exploration of the elements of this study.  A number of 
alternative theories were considered for inclusion in this study; however, none captured the 
focus on the monitoring and control elements of the board which SOX attempted to 
strengthen.  Future research could extend the core ideas presented in this study by using one 
or a combination of these other theoretical approaches.    
A promising theoretical expansion could be through the use of institutional theory.   Scholars 
have used an institutional theory lens to consider board level governance issues from 
multiple perspectives including CEO-board interaction (Ocasio, 1994; Westphal, 1999; 
Westphal & Zajac, 2001), strategic decision making (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Oliver, 1991), 
director characteristics (Peng, 2004), and governance practice dissemination (Shipilov, 
Greve, & Rowley, 2010; Shropshire, 2010).   They have also recognized that “formal 
organizational structures often look quite different from informal practices” (Sauder & 
Espeland, 2009: 63).   
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Institutional theory considers organizations through an open system perspective, where 
“organizations are penetrated by their environments in ways that blur and confound any 
simple criterion for distinguishing the one from the other” (Scott, 1988).  In doing so, 
institutional theory presents a view of organizations that is not just driven by economic 
factors but on conformity to social expectations which provides legitimacy to the 
organization.  Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions" (Suchman, 1995: 574).  Thus, 
organizations are part of a broader framework that is socially constructed and changed by 
institutional elements.  Institutions are defined as “humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction” (North, 1990: 97).  Organizations feel 
obliged to comply with ‘rules’ based on institutionalized norms and beliefs, in order to seek 
legitimacy, achieve fit and become isomorphic with their environments (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) where isomorphism is the homogenization process by which organizations 
facing similar environments, choose to adopt similar practices.   
Organizations conform to institutional pressures through isomorphic processes that can be 
coercive, mimetic or normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Particularly relevant to 
corporate governance is coercive isomorphism, where powerful organizations, states or 
regulatory bodies force organizations to adopt certain forms, processes or actions. This 
could include structuring behaviour based on laws or government regulation.  As noted by 
Zajac and Westphal (2004: 433) “historical change in institutional logics can lead to change 
in organizational policies and practices or to different interpretations of a given policy”.  It 
would include organizations changing their governance practices to meet the SOX 
governance requirements.   It would also capture the heterogeneity in terms of responses to 
these changes expected to occur as long as there is ambiguity in the interpretation and 
application of the legislation. 
Given the results of this study and considering it from an institutional theory perspective, it 
is possible that organizations may have only ritualistically adopted SOX provisions, 
instituting the public, structural elements of SOX requirements to visibly demonstrate 
compliance while decoupling from actual governance practice at the board and senior 
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management levels. Thus, the organization may act in a way that signals compliance with 
the law but in reality does not fulfill the normative aims of the legislation.  In so doing, these 
organizations undermine the ability of SOX to reinstitutionalize strong corporate governance 
codes that protect investors and the broader financial community.  While there have been a 
number of studies that explore organizational decoupling, there have been few that attempt 
to predict when decoupling is more or less likely to occur (Westphal & Zajac, 2001)   
An institutional lens may also allow for the stronger consideration of motivations underlying 
board behaviour.  The results of this study suggest that structural changes alone are not 
strengthening corporate governance as per the aims of SOX; the consideration of why this is 
occurring would necessitate a more detailed study of whether this is willful on the part of 
board members or whether it is a lack of understanding of board charters, a lack of director 
training (either by the board or through independent organizations), an unwillingness by 
directors to go against perceived management power or group preferences, or a fear of 
directors to appear unknowledgeable in front of their peers.  Further research could explore 
these areas as it would provide deeper insight into current governance practices.   
As noted, this study focused on the monitoring role of the board.  There are other roles of 
the board including providing advice to management and resources to the organization 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2008; Lynall et al., 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  Given that SOX was designed to strengthen 
oversight over management by boards, the focus on the monitoring role was determined to 
be appropriate.  However, this does not mean that elements put forward in this study such as 
board independence power could not be further informed in future research that 
conceptually develops how SOX may have impacted all of the functions of the board.      
This study combined differing levels of analysis in the development and testing of board 
independence power, considering information on individual directors, board committees, the 
board, and the full organization.  However, other than information about CEOs, data on 
individual directors (e.g. age, tenure) was aggregated and averaged to the full committee or 
board level.  While it would be very interesting to examine the details of independent 
directors at an individual level and determine whether they have changed over time as a 
result of SOX requirements, that analysis would require a different theoretical approach and 
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a different research question.  I also did not consider the process through which the directors 
were selected and the organizational and social pressures that may influence that process 
(Withers et al., 2012).  Finally, while Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella (2009: 279) 
suggest that “friendship ties…may be a fifth potential source of power for board members”, 
I did not include shared socio-demographic elements between directors in this analysis.  
However, I ascribe to the view that friendship and relational ties between directors on a 
board or committee may be important and suggest that additional works should be done to 
not only consider how directors are connected externally outside the board (the traditional 
governance approach through board interlock research) but also begin to capture shared 
relationships on the home board.  The social network concepts of centrality and density 
could be applied to this idea at the board and committee levels to begin to deconstruct this 
relationship from a purely structural perspective.      
The dependent variable was a measure of board-level corporate governance practices that 
are related, in an inverse way, to shareholder value; it was not a measure of firm 
performance.  While many studies have examined the link between a variety of aspects of 
corporate governance structure and firm performance, the results have been ambiguous 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2009; Hillman et al., 2011) perhaps because of the distance between 
board input and operations at the business unit level (Finkelstein et al., 2009).  Recent work 
has begun to explore the impact of SOX on the governance-performance relationship.  
Bhagat and Bolton (2013: 106) found that “during 2003–2007, the G-Index suggests a 
negative and signiﬁcant relation between good governance and performance. Also, during 
2003–2007, the E-Index suggests an inconsistent relation between good governance and 
performance”.  An extension of this study could look at the impact of SOX changes and 
board independence power on firm performance; however, this would require additional 
theoretical development to explain the relationship including using selected governance 
practices at the board level as a possible mediator between SOX changes and firm 
performance.   
There have been challenges with the indices that have been constructed to measure selected 
governance practices at the board level; however, in the absence of an alternative measure of 
governance practices, the E-Index was selected as it was the most closely aligned with the 
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outcome measure being sought through the research question posed in this study.  The E-
Index is one of the most used widely measures in corporate governance research of the 
strength of governance practices of firms (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014; Bhagat & Bolton, 
2009).  As noted, the results of the study were broadly supported by also conducting the 
analysis with the G-Index (another widely used measure of governance) but the hypotheses 
presented in this study could also be tested using alternate measures such as the Governance 
Score Index (Brown & Caylor, 2006).  This was not attempted in this study due to lack of 
data availability for the measure.  
The use of the board size variable was also a limitation in this study. The variable was used 
in both the EFA and as a control variable for the testing of a number of the hypotheses.  
Given that board size was included in the creation of the board independence power 
construct (specifically as part of board independence structure/prestige power), it was not 
included as a control variable in models that tested the interaction effects or either board 
independence power or board independence structure/prestige power.  As such, an 
endogeneity problem could have been introduced in the analysis given that the board size 
effect was buried in the board independence power measures.  Board size was strongly 
correlated to the board independence structure/prestige power dimension (Table 23) 
suggesting that the board independence structure/prestige power dimension could actually 
just be another measure of size.  Finally, the high correlation between board size and board 
independence structure/prestige power could lead to inflated standard errors.   For this study, 
it was determined important to include the board size variable in the construct as the risk of 
endogeneity could be somewhat mitigated by the inclusion of a robust list of additional 
control variable.  However, future research will test the construction of the board 
independence power construct without the board size variable to see if it impacts the 
analysis put forward in this study.     
This study was very much embedded in legislation, regulatory and stock listing requirements 
related to corporate governance practices in the United States.  As such, it may be capturing 
behaviour that is more reflective of American management practices rather than being 
generalizable to global governance norms.  The sample for this study is from the S&P 500 
and captures many of the world’s largest corporations,  a number of which are headquartered 
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in the United States or perform a significant amount of business in that jurisdiction.  As 
such, the governance requirements in the United States will impact how organizations are 
structured and how they operate.  Given the American bias of this study, a future research 
extension could involve examining governance codes in other countries with major stock 
exchanges (e.g. United Kingdom and the London Stock Exchange, Canada and the Toronto 
Stock Exchange) to see whether the research question of this study is generalizable and 
whether different legislative governance provisions may create different governance 
outcomes.  Similarly, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) have done interesting work on structural 
board and committee conditions for firms in Malaysia and Singapore.  Although their 
primary focus was board size they also did exploratory work around independence levels of 
key board committees.  Boyd, Haynes and Zona (2011) have suggested that culture plays a 
role in whether the mimetic adoption of socially legitimized governance practices are 
successful;  there is an opportunity for an interesting cross-cultural study to determine 
whether adoption levels are influenced by country-specific societal values.  Culture was 
beyond the scope of this study.   
Finally, my sample could have been biased to due to the size of the companies and the 
requirement for them to be listed on the NYSE.  Similar work should be done with small and 
medium-sized firms to determine whether firms of different sizes have fundamentally 
different compositions of their boards and committee structures in terms of size, 
membership and interlocks.   
7.5  Conclusion  
The governance of a corporation is an increasingly difficult task.  This study suggests that 
the mandated SOX structural changes have not led to a strengthening of corporate 
governance provisions in firms in the post-SOX era.  The 2008 global financial crisis, 
precipitated by organizational action motivated by financial greed in the United States, 
suggests that perhaps SOX governance changes were not the right ones to make, or that they 
were necessary but not sufficient to ensure governance decisions associated with protecting 
shareholder value.  Recent work by Joseph, Ocasio and McDonnell (2014) on CEO-only 
boards (boards upon which the only inside member is the CEO) demonstrated that while 
CEO-only boards appear to conform to institutional norms of majority independence, the 
 178  
result is greater CEO entrenchment.  While the crisis could have been the result of 
organizations merely symbolically adopting the SOX structural provisions or even not 
adopting them because of weak penalties and enforcement, this study is perhaps an 
indication that corporate governance reform is not yet getting to the root issue.  There is 
little information to indicate whether independent directors receive the training required to 
be effective monitors or even understand what elements (such as those measured in the E-
Index) for which they should be vigilant.  The understanding of the impact of the SOX 
structural changes on selected board practices would be significantly augmented by better 
understanding how director preparedness and board culture may impact the monitoring of 
management by independent directors.    
The results of this study demonstrate an urgent and ongoing need, from both an academic 
and practitioner perspective to understand what facets of independent board members could 
actually have a tangible, positive impact on governance practices and which are perhaps 
only window-dressing. This provides an opportunity to conceptually and empirically expand 
the consideration of breaches in corporate governances specifically and the role of corporate 
governance more broadly.   
As firms become more complex and less transparent, it will be critical for all organizational 
stakeholders, in particular shareholders, to have their investment protected by independent 
board members who recognize their role on the board and effectively monitor management 
behaviour so that shareholder value is protected.  As noted in this study, a rules-based, 
monolithic approach for publicly traded companies does not appear to have created the 
governance result desired by regulators in the United States.        
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Appendix B:  Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews for Construct Validation 
Questions related to the role/potential power of independent directors of public boards  These questions are not seeking right or wrong answers.  My purpose is to gain your insight related to elements that contribute to a research construct that is being developed that considers the individual and collective power of independent board members.  Boards of directors (boards) of publicly traded companies are usually comprised of management directors and independent directors.  Management members of the board are those elected members of a board of directors who are directly employed by the focal company.  Independent members of the board are those elected members of a board of directors who have not been employees of the focal firm for the past three years, have not had business transactions of $120,000 or more with the focal firm, who are not members of the focal firm’s executive team, and who are not immediately related to current executive members of the focal firm.  Questions: 1. What do you consider to be the most important role of an independent board member of a publicly-traded company?  2. Board independence power is considered to be the cumulative, potential power held by the independent members of the board.  Thinking of this definition, which of these elements (if any) do you feel would make independent board member be seen to have more power on a board: •      Age of the board member •      Length of time on the board •      Sector experience same as the company •      Financial experience •      Alumni from an elite university •      Being on the boards of other companies •      Being a CEO (or former CEO) of another company  
•     Owning a large number of shares of the company on which they are a director •     Chairing/sitting on numerous board committees •     Serving as the lead independent director •     Serving as the board chairperson •     Overall size of the board 
3.       Are there other elements that are not included on the above list that you believe could contribute to the power of independent board members?  4. What do you feel to be the main differences (if any) between the power of management members of the board and the power of independent members of the board?  5. Are there any other comments you would broadly like to make related to the role of independent board members – individually or collectively – based on your experience? 
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